

PREM

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1970 MIDDLE EAST

Cabinet Documents

[illegible]

The above-listed Cabinet documents, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed.

Cabinet documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed Wayland Date 6/6/00

JR Green
Prime Minister's Office Records
Hepburn House, Marsham Street

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 23 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)
unless otherwise stated

I : The Military Situation

Amman

The curfew was lifted for a short time during yesterday morning, but continued Fedayeen action necessitated its reimposition. Beirut telno. 488 suggests that trouble around Amman airport should be expected today.

North Jordan

2. Both the Iraqi and Syrian troops have moved positions, but not so far as to significantly alter the military situation.
3. Israeli sources (FOH 220830Z from Tel Aviv) report Syrian tank strength down to 180-200. There are however reinforcements to the north. Logistic movements have continued. Morale on the Jordanian side is said to be high. Reports of defections from the 40th Brigade are discounted.
4. Tel Aviv FOH 221140Z reports that Iraqi forces have been probing until they made contact and came under artillery fire.

South Jordan

5. Amman tel. No. 639 reports that the Jordanian Army has cleared all resistance to the south except in Madaba.

Israeli Forces

6. Tel Aviv have reported (tel. No. 886) that a considerable redeployment of Israeli forces northwards has taken place, but Mr. Barnes does not consider (tel. No. 887) that this necessarily indicates Israeli intervention. He suggests four reasons for these moves:

- (i) defensive action in case fighting spreads;
- (ii) a warning to Syria, should their penetration into Jordan increase;
- (iii) preparations to force Syrian withdrawal;
- (iv) to ensure that if Jordan is carved up, Israel gets a slice.

No official information has been forthcoming.

The King's View

7. The King has expressed his disappointment (Amman tel No. 639) at the lack of external intervention on his side, and has pointed out that as long as the Syrians remain in North Jordan, they will remain a permanent inducement to the Iraqis to act against his régime, and a source of support to the rebels in Amman and elsewhere.

II : Diplomatic Activity

United Nations

8. UK Mis New York's telegram No. 1998 reports that the Secretary of State saw the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and the UAR. It also records his view that there is no point in holding a meeting of the Security Council now, and that the position should be reviewed after the Arab summit meeting.

Jordanian Representative

9. UK Mis tel. No. 1999 reports the conversation with El Farra. He is opposed to a Security Council meeting because of the Israel-Jordan-US line up to which it might lead, and to the disarray in which it would show the Arabs. He advised waiting until after the Arab meeting, and asked us to pass the record of the conversation to Amman since his own communications are not good.

/UAR Representative

UAR Representative

10. Zayyat agreed with El Farra (UK Mis tel. No. 2000) and said that the question was one for the Arabs themselves. He did not however exclude using the consensus procedure in the Security Council.

French Statement

11. The Presidency of the Republic issued a statement on the afternoon of 21 September, deploring the bloody conflict, and affirming that outside intervention from any quarter creates dangers to world peace. Inspired guidance to the press indicates that this is directed both at the Syrians and at any American military intervention.

UAR Chargé

12. The UAR Chargé d'Affaires called on Sir Philip Adams yesterday, ostensibly to make his acquaintance. He left a copy of a UAR statement about rumours of US troop movements and spoke at length about the apprehensions of his government following these rumours. He remarked that it was being said in the diplomatic community that HMG were actively opposing US plans for intervention in Jordan, and that the Prime Minister would say this very firmly to Mr. Nixon.

Arab Summit Meeting

13. The meeting was at first postponed until later (Jedda tel. No. 559) but radio reports now indicate that it is postponed sine die. According to radio reports a high ranking Arab delegation is now in Amman.

14. Cairo tel No. 1049 assesses the aims of the UAR in the context of this meeting. They are: to prevent outside

/intervention

SECRET

intervention in Jordan; to ensure the survival of King Hussein, since he is the UAR's only possible partner in the quest for a political settlement; to preserve the UAR's relationship with the Palestine resistance; and to prevent the spread of Ba'athism.

15. Sir R. Beaumont considers that the summit is probably unwelcome to Nasser since it will restrict his freedom of action. He also thinks that any Israeli intervention to help Hussein indirectly is likely to destroy his respectability in Arab eyes.

Prime Minister's Message

16. After two drafting amendments, the Prime Minister's message (see para. 14 of yesterday's sitrep) was delivered to Sir R. Beaumont at 1430Z yesterday (Cairo tel No. 1052). The text is as in FCO tel. no. 1216 to UKMis as amended slightly by Cairo tel. no. 1047.

4-Power Appeal

17. Sir Colin Crowe was instructed to discuss such an appeal with his American colleague (FCO tel. no. 1222 to UKMis), after prior discussion with the French. H.M. Ambassadors in Washington and Paris were similarly instructed. The appeal should inter alia condemn foreign intervention in Jordan, urge an end to the strife, call for international medical assistance and seek the early and safe return of the hostages. We have let it be known unattributably that we are working for such an appeal.

18. The French indicated their support (Paris tel. no. 870); this has been confirmed by M. Schumann's letter to the Secretary of State (UKMis tel. no. 2014). Sir Colin Crowe reports however (UKMis tel. no. 2008) that Soviet and US reluctance have brought things to an impasse. The Soviets wished to await the result of the Arab summit, and, although without instructions on the question of a Security Council Meeting or a Four Power

/declaration,

declaration, saw no prospect of agreement on any proposal which did not demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Jordan, including those on the West Bank. The Americans are opposed to any general appeal, and they doubt if the Russians would buy one aimed at Syria alone.

19. The Secretary of State has observed (UK Mis tel. No. 2001) that he agrees with Sir C. Crowe's analysis that we should reconsider how far it is in our interest to continue to press ^{again} for action. The Secretary of State will telegraph/after he has seen Mr. Rogers today.

III : Reactions outside Jordan

UAR

20. Cairo tel. No. 1045 reports an increasingly anti-Hussein press line. An allegation of Jordanian/Iraqi collusion against the Palestinians represents a significant swing in UAR policy against Hussein. Sir R. Beaumont comments that Hussein would have found few friends at the Arab summit.

21. The single press reference to the UK was disparaging.

Iraq

22. Baghdad tel. No. 650 reports that the Iraqis claim to be still working for the release of the hostages, and suggests that a suitable message at some stage might bear fruit. Baghdad tel. No. 651 reports that the Iraqis are likely to remain on the fence, but that they have made gestures towards the Fedayeen.

Sudan

23. Khartoum tel No. 537 reports that the Sudanese are also officially refraining from taking sides, while sympathising with the guerillas.

/USSR

USSR

24. Moscow tel. No. 1092 reports a strong attack in Izvestia on the current US role in the Middle East. Other items merely re-echo previous statements.

IV : H.M. Embassy, Amman

25. H.M. Ambassador was able to take a few hours off when his Counsellor, Head of Chancery and Defence Attaché reached the Embassy yesterday. There is intermittent telephonic contact between the Embassy and their American colleagues. The American fuel situation is now satisfactory.

26. The Embassy report being almost out of beer. Efforts are being made to put this right.

V : Aircraft

TMA DC6, Beirut/Amman/Nicosia, 23 September

27. The prospects for sending the DC6 to Amman today are not good. The intention is to send a chartered Trans-Mediterranean Airways (TMA) DC6 freight aircraft from Beirut to Amman later today with the relief CBO, generator spares, beer and rations for the Embassy, 2½ tons of medical drugs and an RAMC medical liaison officer. The remaining cargo space on this leg has been offered to the ICRC. It is planned that at Amman the DC6 will pick up women and children and take them to Nicosia.

28. TMA have stated their additional terms for carrying evacuees to Nicosia (Beirut tel. Nos. 485 and 486). Beirut have been authorised to agree subject to local legal advice to the form of indemnity against claims from passengers which TMA have requested (FCO tel. No. 409).

/ICRC

28. ICRC Beirut have advised that clearance should be obtained from Al Fatah. Hijazi, a Fatah representative, has said that the situation in Amman is likely to be serious on 23 September and cannot give clearance. TMA are unlikely to be willing to fly against Fatah and ICRC recommendations. Beirut Embassy will discuss with TMA early today (Beirut tel. no. 488). The ICRC will try again for Fatah clearance as soon as conditions in Amman seem more favourable (Beirut tel. no. 490).

29. King Hussein will open Amman airport for medical supplies to be flown in and for departing foreigners to be flown out (Amman tel. no. 638). Amman will report on the state of security at Amman airport in the 0730 telex conference.

30. Amman asked that the TMA plane should arrive at Amman airport not later than 1000 hours. Beirut tel. no. 487 says that clearance has been requested for take-off from Beirut at 1300 to avoid clashing with ICRC flights already cleared. The TMA plane does not arrive at Beirut until 0830 and must then be loaded (Beirut tel. no. 489).

RAF Argosy, Cyprus/Beirut, 23 September

31. An RAF Argosy is to fly the 2½ tons of drugs and the RAMC liaison officer to Beirut to link with the TMA flight. It was due to arrive at 0830, but Beirut have asked that it should remain at Akrotiri until they call it forward (Beirut tel Nos. 487 and 488).

Later Flights Beirut/Amman/Nicosia

32. Beirut have been instructed to arrange for one Middle East Airlines Caravelle or Convair to standby from 24 September

/onwards,

onwards, and to obtain an option on a second trip the same or following day. This would be for a general evacuation of British subjects.

33. The spare cargo space on these aircraft from Beirut to Amman would be available either for ICRC supplies or British medical equipment at present pre-positioned in Akrotiri.

ICRC Flights

34. ICRC have two flights going into Amman today but have said they may not be used for the evacuation of foreigners. Any places must be given to the wounded (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 55).

VI : Evacuation

HMG's Plans

35. The Interdepartmental Ministerial Committee decided that the ICRC should be informed that HMG would like a general evacuation of British subjects set in hand under ICRC auspices as soon as possible.

36. Arrangements have been put in hand to have the necessary aircraft standing by in Beirut on 24 September (see Section V).

37. The TMA DC6 flying to Amman today will be used to bring out 20 women and children. TMA will not take more passengers than they can fit seats for (Beirut tel. no. 489). Mr. Phillips will do his best to see that journalists do not jump the queue.

38. The contingency plan for evacuation through Aqaba is being kept up, in case evacuation by air from Amman falls through.

US Plans

39. The Americans now intend to proceed with the evacuation of those US nationals who wish to leave. They are considering

/evacuation

evacuation by air from Amman, evacuation via Aqaba and, in the worst case, the provision of military protection for evacuation (Washington tel. no. 2800). General Vogt has briefed Mr. Freeman on the present state of American contingency planning (Washington tel. no. 271).

VII : Medical Relief

ICRC

40. The ICRC have no clear picture of the situation in Jordan. Boisard spent only a few hours in Amman on 21 September. He reported that medical needs were immense, but there was no means of getting supplies in. The ICRC building in Amman had been destroyed as well as their radio. ICRC medical staff in Amman had no knowledge of events away from the airfield.

41. The ICRC will seek to obtain the agreement of the Jordanians and the Fedayeen to the ICRC's assuming responsibility for relief operations and safe conduct guarantees for vehicles and personnel.

42. H.M. Consul General Geneva expects the ICRC to stave off the use of military personnel as long as they can. He sees little likelihood of the loaded aircraft in Akrotiri being required in the immediate future or even for several days (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 53).

British Contribution

43. Use will be made of projected aircraft flights into Amman to fly in medical supplies (see Section V).

44. Colonel Ferrie, RAMC has been appointed medical liaison
/officer

officer to the Jordanian armed forces. Sqn. Ldr. Madden has been attached to Beirut Embassy to act as liaison officer with local ICRC representatives.

45. The US Red Cross have issued cards marked "seconded to the ICRC" to American servicemen likely to take part in relief operations. The Director-General of the British Red Cross is doubtful whether his Society can issue papers to British servicemen, but he is prepared to co-operate in the last resort.

46. ICRC have asked for further details of stores, personnel and vehicles available in Akrotiri (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 54).

VIII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

47. There is no news of the whereabouts or fate of the hostages.

Berne Group

48. Boissier remained in Beirut after all. The Berne Group met on the evening of 22 September to consider new PFLP terms (reported in Berne tel. no. 304). The PFLP said that acceptance of the principle of exchange by the Four would bring about the release of the European and Americans who are not dual nationals. Israelis and Americans would be held in a secure place (a hotel in Beirut, according to Boissier) pending further negotiations.

49. The Secretary of State thought these terms a significant advance (UKM is New York tel. no. 2003). Berne Embassy were instructed to urge that the Group's reply should indicate positive interest in a bargain and seek more precise information about the numbers of British, Swiss, Germans and Americans to be released.

/50. At the

50. At the Group's meeting, the American said that his instructions forbade consideration of any deal involving discrimination and that the precise statement of numbers we required implied readiness to accept a discriminatory solution.

51. The Group decided to ask Boissier to extract a precise statement of the proposal including a list giving names and nationalities of all the hostages the PFLP hold. Boissier should suggest that all hostages should be taken without delay to a place of safety (Berne tel. nos. 307 and 308).

IX : Miss Khaled

52. Sir Dingle Foot approached the Home Secretary about a request he had received from a Lebanese advocate claiming to act for Miss Khaled's parents, asking for a private meeting with Miss Khaled. The Home Secretary is likely to reply that under British law, there is no provision for access to someone in Miss Khaled's circumstances. She has not in any case asked to see a solicitor. The Home Secretary is not inclined to use the argument of reciprocity.

*I have suggested
on this point in
view of the risk
of increasing the
danger to the
hostages if there
is publicity for
refusal of access
to Khaled, a Minister
should see Sir D. Foot
and explain the situation
in some detail.*

Ph.

23/9

CONFIDENTIAL

File

September 23, 1970

The Prime Minister was shocked to learn that a number of press men had been the first people to get out of Amman on a Red Cross flight. The Prime Minister wonders whether it would be possible to establish from the ICRC in Berne how this came about.

PJSW

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

File 156

September 23, 1970

The Prime Minister is to appear tomorrow evening at 9.30 p.m. on the television programme "This Week". The programme will be done live from No. 10.

For the purpose of this programme the Prime Minister wishes to have available to him the latest possible telex exchange with Amman. This would enable the Prime Minister to be fully up-to-date on the situation in Amman. This requirement should not, however, be allowed to impede in any way the exchange of necessary information with Amman in the telex talk. I think the best way to meet the Prime Minister's need would be if the telex could be so timed as to enable a copy to be brought by hand to No. 10 to arrive here at 8.30 p.m. If Sir Philip Adams or Peter Tripp were available to bring it over in person so as to go over with the Prime Minister any particular points, this would be especially helpful.

I should also be grateful to have for the purposes of the television interview, before noon tomorrow, the following information:-

- (i) What was the original number of hostages held by the P.F.L.P. as a result of the hijackings?
- (ii) How many of these were British?
- (iii) How many of the hostages have been released?
- (iv) How many of those released were British?

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

It is my understanding that the position on the hostages still held is that they are 8 British subjects (5 passengers and 3 VC 10 air crew), 6 Swiss, 3 Germans and 37 U.S. citizens, two of whom are dual U.S./Israeli nationals. Perhaps you would confirm that this is still the official assessment.

I should also like figures for the total British community in Amman before the most recent crisis began; the figure to which the community was reduced as a result of the first precautionary steps (I believe this was around 130); how many we have since succeeded in getting out.

On a totally different subject, could you please tell me what were the plans, under the previous administration, for reserving certain islands in the Indian Ocean (? Biot?) as possible sites for military use and what has been said publicly about those plans. This information is required in case questions are asked with reference to the Government's policy on protecting the Cape route suggesting that there is no serious British interest in the Indian Ocean area.

P. J. S. M.

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*Latest news is that the
delegation that went to
Amman from Cairo is
now back in Cairo having
seen King Hussein.*

CYPHER CAT/A

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1054

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
23 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

250730Z

*Ph.
23/9*

ADDED TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1054 DATED 23/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO UKAIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV,
AMMAN AND (PRIORITY) TO PARIS, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD,
KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, KUWAIT, JEDDA AND ALGIERS.

ARAB SUMMIT

ACCOUNTS IN TODAY'S PRESS OF WHAT HAPPENED IN CAIRO YESTERDAY
ARE AS CONFUSING AS THE EVENTS THEMSELVES. ARAB DELEGATIONS
CONTINUED TO ARRIVE THROUGHOUT THE DAY TO JOIN WHAT AMMAN
DESCRIBES AS A "WORKING GROUP" RATHER THAN A FORMAL
SUMMIT MEETING. AFTER A SERIES OF MEETINGS FROM WHICH
SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND
THE PALESTINIANS, WERE ABSENT, IT WAS DECIDED TO DISPATCH
A MISSION TO AMMAN CONSISTING OF PRESIDENT MUNAIRI,
THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE KUWAITI MINISTER OF DEFENCE
AND GENERAL SADIQ, THE UAR CHIEF OF STAFF. THE MISSION IS
SAID BY ONE NEWSPAPER TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN FULL POWERS TO
INVESTIGATE THREE PARTICULAR POINTS:

- (I) WAYS OF STOPPING THE FIGHTING, WHICH ACCORDING TO
INFORMATION REACHING CAIRO HAS SO FAR RESULTED IN 15,000
DEAD.
- (II) WAYS OF LIMITING THE CRISIS IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY
FOREIGN INTERVENTION.
- (III) WAYS OF WORKING OUT THE FUTURE OF JORDAN IN THE LIGHT
OF CURRENT EVENTS.

/2. THE LAST

CONFIDENTIAL

2. THE LAST POINT WAS TOUCHED ON BY HAIKAL IN A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN YESTERDAY EVENING, WHEN HE DESCRIBED THE THIRD AIM OF THE "SUMMIT MEETING" AS BEING TO WORK OUT THE BASES FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION MOVEMENT. TO JUDGE FROM A STATEMENT PUT OUT BY THE PLO IN CAIRO THE CHANCES OF CO-OPERATION ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE ARE SLIM. THE PLO SPOKESMAN EXPRESSED A DETERMINATION TO "FIGHT ON TO THE END TO OVERTHROW THE THRONE AND THE MILITARY REGIME", THIS POINT HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED IN THE LOCAL PRESS.

3. THE EMPHASIS IN THE CAIRO PRESS CONTINUES TO BE FAVOURABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS RATHER THAN TO KING HUSSEIN. HAIKAL MADE A POINT OF EMPHASISING IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE BAR WOULD NEVER STAND FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE BY ANYONE WITHOUT ANY BALANCING WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FOUR-MAN MISSION TO AMMAN, GIVEN THE SUDANESE ATTITUDE AS APPROVED BY THE CABINET (KHARTOUM TELNO. 535), AND THE KUWAITI ATTITUDE AS ILLUSTRATED BY THEIR DECISION TO SUSPEND AID TO JORDAN, SUGGESTS THAT THE TUNISIAN WILL HAVE TO PRESS HARD TO MAINTAIN A BALANCED OUTLOOK ON THE PART OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON
PRIORITY TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, AND ALGIERS.

SIR R. BEAUMONT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FCO/WHI. DISTRIBUTION:
H.EASTERN D.

CONFIDENTIAL

DDDDDD

P.A.

M

24/1



24/19.

Prime Minister,

If the PFLP aim
was to destroy any
hopes of a peaceful
M.E. settlement, then
on the basis of this
assessment, they have
largely succeeded.

M.

28/9 (CA) 131

(A) (70)

23.9.70

51c

did

ADVANCE COPIES

JORDAN

B (34)

P.S.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

U.S.

SIR P. ADAMS

MR. GALLAGHER

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (4)

~~HD. A. & T. D.~~

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

~~PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.~~

~~PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)~~

~~SECURITY DEPT.~~

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMNS. DEPT.

CONSULAR D.

FLASH 231935Z SEP

FM NICOSIA

TO FLASH PRODROME LONDON

TO FLASH PRODROME AMMAN

TO IMMEDIATE PRODROME BEIRUT

59423

UNCLASSIFIED 231900Z

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 594 OF 23 SEPTEMBER.
REPEATED TO AMMAN (FLASH) AND TO BEIRUT (IMMEDIATE).

FOLLOWING ARRIVED SAFELY FROM AMMAN:

(1)	MRS. IRENE FERALDI	GREEK	U.N.
(2)	MRS. L. FISHER	BRITISH	
(3)	+ 2 CHILDREN		
	MRS. J. WEAR	BRITISH	
	+ 3 CHILDREN		
(4)	MRS. J. HARRIS	BRITISH	U.N.
	+ 1 CHILD		
(5)	MISS S.M. MC GAREL	BRITISH	

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

CABINET OFFICE: SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

RESIDENT CLERK

*As to 1 of 1 for Amman
(Aptt)*

ADVANCE COPY

(5)	MISS S.M. MC GAREL	BRITISH	
(6)	MISS SPEARES	BRITISH	
(7)	MISS SPEARES	BRITISH	
(8)	MRS. O. FORSTER + 3 CHILDREN	BRITISH	
(9)	MISS A. TOMKINS	BRITISH	
(10)	MISS MARGARET KIDD	BRITISH	
(11)	MRS. G. KNUTSON + 1 CHILD	SWEDISH	U.N.
(12)	MR. V. LORENZ		U.N.
(13)	MRS. D. KARAGUEZIAN + 1 CHILD	RUSSIAN	U.N.
(14)	MRS. M. DAYAL		U.N.
(15)	MRS. M.L. LUSH + 1 CHILD	BRITISH	
(16)	MRS. C.H. HANIEH	AUSTRALIAN	
(17)	MISS A.F.F. CROUCHER	BRITISH	
(18)	MRS. R. SHIBLEY	BRITISH	

18 ADULTS + 12 CHILDREN.

RAMSBOTHAM

SECRET

3

TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN

AT 1400Z ON 23 SEPTEMBER

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL
HAS BEEN RETAINED
UNDER SEC. 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 AND 1977DEN
V1) WE HAVE HEARD ~~_____~~

THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY BUT NOT POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE PFLOP
HAD TRANSFERRED THE HOSTAGES TO THE IRAQ ARMY HQ OUTSIDE AMMAN
YOU MIGHT CARE TO FOLLOW UP THIS WITH ANY SOURCE AVAILABLE

~~_____~~* Passage deleted and
retained under

Sec 3 (4)

J.R. Green 9/6/00

2) AMMAN

THE CARAVELLE MAY FLY INTO AMMAN TOMORROW UNDER ITS OWN COLOURS
THE PALACE HAVE SAID THEY WILL PROVIDE AN ESCORT FROM THE ASSEMBLY
POINT TO THE AIRPORT.

THE OPERATION IS OF COURSE DEPENDANT ON THE AIRFIELD BEING SECURE
TOMORROW AND THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD
NOT BE.

I HAVE NOT YET HEARD WHETHER THE DC6 HAS COME AND GONE, BUT
HOPE TO DO SO SHORTLY. WE HOPE TO HAVE GOT AWAY ON IT 21 BRITISH
AND 9 U.N. OF WHOM 2 ARE BRITISH.
WE HOPE TO GET AWAY TOMORROW. 35 BRITISH PLUS 36 U.N. OF WHOM 20
ARE BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH.

THE BRITISH LEFT AFTER TOMORROW WILL BE IN THREE CATEGORYS

A... THOSE WE CANNOT REACH

B... THOSE WE CANNOT YET SPARE

C... THOSE WHO REFUSE TO LEAVE

CAT C IS SUPRISINGLY LARGE AND INCLUDES NURSES, TEACHERS, RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE WHO CONSIDER IT THEIR DUTY TO STAY AND WHO COULD ONLY BE
REMOVED BY FORCE.

I AM NOW IN POSSESSION OF ROUGH NUMBERS FOR TWO OF THE ABOVE CATS..

A AND C.

THOSE IN A.. NUMBER 42 OF WHOM 17 ARE IN AMMAN AND OTHERS SCATTERED
ABOUT THE COUNTRY INCLUDING 14 AT AQABA WHERE THEY ARE IN NO DANGER.

THOSE IN C.. SO FAR NUMBER 19

THE KING AGREED TO SEE ME YESTERDAY BUT HAD TO CALL IT OFF WHEN
FIGHTING BROKE W OUT AGAIN ROUND THE EMBASSY THERE IS A CHANCE
I MAY SEE HIM THIS EVENING IF I CAN MAKE HONMAR BEFORE DARK.
I.E. WITHIN 90 MINS..

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2.

LONDON

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR INFORMATION PSE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE TOLD BEIRUT OF THE FIRST BIT OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE CARAVALLE.

2. I NOTE THE NUMBERS IN THREE CATEGORIES WOULD IT HELP IF THE BBC WERE TO BCAST AN ANNOUNCEMENT FOR YOU IF SO IN WHAT TERMS ?

Amman

I HAVE YET NOT XXXXXX

I HAVE NOT YET TOLD BEIRUT ABOUT THE CARAVELLE COMING IN & UNDER ITS OWN COLOURS SINCE I RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION ONLY A FEW MINUTES AGO I WILL SEND A FLACH TELEGRAM AFTER THIS CONFERENCE UNLESS YOU FEEL THAT IT WOULD COME QUICKER FROM YOU..

REGARDING YOUR SECOND POINT I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE BBC WERE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY NOT SO FAR IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO GET IN TOUCH BY ANY MEANS POSSIBLE INCLUDING TELEPHONES SOME OF WHICH ARE WORKING SINCE THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS ~~AND NOT SO EARLY~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

I THINK WE SHALL HAVE THAT CARAVELLE TOO FULL TO TAKE EXTRA APPLICANTS.

LONDON

WE WILL SEND THE TELEGRAM TO BEIRUT NOW

MANY THANKS WE VERY MUCH ~~THANK~~ HOPE THE CARAVELLE WILL BE ABLE TO DO TWO TRIPS TOMORROW. IF THIS PROVES POSSIBLE I ASSUME YOU WOULD PREFER TO ORGANISE ONE RPT ONE CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT WITH THE PASSENGERS FOR BOTH FLIGHTS INSTEAD OF TWO SEPARATE CONVOYS IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE JORDANIANS IN ORGANISING ESCORTS . DOES THIS SEEM ALRIGHT ???

KKKKKK

=) Amman

IF WE WILL HAVE TO PLAY THIS ONE OFF THE CUFF AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW BECAUSE I DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY FOREIGNERS INCLUDING BRITISH WE SHALL BE ABLE TO ROUND UP IF WE CAN FILL THE CARAVELLE TWICE OVER THEN CERTAINLY ONE TRIP WILL BE PREFERABLE TO TWO FOR THE REASON YOU MENTIONED IT IS ~~VERY~~ VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH MANY POTENTIAL EVACUEES AFTER DARK AND I THINK I SHALL HAVE TO MAKE A FINAL ~~RECOMMENDATION~~ RECOMMENDATION AT SAY 0600Z TOMORROW.

KKKKKKKKKKKK

~~SECRET~~

LOND
WILCO FINE

3.
SECRET

NOW A FEW QUESTIONS ON LOCAL SITUATION

1. HAS THE CURFEW BEEN LIFTED

2. PRINCESS MUNA HAS TWO REPORTS FROM JORDANIANS THE FIRST THAT THE WOMEN OF THE ROYAL FAMILY HAD LEFT FOR AQABA SECOND THAT THEY HAD EVACUATION HOMMAR BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN BADLY DAMAGED BY SHELL FIRE CAN U LET US HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON EITHER OF THESE QUERIES

3. WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING LIGHT WAE// WATER AND FOOD ?

4. I ASSUME YOU WILL HAVE NOTHING ON THE GENERAL SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE SEEN THE KING

5. ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH MANY OF YOUR COLLEAGUES ?

QMM THE CURFEW HAS NOT RPT NOT OFFICIALLY BEEN LIFTED TODAY BUT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN DESPARATION HAVE EMERGED ON THE STREETS WITH VESSELS AND CONTAINERS IN SEARCH OF FOOD AND WATER AND HAVE NOT BEEN SHOT BY THE PATROLLING TROOPS.

2.. THE QUEEN MOTHER WAS SEEN HEADING SOUTH TOWARDS AQABA A DAY OR TWO AGO BY A JOURNALIST COMING THE OTHER WAY. I HAVE HEARD NOTHING ABOUT HOMMAR BEING EVACUATED AND DOUBT THIS STORY BUT ~~WILL TRXXXXXX~~ WILL CONFIRM ~~WEN~~ NEXT IN TOUCH WITH THE KING.

HE TOLD ME ~~WEN~~ WHEN I LAST SAW HIM THERE THAT THEY HAD BEEN ROCKETTED SEVERAL TIMES AT NIGHT.

3.. THERE IS NO ELECTRIC LIGHT (EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHO HAVE GENERATORS)

WATER IS SCARCE BUT IS STILL TRICKLING ALONG THE PIPES WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN BY SHELL FIRE. FOOD IS SHORT AND GETTING SHORTER. THE EMBASSY IS ALRIGHT FOR THE TIME BEING SINCE WE ARE LIVING OUT OF THE TINS AND PACKETS IN THE SHOP (EMBASSY) I BELIEVE THE RED CROSS HAVE BEEN FLYING IN SOME FOOD AS WELL AS MEDICAMENTS BUT AS SOON AS THE FIGHTING REALLY STOPS A BIG RESCUE OPERATION IS CLEARLY GOING TO BE NEEDED. THE TOWN ~~FEVER~~ IS AN ABSOLUTE SHAMBLES HEARTBREAKING TO ANYONE WHO KNEW IT. ~~BEFORE~~ BEFORE.

4.. MY FIRST SEC. IS ON THE LINE TO HOMMAR AT THE MOMENT I MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO TELL YOU LATER THIS EVENING IF WE HAVE ANOTHER TELECONF.. AT SAY 1630Z IF THIS SUITS YOU?

I SHOULD BY THEN KNOW IF THE DC6 HAS TAKEN OFF, WE NOW KNOW IT ARRIVED ALRIGHT.

5.. I AM IN TOUCH ~~2~~ BY TELEPHONE WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SINCE YESTERDAY. I CAN REACH THE FRENCH AND GERMANS IN AN ESCORTED MILITARY VEHICLE. THE INDIAN CHARGE AND THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR ~~HAVE ALSO BEEN CONTACTED~~ CAN ALSO AND HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE. THE TURK I GATHER IS ONCE MORE IN TOUCH WITH HIS PEOPLE BUT I HAVE NO NEWS OF THE PAKISTANI. THE RUSSIAN IS ALRIGHT **SECRET**

SECRET

London

ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH T/// THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE AND IS HE
LIKELY TO BE ANY HELP WITH EVACUATION ?
WHAT ARE THE INTENTIONS OF YOUR COLLEAGUES REGARDING EVACUATION
OF THEIR NATIONALS ?

PLEASE LET US KNOW AT YOUR NEXT CONF AT 1630Z WHAT WE CAN DO
TO ENSURE THAT YOUR REQUIREMENTS BOTH AS REGARDS EVACUATION AND
THOSE WHO REMAIN ARE MET AS FAR AS POSSIBLE

J. Amato

~~SECRET~~ THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE HAS VERY RECENTLY SURFACED
AND WE PROPOSE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM FIRST THING TOMORROW ~~FROM~~
MORNING. I THINK HOWEVER THAT AT THIS STAGE HE IS UNLIKELY TO BE
OF MUCH HELP AND THAT WE SHOULD BDO BETTER COORDINATING OUR OWN
ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

OF MY COLLEAGUES ONLY THE AMERICANS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER
OF NATIONALS AND THEY ONLY TODAY DECIDED TO START EVACUATING
IN A BIG WAY. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND WILL BE DISCUSSING
JOINT PLANS TOMORROW, MEANWHILE I AM GIVING FIRST PRIORITY TO
FOLLOWING UP OUR OWN INITIATIVE WITH THE CARAVELLE.
YOUR LAST PARA NOTE.D

I HAVE JUST HAD A MESSAGE THAT THE KING IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL
FOR THE INFORMATION RECEIVED IN TEL AVIV TELNOXXXXX RECEIVED
FROM TELAVIV COULD YOU PLEASE KINDLY A PASS TO TEL AVIV
FLASH THE ANSWER TO THEIR QUERY ABOUT KING HUSSEINS INTENTIONS
(THERE TEL NO 895) WHICH ARE TO CLEAR THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH
IF HE CAN BUT NOT PERSUE THE SYRIANS INTO SYRIA
HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF TEL AVIV COULD CONFIRM THAT ~~THE~~ A
BRIGADE REPORTED IN TRED IS INFANTRY AND NOT ~~THE~~ ARMOUR
KKKKKKKK

SECRET

TELEX CONF. WITH AMMAN 16.30 Z 23/17

LONDON

SRI TO RUSH YOU BUT I HAVE JUST BEEN ASKED HAS THE DC6 LEFT AMMAN YET

KKKKKKKKKK

AMMAN

YES LEFT OKAY

A LONDON

4. EVACUATION

WITH REGARDS TO THE CARAVELLES FOR TOMORROW, WE HAVE HEARD FROM BEIRUT THAT THE RUNWAY LENGTH AT AMMAN NOW OPEN TO AIRCRAFT IS ONLY 4000 YDS. IF TRUE, THIS WOULD RULE OUT CARAVELLES AND CONVAIRS. BEIRUT ARE CONFIRMING FROM PILOTS OF ICRC FLIGHTS WHO WENT IN TODAY. IF IT IS CONFIRMED, THEN THEY WILL CHARTER A DC3 FOR TOMORROW ON A SCHEDULE BASIS. THIS AIRCRAFT HAS ONLY 24 SEATS. WE ARE ALSO URGENTLY INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBILITY OF CHARTERING A DC6 IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD FLY TO BEIRUT OVERNIGHT. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO RAISE HOPES ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF THE DC6 MUCH DEPENDS ON A CORRECT REPORT OF THE STATE OF AMMAN RUNWAY.

4. THE GERMAN ~~EMBASSY~~ EMBASSY HERE HAS ASKED FOR NEWS ABOUT EVACUATION OF GERMAN NATIONALS. THEY HAD HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS THAT AN EVACUATION "IS BEING ARRANGED". THEY WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED TO KNOW IF ANY GERMANS HAVE LEFT TODAY AND IF ANY LEAVE TOMORROW. THEY ASKED WHETHER THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN AMMAN COULD PASS MESSAGES ~~THROUGH~~ THROUGH YOU.

5. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A ROSTER OF THOSE WHO LEFT THIS AFTERNOON SO THAT WE CAN ALERT RELATIVES HERE?

08 11/14/84
2 OUR AA DOES NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION. THE LENGTH OF AMMAN AIRPORT A RUNWAY IS OVER 8,000 FT RPT FT NOT YARDS AND THE FULL LENGTH WAS OPERATIONAL THIS AFTERNOON.

TRIDENTS HAVE BEEN LANDING AND TAKING OFF TODAY AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY WHATEVER IN BRINGING IN A CARAVELLE.

4. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY BUT WERE UNABLE TO INCLUDE ANY OF THEIR PEOPLE IN THE SMALL NUMBER OF TOP PRIORITY CASES WE MANAGED TO GET OUT TODAY.

WE HAVE HEARD THAT ONE GERMAN MANAGED TO GET OUT ON A REDCROSS FLIGHT THIS AFTERNOON BUT DO NOT KNOW HIS NAME.

IF THERE IS ANY SPARE CAPACITY ON OUR CARAVELLE (SIC) TOMORROW WE SHALL MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO THEIR MORE DESV DESERVING CASES.

5. NOMINAL ROLL AS FOLLS:-

MR FISHER
CAROL FISHER
ANGELA FISHER

~~MRS LUSH~~

AMANDERXXX
AMANDA CROUCHER
DOMING LUSH (BABY)

MRS SHIBLEY

2 SPEARES DAUGHTERS JAN AND SANDRA

MRS FORSTER AND 3 FORSTER CHILDREN

MRS WEAR AND 3 WEAR CHILDREN

MISS KIDD

MISS TOMKINS

MISS MCGAREL

MRS HANIEH

(ASU AUSTRALIAN)

U.K.

MRS KNUTSSON AND 1 CHILD

MRS KARAGYOZIAN AND 1 CHILD

MRS DAYAL

MRS HARRIS AND ONE CHILD

MR LORENZ

MRS FERALDIS

~~CGN ALTER TO ROAD AND RPT MRS LUSH (HE IS HERE)~~

~~THE TMA XXXXXXX~~

THE TMA DCG CAME IN AT 3.25 LOCAL TIME AND AFTER THE MEDICAL

LONDON

B

MANY THANKS FOR THIS INFORMATION

WE HAVE ALREADY TLD BEIRUT ABOUT THE RUNWAY SO HOPE THE CARAVELLE WILL OPERATE TOMORROW. CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU R AMATEUR STEVEDORES FOR UNLOADING THE AIRCRAFT SO QUICKLY I HOPE THEY DID NOT DRINK ALL THE BEER IF BEIRUT REMEMBERED TO PUT IT ON

AMMAN

IS THERE ANYTHING NEW ABOUT PLACING THE BRITISH MEDICAL RELIEF EFFORT UNDER RED ~~CROSS~~ CROSS AUSPICES???

WE UNDERSTAND FM COL FERRIE WHO ARRIVED SAFELY TOGETHER WITH DAVID COCKH SHOT (CBL)

THAT THERE IS A PLANE LOADED WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN CYPRUS WAITING TO TAKE OFF.

COL FERRIE WAS TOLD AT THE A RAJAF HOSPITAL THAT THE MAIN NEED WAS FOR DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES BUT THAT THEY COULD ALSO MAKE FULL USE OF A FULLY INDEPENDANT MOBL MOBILE FE FIELD HOSPITAL

LONDON

AS REGARDS MEDICAL SUPPLIES THE MOD TEAM WENT TO GENEVA TODAY WHERE THEY HAD AN UNSATISFACTORY TIME. THE ICRC HAVE SAID THEY CANNOT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ACCEPT MEDICAL STORES BY RAF AIRCRAFT EVEN IF OVERPAINTED SO THE STORES ARE BEING UNLOADED AT AKROTIRI AND WILL BE PICKED UP BY THE ICRC IN THEIR OWN TIME AND TAKEN TO AMMAN. A Q

A QUESTION FROM NEWS DEPT

D

SOME OF THE CORRESPONDENTS (KATS) WHO LEFT AMMAN THIS MORNING HAVE REPORTED FROM BEIRUT THAT THE PHILADELPHIA HOTEL WAS QUOTE FLATTENED UNQUOTE DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS ??

AMMAN

D

WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET DOWN TO THE PHILADELPHIA WHICH IS IN A BAD AREA OF TOWN BUT HAVE HEARD THAT THE ANNEX HAS BEEN QUITE BADLY DAMAGED.

I AM AFRAID THAT WE HAVE NO NEWS OF THE ~~CORR~~ CORRESPONDENTS WHO WERE STAYING THERE.

AMMAN

THE AMBASSADOR IS WITH THE KING AT HOMMAR NOW. HE WAS HOPING TO GET BACK FOR THIS CONFERENCE BUT NATURALLY COULD NOT BE SURE. (CHRISTOPHER LUSH HERE)

4
E THINK YOU VERY MUCH DO YOU THINK THE AMBASSADOR WILL WISH TO
HAVE A TELECONF ON HIS RETURN FROM MOHMAK OR WAIT TILL FIRST
CONTACT TOMORROW ? IN ANY CASE WE SHALL WANT TO BE IN TOUCH
EARLY TOMORROW ABOUT EVACUATION

AMMAN

I IMAGINE THAT HE WILL NOT WANT A TELFCONF. UNLESS SOMETHING
REALLY IMPORTANT TRANSPIRED .
MAY I LEAVE IT AT THAT....

WE WILL NOT HAVE A ANOTHER ONE UNLESS
WE SPECIFICALLY ASK FOR IT TONIGHT.
WHAT TIME WDCU WUD YOU LIKE TO BOOK FOR 1ST CONF TOMORROW???

LONDON

F THANKS VRY MUCH WE WOULD LIKE A CONFERENCE TOMORROW AT 0600Z

~~GOOD NITE~~

RGR

FOH 231610Z DEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 231030Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 231600Z SEPT.

1. IDF REPORT JORDAN ARMY UNITS ON OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF WHETHER THEY INTEND TO ENTER TOWN OR BYPASS IT. IT IS REPORTED BY THE IDF THAT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO ENTER THE TOWN. THEY ARE ALSO REPORTED TO BE IN RAMTHA.

2. ALL SYRIAN ARMY TANKS ARE REPORTED OUT OF JORDAN. 187 WERE COUNTED AS THEY WITHDREW. THE SYRIAN 67 BRIGADE COVERED THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN WHO ARE NOW REPORTED AS BEING BACK BEHIND THE SYRIAN BORDER. THERE WAS NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE WITHDRAWING SYRIAN FORCES AND THE JORDAN ARMY WHO APPEARED TO BE FOLLOWING UP THE WITHDRAWAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MOD UK DI 4 AND JISNE.

BARNES.

NNNN

ADVANCE COPIES

JORDAN

33

P.S.

~~P.S.~~ TO MR. GODBER

P.U.S.

SIR P. ADAMS

P.S. to Mr. Royle

MR. GALLAGHER

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (7)

HD. A. & T. D.

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)

SECURITY DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMNS. DEPT.

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

P.S. to Sec of State for Defence

CABINET OFFICE: SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

RESIDENT CLERK

DWF E 112/23

FLASH

FCO

GROUPS 150

CYPHER CAT A

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 231610Z

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 231610Z SEPT RFI FLASH
DA AMMAN JISNE WASHINGTON.

FOH 231610Z DEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

The Middle East

The latest developments are:-

- (i) The DC 6, as I told you, got out of Amman safely. It took 30 women and children of whom 21 were British and 9 U.N. (including 2 British). Arrangements are now in hand to get a further flight in tomorrow. If the flight tomorrow can be made by a Caravelle then it will be possible to get away a further 70 people of whom half will be British and the other half U.N. (including again some British). There is, however, some doubt whether the runway can take a Caravelle and it may be necessary to fall back on another flight by a DC 3 or a DC 6. This will reduce the numbers who can be carried to about 25 or 30. If the 35 British can be got out by Caravelle tomorrow this will only leave 42 whom the Embassy are unable to reach (17 of whom are in Aqaba and in no danger) and 19 who refuse to leave, as well as an unspecified number who cannot be spared.

The movement of people is being described as a "voluntary departure" rather than an evacuation to avoid possible adverse affects on the Jordanian situation. (This

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is a point to be remembered for tomorrow night's T.V. programme).

- (ii) According to an I.D.F. report, Jordan Army units are on the outskirts of Irbid. There is no indication of whether they intend to enter the town or by-pass it, but it is reported by the I.D.F. that it is quite possible for them to enter the town. They are also reported to be in Ramtha. According to the same report all Syrian Army tanks are out of Jordan and 187 were counted as they withdrew. The Syrian Forces in Jordan are now reported as being back behind the Syrian border. The report said that there was no contact between the withdrawing Syrians and the Jordan Army who appear to be following up the withdrawal.

This information, of which we have not *but have no reason to doubt it* had independent confirmation, appears to have been passed to King Hussein. In reply to a query about his intentions the King has said that these are to clear the situation in the north if he can, but not to pursue the Syrians into Syria.

- (iii) Boissier has reported back to Berne about his contacts with the PFLP this morning. The PFLP purported to be indignant at the "enormous conditions" laid down by the Berne group. The PFLP contact threatened

to announce that the PFLP were prepared to hand over a large number of hostages and to place the rest in safety possibly Beirut, with the implication (though unstated) that it would be made clear that it was the obstinacy of the four Governments which had prevented this.

Instructions have been sent to our representative in the Berne group to press again that we should give the PFLP contact our breakdown of the hostages and ask for confirmation of our understanding that their proposal is that in return for an undertaking on our part to hand over through the ICRC the 7 Fedayeen in custody in Switzerland, Germany and the U.K., together with the body, they are willing to hand over to the ICRC all the hostages except two (or possibly 3) and to remove these latter to a safe place where they can be visited by the ICRC.

At the same time our representative has been told to make clear that we see some danger that we may be made to appear obstructive if we fail to follow up vigorously the possibility of progress presented by the latest PFLP offer.

The Swiss Federal Council are reported to have decided that if the PFLP offer means that all the hostages could be taken to a place of safety, then it must be taken up.

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(The Berne group have been informed of this decision but it has not yet been announced publicly.) The Germans are expected to follow the Swiss. At the same time as sending instructions to Berne, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have told our Embassy in Washington to speak again to the Americans.

If we do not get a satisfactory outcome at the Berne meeting tonight it is intended to ask immediately for another meeting tomorrow afternoon with in mind that we will then make one further attempt to persuade the Americans to join us, before a final decision is taken on going ahead with the Swiss and the Germans.

A.

September 23, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN
0600Z 24.9.70

ON
I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO REQUEST YOUR REPLY TO OUR TELEGRAM NO 379
HAVE YOU SOMETHING FOR US ?

AM
I HAVE AS YET NO PARTICULAR COMMENT ON BEIRUT TELNO 496
OTHER THAN THE FOLLOWING:-

X
AS OF NOW THE AIRPORT IS IN SECURE OPERATION AND FULL LENGTH
OF RUNWAY AVAILABLE. SHOULD THE SITUATION CHANGE I WILL IMMEDIATELY
INFORM BEIRUT IN WHICH CASE WE WILL ~~ACTIVELY~~ TRY TO ACTIVEATE
AT LEAST ONE DC FLIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2 OF BEIRUT'S TEL.

WE ARE MEANWHILE COLLECTING AS ~~MANY~~ MANY PASSENGERS AS WE CAN
TO BE AT THE AIRPORT FOR TAKEOFF AT 0900Z.

Y
I WILL PASS YOUR COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF SECURITY IMMEDIATELY
TO BEIRUT

Y
AS REGARDS THE AMERICANS I CANNOT CLAIM TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH
US AMBASSADOR BUT WE ARE INTERMITTENTLY IN TOUCH ~~WITH~~ TELEPHONE
~~WE~~ WITH U.S. CONSUL WHO IS PLANNING TO GET A CONVOY AWAY FROM
THE HOTEL AREA AT APPROX 1100Z HIS PLANS ARE BY NO MEANS
FINALISED AND THE AMERICANS MAY IF THEY CAN REACH ENOUGH POT-
ENTIAL EVACUEES COME IN ON OUR CONVOY AT APPROX 0330Z.

Y
REGARDING PARA 4 OF YR TEL NO 379 I DO NOT AT THE MOMENT ENVISAGE
THE NEED FOR A SECOND FLIGHT BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT
TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER FRIENDLY NATIONALS BUT I WILL REPORT
IMMEDIATELY IF ~~IT~~ IT APPEARS THAT A SECOND FLIGHT COULD USEFULLY
BE LAID ON. RT

FOR AMBASSADOR PERSONALLY FROM MR. TRIPP.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT EVERYONE HERE IS DELIGHTED AT YOUR
SUCCESS IN GETTING THE DC IN AND OUT YESTERDAY, AND SEND
YOU THEIR CONGRATULATIONS. WE ALL WISH YOU AS MUCH SUCCESS
IN TODAY'S OPERATIONS.

SECRET

AMMAN

PLEASE THANK MR TRIPP VERY MUCH FOR HIS MESSAGE. I FEAR THAT YOU AT HOME MAY FIND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE NOT GETTING MORE BRITISH ONTO THESE FIRST FLIGHTS. APART FROM THOSE WHO ARE INACCESSIBLE IT IS PROVING VERY DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE, OR EVEN IN THE CASE OF MY OWN STAFF TO GET ORDERS OBEYED AFFECTING THOSE WHOM WE WISH TO GET OUT. THEY FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD NOT DESERT THE SHIP. THIS IS ADMIRABLE BUT UN-HELPFUL.

I HAVE ~~MANAGED~~ MANAGED TO LOCATED THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR.
~~XXXX~~

HE SURVIVES BUT IS SOMEWHAT IMMOBILE. THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF FIGHTING ROUND HIS RESIDENCE.

WOULD YOU KINDLY PASS TO BEIRUT BECAUSE I THINK YOUR COMMS ARE QUICKER THE INFO GIVEN IN MY 1ST PARA ABOUT THE SA STATE OF THE RUNNWAY.

LONDON

V

YOUR LAST COMMENT WE ARE ALREADY TRANSMITTING (I HOPE) YOUR FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHS TO BEIRUT.

[ED. A PARAPHRASE OF X AND Y. WAS IN FACT SENT FLASH]

LONDON

MRS MICHAEL ADAMS WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY HER HUSBAND IS STAYING IN AMMAN. SHE ASSUMES THERE IS A GOOD REASON BUT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT IT IS.

AMMAN

REGARDING MICHAEL ADAMS HE IS ON THE LIST FOR DEPARTURE TODAY IF WE GET THE CARAVELLE AWAY. REASON FOR DELAY IS THAT HE DREW UP A LIST OF PRIORITYS FOR THE EVACUATION OF THOSE STAYING IN HOTEL AND TYPICALLY PUT HIMSELF NEAR THE BOTTOM.

LONDON

THE LONDON GENERAL MANAGER OF GRINDLAYS HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US AGAIN ABOUT THEIR STAFF IN AMMAN. IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN TELL HIM? CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT MRS. CAIRNS AND FAMILY ARE LIKELY TO BE JOINED BY PAUL. ENJOYES ??

SECRET

AMMAN WE HOPE TO GET THE CAIRNS FAMILY AWAY TODAY

WE RECENTLY HAD A QUERY ABOUT A MISS E.C. VERITY (I FEAR THAT THE RELEVANT TELEGRAM IS BURIED IN A PILE OF PAPER) SHE IS WELL BUT REFUSING TO BE EVACUATEED.

LONDON MANY THANKS WE GATHERED THAT MISS VERITY WAS LIKELY TO REFUSE TO BE EVACUATED BUT WE WILL PASS THE MESSAGE THAT SHE IS WELL TO HER BROTHER IN BRIDGEND, WHO WAS ENQUIRING

AMMAN I THINK I HAD BETTER STAND DOWN NOW BECAUSE TODAY'S OPERATION IS GOING TO NEED A LOT OF ORGANISING AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE STILL LOUSY.

MAY I COME UP AGAIN AT 0700Z

I INTEND TO GIVE FIRST PRIORITY NATURALLY TO EVACUATION AND WILL AT A LATER STAGE CONVEY THE GIST OF MY TALK LAST NIGHT TO THE KING WHICH WAS REALLY PRETTY GENERAL.

LONDON

WE WE WISH YOU ALL THE BEST OF LUCK AND SUCCESS FOR TODAY'S OPERATION.


AGREED, SEE YOU AGAIN 0700Z

SECRET

2
#5

Private Secretary

... I submit a copy of the telex conference with Amman which was conducted at 0515Z.


(A. Ibbott)
Emergency Unit
24 September, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Royle
Mr. Tesn
Mr. Bottomley
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
- Mr. Moon - No. 10
Mr. Maitland - No. 10
Emergency Staff

SECRET

September 24, 1970

The Prime Minister would like to send a message to our Ambassador in Amman expressing his admiration for the conduct of the Ambassador and of the Embassy staff as a whole. I enclose the text of the message which the Prime Minister would like sent. Provided no objection is seen I should be grateful if this message could be sent as soon as possible. If the message is despatched in time we would propose to publish it from here at 4 pm.

P511

I. McCluney Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE
AMMAN EMBASSY

All of us here are filled with the greatest admiration for the cheerful and steadfast way in which you and all your staff have faced the events of recent days. Your reports and advice have been invaluable. And we are particularly grateful for all that you have succeeded in doing despite every danger and difficulty to fly out those wishing to leave Amman. Our thoughts are with you; well done and best wishes.

EDWARD HEATH

September 24, 1970

Subject



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

MESSAGE

24 September, 1970

FILE NO. T92^m/70

Dear Peter,

You will wish to know straight away that at the 1830 telex conference with Amman our Ambassador, Mr. Phillips, passed on a personal message from King Hussein to the Prime Minister.

The text is as follows:

"Sir,

May I express to you my profound gratitude for the sympathy, understanding, friendship and assistance which you showed during the difficult and crucial week through which Jordan passed. At a time of grave danger, we felt we were not alone. We appreciate all you have done for us. We know we can count on your help in our determination to rebuild a new strong and dynamic Jordan. With my repeated thanks, please accept my respect, regards and best wishes."

Yours sincerely
Ian H. Murray.

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

• IMMEDIATE MADRID

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 495

22 SEPTEMBER 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

2217:0Z

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

A REPUTABLE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT HERE HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND BY A VERY WELL - PLACED SPANISH SOURCE THAT WHEN THE UAR FOREIGN MINISTER PAID HIS RECENT OFFICIAL VISIT TO SPAIN, HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW THEIR MISSILE SITES TO WHERE THEY WERE IN ORDER TO GET TALKS STARTED AGAIN.

2. CORRESPONDENT FELT THAT HE HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY FED THIS STORY. IT MAY REPRESENT NO MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO BOOST SPANISH PRESTIGE BY CASTING SPAIN IN THE ROLE OF A POSSIBLE INTERMEDIARY, WITH AN EYE TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT IN EARLY OCTOBER. THIS IS AN IDEA WHICH HAS ALREADY RECEIVED AN AIRING IN THE SPANISH PRESS.

MR. KEEBLE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

NEED

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

HAD

ARABIAN DEPT.

NEED

AMERICAN DEPT.

NEED

NEED

UND

DEFENCE DEPT.

PUSD

NEWS DEPT.

TELETYPE UNIT

RECEIVED (M.A. SEC.)

(M.A. SEC.)

(M.A. SEC.)

(M.A. SEC.)

(M.A. SEC.)

CONFIDENTIAL

BF 30/9/70.

JK
ELK

September 24, 1970

The Prime Minister has seen Madrid Telegram No. 495 of September 22 which reported a foreign correspondent in Madrid informing the Embassy in confidence that according to information from a "well-placed Spanish source, the Egyptians would be willing to withdraw their missile sites to where they were in order to get talks started again". The telegram went on to say that the correspondent felt that he had been deliberately fed this story and that it might represent no more than an attempt to boost Spanish prestige by casting Spain in the role of a possible intermediary with an eye on President Nixon's forthcoming visit.

The Prime Minister has enquired whether this is being followed up with our Embassy in Cairo. I should be grateful to see in due course any comments which our Embassy may have to make on it.

PTM

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Mr. Moon

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN

0700Z 24 SEPTEMBER

AMMAN

SITREP....

240700Z....

APART FROM SNIPERS WHO ARE STILL FAIRLY ACTIVE ROUND THE EMBASSY AMMAN IS COMPARATIVELY QUIET TODAY. THE AIRPORT AND AN APPROACH TO IT ARE OPEN.

EVACUATION....

WE NOW HAVE OUR CONVOY LAID ON TO LEAVE FOR THE AIRPORT BETWEEN 0800Z - 0830Z

WE HAVE ALSO MANAGED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICANS FOR AN ESCORTED CONVOY TO LEAVE THE HOTEL (CONDITIONS PERMITTING) AT ABOUT 1200Z

I HOPE WE MAY BE ABLE TO GET STRAGGLERS (IF ANY) FROM OUR CONVOY ONTO THE AMERICAN ONE.

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FLASH THE ABOVE INFO TO BEIRUT.

I AM EVACUATING CERTAIN MEMBERS OF MY STAFF BY TODAYS FLIGHT IF IT GETS AWAY INCLUDING-GRAY (COMMERCIAL) BILL PINK (CBO) HIGGS (SECURITY OFFICER) GREENE (A.O.) MACDOUGALL (FORMER A.O.) MISS BOWMAN MISS COPLAND AND MISS KARTELEW.

I WILL RECONSIDER POSITION OF EMBASSY STAFF LATER AFTER THIS LOT GETS AWAY.

APART FROM RECEIVING FLASH I HAVE NO MORE FOR NOW
IF YOU WISH TO CONTACT ME LATER OR IF I WSH TO CONTACT YOU FOR TELECONF. WE CAN DO SO AT SHORT NOTICE.
WE WILL GET BACK TO THE JOB....

— 2 —

LONDON

REF OUR ~~LAST~~ LAST TELEX CONF IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WANT
TO TELL US ABOUT YOUR CONFERENCE WITH THE KING ?

MMAN

~~YES~~ AMBASSADOR HAS FINISHED FOR THE TIME BEING

Mr. Moon

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN

0700Z 24 SEPTEMBER

AMMAN

SITREP.....

240700Z.....

APART FROM SNIPERS WHO ARE STILL FAIRLY ACTIVE ROUND THE EMBASSY AMMAN IS COMPARATIVELY QUIET TODAY. THE AIRPORT AND AN APPROACH TO IT ARE OPEN.

EVACUATION.....

WE NOW HAVE OUR CONVOY LAID ON TO LEAVE FOR THE AIRPORT BETWEEN 0800Z - 0830Z

WE HAVE ALSO MANAGED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICANS FOR AN ESCORTED CONVOY TO LEAVE THE HOTEL (CONDITIONS PERMITTING) AT ABOUT 1200Z

I HOPE WE MAY BE ABLE TO GET STRAGGLERS (IF ANY) FROM OUR CONVOY ONTO THE AMERICAN ONE.

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD FLASH THE ABOVE INFO TO BEIRUT.

I AM EVACUATING CERTAIN MEMBERS OF MY STAFF BY TODAYS FLIGHT IF IT GETS AWAY INCLUDING GRAY (COMMERCIAL) BILL PINK (CBO) HIGGS (SECURITY OFFICER) GREENE (A.O.) MACDOUGALL (FORMER A.O.) MISS BOWMAN MISS COPLAND AND MISS HAFTELEN.

I WILL RECONSIDER POSITION OF EMBASSY STAFF LATER AFTER THIS LOT GETS AWAY.

APART FROM RECEIVING FLASH I HAVE NO MORE FOR NOW
IF YOU WISH TO CONTACT ME LATER OR IF I WSH TO CONTACT YOU FOR TELECONF. WE CAN DO SO AT SHORT NOTICE.
WE WILL GET BACK TO THE JOB.....

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 hours on 24 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

I : The Military Situation

Amman

Amman remained quiet throughout 23 September and a number of aircraft were able to fly in and out. There have been radio reports of isolated shelling, and Israeli sources reported (FOH 231030Z) that the Army was still shelling isolated pockets of resistance.

North Jordan

2. The same Israeli sources report Syrian losses in the North, and that after taking heavy punishment from the Jordanians, some Syrian units are being withdrawn. Radio reports also say this. The Israelis assert that the Syrian withdrawal was due to Arab and Soviet pressure, and to the fear of Israeli and US intervention. Further checking has revealed that the amount of armour on both sides is lower than originally estimated.

3. Iraqi forces are reported as remaining in Jordan without taking any action. Baghdad tel. no. 654 confirms this.

Israeli Movements

4. Tel Aviv tel. no. 896 reports that the build up of Israeli forces in the north-east of the country continues and is now at the level of four brigades or equivalent. Tel Aviv tel. no. 897 reports on an Israeli cabinet meeting at which, it is understood, no firm decision was taken. The balance of opinion in the cabinet, including that of General Dayan, is thought to be against Israeli intervention.

II : Diplomatic Activity

Anglo-French Statement

5. Paris tel. no. 881 reports the French reaction to the Secretary of State's idea of a joint statement. The French official view is broadly favourable, with the reservation that such an appeal might imply the collapse of the four power machinery. However, they broadly concur with the proposed text (FCO tel. no. 1222 to UKMis New York, para 3).

M. Schumann's views will now be sought.

New York

6. Sir Colin Crowe has reported (UKMis tel. no. 2022) that he was asked to call on the President of the Security Council yesterday. The President told him that he had seen Malik (USSR) who had said that he doubted the appropriateness of a Four Power meeting, but that if any statement were to issue from one, it would have to include a reference to Israeli withdrawal. Sir C. Crowe briefed the President on his own consultations; he believes that the President's ^{aim is} merely to brief himself, and to ensure that the Security Council is not overlooked.

7. New York's press line is contained in UKMis tel. no. 2023.

Arab Summit

8. Cairo tel. no. 1054 reports a degree of confusion surrounding the summit. The outcome of a series of meetings, from which several delegations were absent, was the despatch to Amman of a mission consisting of President Numeiri, the Tunisian Prime Minister, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defence, and General Sadiq. The mission, which is reported on the radio as having already visited Amman, is charged with stopping the fighting, limiting the crisis so as to prevent foreign intervention and finally with finding a modus vivendi for Jordan in the future. Sir R. Beaumont suggests that the Palestinian reaction has been such as to make slight its chances of success.

NATO

9. UKDel Nato tel. no. 506 reports that Nato is to discuss the situation at this morning's Council meeting. Background for a UK statement has been sent (FCO tel. no. 327 to UKDel).

USA

10. The Secretary of State spoke yesterday with the President and Mr. Rogers. Washington tel. nos. 2820 to 2822 report his subsequent remarks to the press.

III: Reactions outside Jordan

UAR.

11. Cairo continue to report (tel. no. 1054) a pro-Palestinian line in the UAR press although the PLO's most extreme remarks do not appear to have been quoted.

Iraq

12. Baghdad report (tel. no. 654) indications that the Iraqis believe that the days of the Jordanian monarchy are numbered. There are also press reports of volunteers being sent to Jordan, although no large-scale movements have been seen, and of a recall from leave of members of the Salahuddin forces. There appears to be a limited state of alert in Baghdad.

China

13. Peking report a government statement (tel. no. 613) reiterating Chinese support for the guerillas and against a political settlement. Mr. Denson's analysis is that the Chinese have no wish to get directly entangled in the Middle East, and while they are likely to continue to supply revolutionary movements, such support will be covert. The Swiss Chargé is also reported as pursuing his quest for Chinese intervention on behalf of the hijacked (tel. no. 614). Mr. Denson thinks that the Chinese are opposed to hijacking, but whether they have made this view known is not clear.

/USSR

SECRET

USSR.

14. Moscow report (tel. no. 1096) that the Soviet press continues to report the events in Jordan without mention of alleged Syrian involvement. US preparations for a rescue operation are said to be no more than a cover for military intervention. Telegram no. 1097 reports an article strongly condemning hijacking in general and the activities of the PFLP in particular.

IV : H.M. Embassy, Amman

15. The relief CBO and the spares for the generator have arrived. Supplies of food are adequate for the time being.

V : Evacuation

General

16. The TMA DC6 to Amman on 23 September brought out 21 British and 9 UN women and children. Two of the UN group were British. Today it is hoped to evacuate a further 35 British and 36 UN, of whom 20 are British or Commonwealth. After today it is expected that those left will be

- (a) those the Embassy cannot reach (roughly 42 of whom 17 are in Amman and the others elsewhere in Jordan, including 14 at Aqaba, where they are in no danger);
- (b) those the Embassy cannot spare; and
- (c) those who consider it their duty to stay and who could only be removed by force (so far about 19).

17. Plans to send a second aircraft to Amman yesterday were dropped, as it would have been difficult to persuade the Jordanians to lay on a second convoy to fill the aircraft before darkness.

18. An ICRC aircraft which took medical supplies to Amman brought out able-bodied journalists as well as some women and children.

/Plans

SECRET

Plans for Evacuation, 24 September

19. According to information reaching airlines the runway at Amman airport is at times limited to 4,000 feet because of firing at the southern end. The aircraft to be used today will depend on answers about the state of the runway, which Beirut Embassy have asked for by 0700 (tel. no. 496). (As at 0705 Amman have reported that the runway is clear, and a message has been passed to Beirut accordingly).
20. A Middle East Airlines Caravelle has been hired to be available at Amman at 1000 hours, subject to confirmation that the full length of the runway will be available.
21. By way of backstop and in case additional capacity is required two DC3 aircraft of ADCO have been chartered. One of these can be at Amman at 1000 hours and could make one flight to Beirut and a second to Nicosia. The other DC3 would be available at Amman during the afternoon and would make one flight to Nicosia. This aircraft is in Cyprus and its servicability is being checked.
22. If the full length of Amman runway is not available and all 70 are to be evacuated, the first DC3 must leave Beirut not later than 0730 (Beirut tel. no. 496).
23. RAF aircraft are being positioned to lift 100 evacuees from Nicosia to Gatwick (i.e. 30 at present in Nicosia and 70 to be brought out today) and, if necessary, to take 35 of today's evacuees from Beirut to Nicosia (MODUK Air 232128Z).
24. MCD have not been offering journalists any hope of free lifts on RAF aircraft (MODUK 221850Z to HQBFNE).
25. The US Embassy in Jedda are being asked if there would be space on any Saudi aircraft they may charter to bring Americans out through Aqaba to pick up the 14-17 British already there.

/Aqaba

SECRET

Aqaba Route

26. The Israeli press surmised from our enquiries about accommodation in Eilat that we were making contingency plans for evacuation via Aqaba/Eilat.

27. It was established that it should be technically possible for a Hercules to land at Eilat, but a fully laden aircraft of this type might have difficulty. The Israelis agreed in principle to such flights. Tel Aviv Embassy suggest that it might be safer, easier and more comfortable to send the evacuees by air-conditioned coach to Lod.

ICRC

28. ICRC have said informally they do not see how they could agree that evacuation arrangements should be under their auspices. For aircraft to operate under ICRC colours, clearance would be necessary from both parties to the conflict and there would be difficulty in increasing the number of ICRC aircraft operating into Amman. The ICRC do not want to take up our offer of spare space on our MEA aircraft (C.G. Geneva tel., no. 56).

29. Amman Embassy will be in touch with the local ICRC representative, who has reappeared, but they do not think he will be of much help over evacuation.

US Plans

30. The American Ambassador in Amman has told Mr. Phillips that he has decided to evacuate all inessential members of his staff and to advise the American community to leave as soon as possible. (0945 telex).

31. From an evacuation notice broadcast last night by VOA (and once by the BBC, at the Americans' request) it appears that the Chinese, Germans, Dutch and Italians are invited to participate in the American evacuation beginning today.

/VI

VI : Medical Relief

Amman

32. Medical supplies were aboard the ICRC aircraft and the TMA DC6 which arrived in Amman yesterday.

ICRC

33. ICRC Geneva informed a MOD delegation, who called with details^{of}/material and personnel in Akrotiri, that the ICRC were concentrating on help offered by Arab governments. The Palestinians were objecting to help from certain governments, particularly the British and US governments. There seems little likelihood of their accepting our offer until the conflicting parties agree to it. An ICRC delegation was due to leave yesterday for Amman. (C.G. Geneva tel. no. 57).

Save the Children Fund

34. SCF supplied 10 tons of blankets and medical supplies to the Jordanian Embassy for despatch yesterday by air to Amman or Aqaba (FCO tel. no. 377 to Amman).

Israel

35. The Israeli Minister of Health announced his country's readiness to treat Jordanian war casualties in Israeli hospitals (Tel Aviv tel. no. 898).

Abu Dhabi

36. The Director of the Abu Dhabi Palace Office has apparently agreed, under PFLP pressure, to provide a surgical team and medical supplies, together with financial aid. Subject to the Ruler's confirmation, it is the intention to fly the team and supplies direct to Amman (Abu Dhabi tel. no. 245).

VII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

37. While there is no hard news on the whereabouts of the

/hostages,

hostages, it has been indicated to sources in Beirut that the PFLP may have transferred the hostages to the Iraq Army HQ outside Amman.

Berne Group

38. Mr. Midgley has reported (Berne tel. no. 310) that M. Boissier has been unsuccessful in persuading his contact with the PFLP to negotiate on the basis of the letter in Berne tel. no. 308. He also reported that the PFLP were threatening to announce their ~~terms~~ to the press in such a way as to put the blame for the delay in reaching agreement solely on the four governments concerned.

39. As a compromise, Boissier proposed a form of words (text in tel. under reference) based on the PFLP's first proposal (Berne tel. no. 304). Mr. Midgley recommended a further proposal (Berne tel. no. 311) which would tell the PFLP the number of each nationality which we understood them to hold. He was instructed (FCO tel. no. 189 to Berne) to propose a Four-Power message on this basis. At the same time Washington were asked to discuss developments with the Americans, in particular the news that some more of the Americans may hold Israeli passports.

40. The Group was unable to agree to a letter on the lines of Mr. Midgley's instructions, but finally the Four were able to agree ad referendum a letter to Boissier, (Berne tel. no. 313), subject to a confidential guidance (Berne tel. no. 314).

Mr. Midgley makes it clear however that, if the letter is not agreed, the Swiss and Germans are likely to strike their own bargains.

Secretary of State's Discussions

41. We await a report (see Washington tel. no. 2817) on the Secretary of State's discussions with Mr. Rogers on the Berne

Group proposals.

VIII : Leila Khaled

42. The Home Office and other Departments concerned are to be informed if we hear from Berne or Amman that any Arabs have left for this country for the purpose of having access to Miss Khaled.

IX : ICAO

43. Western European ICAO Council members plus Canada met informally in Paris at the invitation of the Americans to hear an explanation of the US draft resolution for the ICAO Council on aircraft hijacking. No collective conclusions were reached (Paris tel. nos. 872 and 873).

TELEPRINTED CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN AT 0930Z on 24/ix
CONFIDENTIAL

I SHALL NOW ATTEMPT TO GIVE SOME DISCRIPTION OF MY TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN AT HOMMAR LAST NIGHT.

IT WAS NOT VERY PRODUCTIVE EITHER OF FACTS OR IDEAS AND THIS ACCOUNT MAY BE RATHER INCOHERANT SINCE WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF GETTING OFF A CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARMY ARE BACK AT THEIR OLD GAME OF BLASTING OUT SHIPERS WITH ARTILLERY AND THE MAIN ARMOURMENT OF TANKS.

FOR BREVITY I WILL TABULATE THE POINTS THAT EMERGED.

- A.. THE KING HAS RECOVERED HIS NERVE AS A RESULT OF HIS SUCESS IN DRIVING BACK THE SYRIANS AND ONCE AGAIN SURROUNDING IRBID. HE MAY INDEED BY NOW HAVE TAKEN IT.
- B.. HE SPENT SOME TEN MINUTES JUSTIFYING THE AMMAN MASACRE ("A CANCER OPERATION THAT HAD TO BE PERFORMED TO SAVE JORDANS LIFE"). AND SOME TWENTY MINUTES DESCRIBING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SYRIANS.
- C.. RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HAD NECESSATATED AN ALL OUT MILITARY ATTACK ON THE FEDAYEEN LAY AT THE DOOR OF THE TWO FACED POLITICIANS WHO HAD ENCOURAGED AND PROTECTED THEM WHILE PRETENDING TO BE LOYAL SERVANTS OF THE KING. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDED AND WOULD GET FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE WAS A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THERE WOULD BE NO RETURN (SIC) TO PARTY POLITICS. EVENTUALLY A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MIGHT BE RECREATED.
- D.. THE KING DISAGREED WITH ME WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT MIGHT BE BADLY WOUNDED BUT WAS FAR FROM DEAD. HE SAID IT COULD NOT SURVIVE A "BROKEN BACK" HE SCOUTED MY SUGGESTION THAT IT WOULD SURVIVE AND RECOVER IN SYRIA HE THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT FALL AS A RESULT OF THEIR REVERSE IN JORDAN. THE BAATHIST REGIME BOTH IN SYRIA AND IRAQ MUST HAVE BEEN DISCREDITED BY RECENT EVENTS.
- E.. THE KINGS RELATIONS WITH NASSER WERE UNDER SOME STRAIN AND HE PARTICULARLY RECENTED THE REPROACHFUL TONE ADOPTED BY THE U A R CHIEF OF STAFF WHO HAD VISITED HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM TUNISIA SUDAN AND KUWAIT AND THE U A R AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN MOST UNHELPFUL THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS HOWEVER THE DELEGATION HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT THE TERMS WHICH THE KING HAD WORKED OUT WITH ABU AYYAD (THE CAPTURED FEDAYEEN DEPUTY LEADER) FOR A CEASE FIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN FROM THE TOWNS AND REFUGEE CAMPS BACK TO THE BORDER AREA WITH ISRAEL.

F.. SAMIR KHATIB ANOTHER FEDAYEEN LEADER CAPTURED WAS A "GOOD PALESTINIAN" AND HAD PROVED MOST COOPERATIVE HE WAS NOW PROVIDING A USEFUL HELP AT JORDAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE HQ. (2)

G.. I KEPT TRYING TO GET H.M. TO FOCUS ON THE URGENT PROBLEM OF RESTORING LIFE TO THE DEVASTATED CITY. THE DEAD MUST BE BURIED THE WOUNDED TENDED FOOD SOMEHOW BROUGHT IN WATER MADE TO FLOW AND SOME BASIC FACILITIES RESTORED IN PARTICULAR ELECTRICITY. THE KING SAID ALL THIS WAS VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND AND HE HOPED TO START THE PROCCES OF RESTORATION AS SOON AS IT WAS PRACTICABLE. FEDAYEEN WERE STILL RESISTING IN SOME

AREAS. I SAID SURELY RESTORATION COULD START IN SOME OTHER AREAS' THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS GOING ON WOULD INCREASE POPULAR RESENTMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN WHO CONTINUED TO RESIST DRAW THE ARMY'S FIRE AND POSTPONE HELP. THE KING REITERATED HE WOULD START THE PROCCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

H.. THE KING CONCLUDED BY THANKING H.M.G. FOR THEIR MORALE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS AND ALSO FOR THEIR PROMPT RESPONSE TO HIS APPEAL FOR MEDICAL AID HE NEW THAT ~~WE~~HAD TEAMS STANDING BY AND THAT AN RAMC LIASON OFFICER HAD ARRIVED. HE HOPED THAT ICRC UMBRELLA WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH LONGER TO UNFOLD.

London

MANY THANKS FOR THIS EXTREMELY USEFUL SUMMARY

VDO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE CARAVELLE HAS LANDED AND ~~WHETHER~~ IT HAS AGAIN TAKEN OFF ????

AMMAN

SORRY I DO NOT YET KNOW THIS BUT THE CONVOY LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT SOME 50 MINS AGO. MY CONSUL AND A.A. ACCOMPANIED IT AS THEY DID YESTERDAYS CONVOY. WE CANNOT EASILY CONTACT THE AIRPORT AND I WILL HAVE TO WAIT. ~~YES AND AS SOON AS I SPEAKING~~

WE ARE BEING FLOODED WITH APPLICATIONS FOR EVACUATION FROM A PATHETIC NUMBER OF APPLICANTS TO WHOM I CANNOT GIVE PRIORITY OVER OUR OWN AND COMMONWEALTH AND AMERICAN PASSENGERS. ~~AMMAN~~

London

AS REGARDS THE KINGS ASSESSMENT I FULLY SHARE THE DOUBTS WHICH YOU EXPRESS AND LATER ON TODAY OR EARLY TOMORROW WILL HAVE SOME THOUGHTS TO PUT TO YOU FOR YOUR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND COMMENTS

AS REGARDS THE ICRC AND THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION.

WE ARE GLAD THAT THE KING REALISED THAT WE HAVE STOCKPILED A LARGE ~~AMOUNT~~ QUANTITY OF MEDICAL STORES IN CYPRUS. WE HAVE ALSO POSITIONED THERE IN A LARGE ~~AMOUNT~~ MEDICAL STAFF FULLY TRAINED TO OPERATE IN THE S CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OBTAIN IN AMMAN

UNFORTUNATELY OUR DELIGATION TO GENEVA YESTERDAY MET A BLANK REFUSAL BY THE ICRC TO CONTEMPLATE & ALLOWING BRITISH MEDICAL PERSONNEL & EVEN UNDER THEIR UMBRELLA TO GO INTO JORDAN. WE ARE CONSIDERING URGENTLY WAYS OF CIRCUMVENTING THIS EMBARGO PERHAPS BY APPEALS TO SOME ARAB GOVTS. IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE YOUR MENTIONING THIS TO THE KING WITHOUT HOWEVER AT THIS STAGE. LANDING THE ICRC COMPLETELY IN THE WHAT-NOT BUT THERE IS VERY STRONG FEELING HERE THAT THE ICRC BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF HUMANITARIAN HELP. THE ICRC MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF THE FEDAYEEN AND WELL OF THE JORDAN & GOVT BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE THEM & UMBRELLA TO BRITISH DOCTORS OR NURSES

AMMAN

THE REPUTATION OF THE ICRC HERE STANDS PRETTY LOW T WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVT. AND I DO NOT THINK THE FEDAYEEN PIN THEM IN MUCH EITHER RATHER THAN LEAVE THE WOUNDED TO SUFFER I SHOULD PREFER THAT THE OPERATION CAME IN UNDER THE UNION JACK. AND HANG EVERYBODY. ~~WATERXXX~~

THE JORDANIAN GOVT. WOULD CERTAINLY AGREE.

London

THIS IS A POSSIBILITY WE ARE CONSIDERING. BUT MINISTERS WILL NEED TO BE REASSURED THAT BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT AMMAN AIRPORT WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND STORES WOULD NOT BE RUNNING UNACCEPTABLE RISKS
COMMENTS PSE

AMMAN

AS THE SITUATION IS AT PRESENT I THINK THE JORDANIAN GOVT. COULD ~~GUAR~~ GUARANTEE THE SAFE LANDING AND DISPERSAL OF FULLY SELF CONTAINED MEDICAL TEAMS. BUT I FULLY UNDERSTAND MINISTERS NEED FOR RE-ASSURANCE. THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE ADVANCE PUBLICITY AND EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THE TEAMS HAD COME TO TREAT EVERYBODY REGARDLESS OF WHOSE SIDE THEY ARE ON AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE COME IN UNDER NATIONAL COLOURS IS BECAUSE ANY OTHER WAY OF OPERATING WOULD IMPOSE INTOLERABLE DELAY.

I HAVE DRAFT SITREP PREPARED BY MY D.A. WHO REACHED EMBASSY THIS MORNING ALSO MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAS JUST ARRIVED THE SEIGE HAVEING BEEN LIFTED ON HIS EMBASSY THIS MORNING.

I WILL NOT NOW SEND A SITREP BEYOND ~~BE~~ SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARMY IS IN ACTION IN ONE OR TWO PARTS OF AMMAN AGAINST ISOLATED RESISTANCE IN GENERAL IT IS QUIETER THE ARMY ARE IN CONTROL OF MOST AREAS AND ABOVE ALL OF THE NORTHERN APPROACH TO THE AIRPORT AND OF THE AIRPORT ITSELF.

Private Secretary

c.c. Mr. Battiscombe

Mr. Daunt

Sir P. Adams

Mr. Tripp

Emergency Unit

At the 1330 telex conference with Amman Mr. Phillips said he had just received a personal message from King Hussein to the Prime Minister in the following terms:

Sir,

May I express to you my profound gratitude for the sympathy, understanding, friendship and assistance which you showed during the difficult and crucial week through which Jordan passed. At a time of grave danger, we felt we were not alone. We appreciate all you have done for us. We know we can count on your help in our determination to rebuild a new strong and dynamic Jordan. With my repeated thanks, please accept my respect, regards and best wishes.

(P.R.H. Mincholliffe)

24 September, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

26/9

Am.

25/9

(1)

TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN AT 1600Z

AMMAN

THE CONSUL WAS ABLE TO VISIT THE EIGHT RELEASED BRITISH HOSTAGES THE 5 SWISS AND 2 GERMANS FOR AN HOUR THIS AFTERNOON. PERSONAL MESSAGES ARE ABOVE TOGETHER WITH A LIST OF THE SWISS AND GERMAN WHICH YOU MIGHT LIKE TO PASS TO ~~BERNE AND BONN~~ AND ~~BONN~~ TO BERNE AND BONN.

ALL 15 HOSTAGES SAID THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE JORDAN TOMORROW IF THIS WAS POSSIBLE AND WERE ~~DIPLA~~ THAT THEY WOULD ~~NOT~~ WANT TO BE FLOWN TO BEIRUT BECAUSE OF THE PFLP PRESENCE THERE. THEY ARE CONSCIOUS THAT THEY ARE PRISONERS WHO HAVE BEEN SPRUNG BY THE JORDAN ARMY NOT VOLUNTARILY RELEASED BY THE PFLP. THE JORDANIANS SAY THAT THEY ARE HAPPY FOR US TO ARRANGE TO FLY THE HOSTAGES OUT. WE HAVE NOT YET CONTACTED THE GERMANS HERE BUT ARE SURE THEY WOULD LIKE US TO DO THIS. THE SWISS HAVE NO LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE. YOU MAY HOWEVER BE ABLE TO ASK THE TWO GOVTS. THEIR VIEWS ON ACCEPTING BRITISH FACILITIES FOR EVACUATION.

GIVEN THE NEED TO KEEP DETAILS OF THE PASSENGERS ON THIS FLIGHT SECRET WE WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE DC3 CHARTERED TOMORROW TO EVACUATE THE AQABA GROUP TO LAND AT AMMAN ON ITS RETURN ~~JOURN~~ JOURNEY AND PICK UP THE HOSTAGES.

THE HOSTAGES WERE HELD IN A HOUSE IN ~~JEBEL MUSA~~ JEBEL ~~MUS~~ HUSSEIN FOR THE PAST EIGHT DAYS THIS MORNING THE TWO PFLP GUARDS IN THE HOUSE LEFT AND DID NOT LOCK THE DOOR. WHEN THE JORDAN ARMY TURNED UP THEY REALISED THAT THEY WERE FREE.

THEY SAY THAT THEY WERE PROPERLY TREATED BY THE PFLP THROUGHOUT THERE WERE NO CASES OF PHYSICAL MALTREATMENT AND ONLY ONE OF THREATS BEING USED TO FRIGHTEN ONE OF THE MEN WHICH OCCURED WHILE THEY WERE STILL ON THE AIRPLANE.

CAPT. GOULBORNE COMMENTED THAT HE PERSONALLY SYMPATHISED WITH THE FEDAYEEN IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

AL

ALL 15 HOSTAGES WERE IN EXCELLENT SHAPE AND ARE BEING WELL LOOKED AFTER BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY

THEY ARE PROBABLY SAFER AND ARE CERTAINLY LIVING MORE COMFORTABLY THAN THEY WOULD BE IF THEY WERE WITH US.

London

WE ARE DELIGHTED WITH THIS EXCELLENT NEWS THE PERSONAL MESSAGES ARE ALREADY BEING TELEPHONED TO THOSE CONCERNED. WE NOTE THE WISH OF THE 15 NOT TO FLY TO BEIRUT AND ARE URGENTLY INVESTIGATING WAYS OF FLYING ~~THEM~~ THEM OUT OF AMMAN TOMORROW PROBABLY DIRECT TO CYPRUS AND THENCE TO DESTINATIONS OF THEIR CHOICE. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU LATE ABOUT THIS.

HAVE THE RELEASED HOSTAGES ANY NEWS OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE OTHERS?

THERE IS IN BEIRUT TELNO 508 A DISTURBIN G REPORT ABOUT ONE BRITON AND ONE GERMAN MISSING FROM THE PHILADELPHIA HOTEL. HAVE YOU ANY INFORMATION ON THIS IF NOT CAN YOU GET SOME KKKKK

AMMAN

THE RELEASED HOSTAGES POINTED OUT TO THE JORDAN ARMY THIS MORNING A HOUSE STILL IN FEDAYEEN TERRITORY IN WHICH THEY HAD PREFIVIOUSLY BEEN CONFINED AND IN WHICH THEY BELIVE BELIEVE THE AMERICANS WERE NOW HELD. THE JORDANIAN SAID THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TRY TO GET TO IT BUT AS OF NOW WE HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS.

AS REGARDS YOUR SECOND W QWSTION...

IM AFRAID THAT TTHE PHILADELPHIA REMAINS IN ACCESSABLE.

WE WILL OF COURSE DO ALL WE CAN TO FIND OUT ABOUT THE MISSING TWO BUT OBVIOUSLY CAN PROMISE NOTHING.

V

AS REGARDS AN AIRCRAFT FOR THE RELEASED HOSTAGES WE AGREE THAT THE DC3 ON THE AQABA RUN COULD WELL STOP OFF AT AMMAN ON THE WAY BACK TO DROP THE AA (A GOOD SECURITY COVER) AND TO PICK UP THE HOSAGES. IT COULD THEN GO TO NICOSIA WERE ~~SAFARI~~ ^{SATINIA} WHERE WE ARE TRYING TO POSITION AMMAN ~~COY~~. THIS REMAINS SUBJECT TO A TELECONF WITH BEIRUT WHICH WE ARE HAVING AT 1800Z SINCE BEIRUT, ESPECIALLY THE CAA, HAVE FIRM VIEWS ON AIRCRAFT SAFETY. YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW IN PARTICULAR THAT THEY THINK IT ~~JW~~ MOST IMPORTANT THAT HOSTAGES SHOULD NOT TRAVEL BOAC ON THIS JOURNEY. ~~KATMOVE~~

V

~~VK~~ NEXT

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. THE DRUGS COULD BE FLOWN OUT FROM THE UK ON EITHER SUNDAY OR TUESDAY. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE ON WHICH TO CHOOSE. SECONDLY IF THE RED CRSCENT IS NOT IN YOUR VIEW THE BEST BODY FOR RECEIVING AND DISTRIBUTING OUR SUPPLIES WHO WOULD BE ?? THE BRITISH RED CROSS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE ICRC ON THE SPOT UNDER DR. MARTI MIGHT BE THE BEST BET. BUT THAT MIGHT SIMPLY EXPOSE US TO MORE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ICRC. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THIS POINT TOO.

THIRDLY THERE ARE REPORTS NOW THAT ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN HAVE AGRRED TO A ~~TE~~ CEASEFIRE. IS THERE ANY SIGN OF THIS ,,??

AMMAN

ON YOUR QUERY ABOUT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, I WOULD GUESS SUNDAY
BUT WILL CONSULT COLONEL FERRIE FIRST THING TOMORROW

4

AS REGARDS WHO COULD RECEIVE OUR SUPPLE SUPPLIES, COLONEL FERRIE
IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE ARE NOW ONLY TWO ORGANISATIONS
CAPABLE OF DOING THIS. THE ARMY OR THE I C R C .

I SHOULD PREFER FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS THAT THE ARMY
SHOULD NOT BE THE OFFICIAL RECIPIENTS.

HAVE YOU SEEN OUR TELEGRAM NO 659 ABOUT THIS??

AS REGARDS THE CEASE FIRE , MESSAGES WERE BROADCAST BY
HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT AT LUNCH TIME ORDERING THIS BUT THERE
HAS BEEN LITTLE OUTWARD SIGN THAT THE ORDER IS BEING HEEDDED
BY EITHER SIDE.

THIS IS NECESSARILY A SUBJECTIVE VIEW BASED ON WHAT WE CAN SEE AND
HEAR FROM THE EMBASSY AND ~~JEV~~ JEBEL AMMAN WHERE SNIPING
AND ARMY COUNTERFIRE HAVE BEEN AS BRISK AND MOVEMENT IN
CONSEQUENCE AS HAZARDOUS AS EVER.

London

CAN YOU TELL US WHAT FLIGHTS ARE NOW GOING INTO AND
COMING OUT OF AMMAN.? ARE THESE MERELY RED CROSS A/C
AND THOSE CHARTERED FOR EVACUATION???

ABOUT THE FLIGHTS OF DRUGS , CALEDONIA AIRWAYS FROM
WHOM THE A/C IS CHARTERED ARE GETTING COLD FEET AND WOULD
LIKE ADVICE AS TO WHETHER THERE IS MORE DANGER TO A BRITISH A/C
THAN TO A TMA OR MEA FOR EXAMPLE.

MOD NOW ADVISE THAT THE BEST A/C TO TAKE OFF THE HOSTAGES
IN CYPRUS WOULD BE A COMET WHICH THEY WILL MAKE AVAILABLE
AT AKROTIRI. THIS COULD OF COURSE ALSO LIFT THE AQABA EVACUEES
TO THE UK .

AMMAN

THE AMBASSADOR ASKED US TO GIVE YOU THE ANSWER TO
CHRISTOPHER MAKINS QUESTION ABOUT THE NEED FOR FURTHER
CHARTER FLIGHTS FOR EVACUEES. SO FAR AS WE CAN FORESEE
THE FEW REMAINING EVACUEES WILL BBE ABLE TO GET OUT ON
RED CROSS PLANES.

SECONDLY. SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE FLIGHTS TO AND FROM AMMAN ARE STILL FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES ONLY I.E. NOT COMMERCIAL.

THIRD POINT. I DOUBT WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MORE DANGER TO A BRITISH AIRCRAFT AT AMMAN AIRPORT THAN TMA OR MEA, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL WHETHER FEDAYEEN HAVE IMMEDIATE OBSERVATION OF THE AIRPORT, BUT THIS IS REALLY NO MORE THAN A GUESS.

NEXT POINT. COMET SOUNDS SPLENDID

THE AMBASSADOR HAS JUST RUNG THROUGH TO SUGGEST THAT A SPECIAL MESSAGE OF THANKS FOR THE RESCUE OF THE BRITISH HOSTAGES SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE JORDANIANS.

THE LEVEL OF THIS IS UP TO YOU BUT IT WOULD BE NICE IF IT COULD COME FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING HUSSEIN.

*FW agree.
But after
the hostages
are out.*

London

WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN ON THE MESSAGE.

SECONDLY THERE IS SOME DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE DC3. BEIRUT ARE HAVING A HARD TIME GETTING HOLD OF ONE. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THEY MAY ONLY BE ABLE TO GET A SAUDI ONE, WHICH WILL NOT BE MUCH GOOD SINCE IT CANNOT OVERFLY SYRIA OR ISRAEL AND WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO LAND AT CAIRO OR THEREABOUTS. THIS IS CLEARLY NO GOOD HS GOOD HOSTAGE WISE. IF NECESSARY WE WILL HAVE TO GET ANOTHER A/C TO AMMAN TO PICK UP THE PASSENGERS FROM A DC3 FROM AQABA TO TAKE THEM AND THE HOSTAGES TO AKROTIRI. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW MORE AFTER WE VE BEEN THROUGH TO BEIRUT & LATER ON. I THINK WE CAN PLAN TO DO THIS BY TELEGRAM RATHER THAN BY TELECONF. ONE QUESTION HOWEVER NOW. COULD A DC3 ~~REFUEL~~ ~~AT~~ REFUEL AT AMMAN IF NECESSARY?? KKKKK

Amman

YOUR LAST POINT. I'M AFRAID I WILL HAVE TO RAISE THIS WITH OUR AIR ATTACHE AT OUR NEXT CONTACT BUT WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CARAVELLE WAS REFUELLING YESTERDAY SO WITH ANY LUCK IT SHOULD BE O.K.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Moon

As promised

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2170

TO WASHINGTON

25 SEPTEMBER 1970

(NE)

26/9

CONFIDENTIAL

251750Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2170 OF 25/9 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, NICOSIA, BERNE, BONN, MOSCOW, CG GENEVA, OTTAWA, ROME, AMMAN.

EMERGENCY AID FOR JORDAN

WE CONFIRMED WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY THIS MORNING THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED THE TWO LISTS (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.) FROM THE PALACE OF FOODSTUFFS NEEDED FOR CIVILIANS IN AMMAN, AND THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES' REQUIREMENTS OF FOOD AND OTHER ITEMS. THE U.S. EMBASSY SAID THAT UNDER QUOTE OTHER ITEMS UNQUOTE THEY HAD RECEIVED A VAGUELY WORDED REQUEST FOR A LARGE AMOUNT OF MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION, ON WHICH THE KING HAD SAID THAT THE JORDAN ARMY WAS EXTREMELY LOW.

2. ON WAYS AND MEANS OF RESPONDING TO THE APPEALS FOR FOOD (WHICH SHOULD IDEALLY BE CONSIGNED AS SPECIFICALLY AS POSSIBLE FOR CIVILIAN USE), THE AMERICANS AGREED THAT THE QUANTITIES WERE SUCH THAT SUPPLY BY SEA WAS PROBABLY THE BEST MEDIUM TERM SOLUTION. THEY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY MIGHT BE MOUNTING A CRASH PROGRAMME BY CHARTER AIRCRAFT TO BRING IN ESSENTIAL FOODSTUFFS (IN ADDITION TO ANY MEDICAL SUPPLIES WHICH THEY MAY SOON BE DELIVERING), BUT THAT SUCH A FOOD AIRLIFT WOULD ONLY BE A LIMITED OPERATION.

3. WE SUGGESTED THAT DIVERSION TO AQABA OF SHIPPING ALREADY AT SEA WITH GRAIN OR RICE ABOARD WOULD PROBABLY BE THE QUICKEST WAY OF GETTING BULK SUPPLIES INTO JORDAN. WE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT AS THE U.S. AND/OR CANADA, WITH PERHAPS SOME OF THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY SUPPLIERS OF FLOUR AND RICE,

/A THREE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

A THREE POWER CO-ORDINATING BODY SHOULD BE SET UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY IN WASHINGTON FOR REASONS OF CONVENIENCE, TO CONSIDER HOW THE JORDANIAN REQUEST COULD BE HANDLED MOST EFFECTIVELY.

4. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE TRANSPORT OF MEDIUM TERM FOOD SUPPLIES ON UNRWA SHIPPING. THE AMERICANS POINTED OUT THE LIMITATION OF UNRWA'S MANDATE TO THE 1948 REFUGEES AND, ON AN INTERIM BASIS, TO THOSE DISPLACED BY THE 1967 WAR. THEY FORESAW DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING UNRWA TO SPRING QUICKLY INTO ACTION, PARTICULARLY IN ITS DIFFICULT FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO HELP THOSE RENDERED HOMELESS AND HUNGRY BY THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR. ANY NEW APPEAL TO UNRWA WOULD CAUSE THE AGENCY TO SEEK IMMEDIATE SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THOSE WHO APPROACHED THEM. WE AGREED THIS WOULD BE A RISK BUT SAID WE THOUGHT THAT THOSE AIDED AS PROPOSED WOULD, IN FACT, BE COVERED BY EITHER UNRWA'S ORIGINAL OR INTERIM MANDATES.

5. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. I SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS FROM UKMIS NEW YORK ON DR. MICHELMORE'S LIKELY REACTION TO ANY REQUESTS FROM GOVERNMENTS KEEN TO HELP THE JORDANIANS FOR E.G. CARGO SPACE ON UNRWA VESSELS OR OTHER FORMS OF TRANSPORT.

6M WE SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL IF H.M. EMBASSY IN PARIS COULD ASCERTAIN HOW THE FRENCH PROPOSE TO RESPOND TO THE TWO APPEALS FROM THE PALACE SET OUT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. WE HOPE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A CO-ORDINATING EXERCISE.

/WE HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 2170 TO WASHINGTON

- 3 -

WE HAVE ALREADY PUT THIS IDEA TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE. WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW HOW AND WHERE THEY THINK THIS MIGHT BEST BE HANDLED.

7. COULD LANDYMORE IN ROME LET US KNOW WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF A SPEEDY RESPONSE OF THE TYPE DESIRED IF THE JORDANIANS WERE TO APPROACH THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION/WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME?

DOUGLAS-HOME

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CYF/CR/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2171

TO WASHINGTON
25 SEPTEMBER 1970
(NE)

CONFIDENTIAL

251750Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2171 OF 25/9 AND REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, NICOSIA, BERNE, BONN, MOSCOW,
C.G. GENEVA, AMMAN, OTTAWA, ROME.

M.I.P.V.

EMERGENCY AID TO JORDAN

IN A TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN AT 1830Z ON 24 SEPTEMBER,
TWO URGENT APPEALS FROM THE PALACE FOR AID WERE SET OUT, AS
BELOW:

ONE IS HEADED FOOD BADLY NEEDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF AMMAN. (THIS
MUST BE AIRLIFTED IMMEDIATELY.),

AND GOES ON TO LIST THE FOLLOWING:-

1800 TONS OF BREAD OR EQUIVALENT AMOUNT OF FLOUR.

350 TONS OF RICE

350 TONS OF SUGAR

100 TONS OF CANNED FOOD - BEANS ETC...

50 TONS OF FOOD OIL

50 TONS OF VARIOUS OTHER FOOD STUFFS.

N.B. THIS IS THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF AMMAN FOR ONE WEEK
ONLY.

THE OTHER LIST IS HEADED:-

JORDAN ARMED FORCES REQUIREMENTS OF FOOD AND OTHER ITEMS.

AND GOES ON TO LIST THE FOLLOWING:-

/COMMODITY

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- 2 -

COMMODITY	QUANTITY IN METRIC TONS.
CORNERD BEEF	510
TINNED VEGETABLES	252
TINNED POTATOES	336
TINNED CHEESE	144
TINNED MILK	84
BISCUITS SERVICE	1050
COOKING FAT	126
DRY BEANS	144
TEA	48
DRY PEAS	144
LENTILS	144
BLANKETS	100,000
MARQUEE TENTS (FOR STORES)	200
TENTS (FOR 8 PERSONS)	3000 TENTS

N.B. THESE ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 60 DAYS. IMMEDIATE AIRLIFTING OF AT LEAST SOME OF THIS LIST IS A DIRE NECESSITY. A MESSAGE IN IDENTICAL TERMS INCLUDING BOTH LISTS HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH.

2. TRIPP SAID THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE CONSIDER THE JORDANIAN APPEAL FOR FOOD TENTS AND BLANKETS. THE PROBLEM IS OF COURSE IMMENSE AND PROBABLY CAN ONLY ADEQUATELY BE MET (SO FAR AS THE PROVISIONS OF FOOD ETC IS CONCERNED - NOTHING CAN MAKE UP FOR THE SUFFERING OF THE JORDANIANS OVER THE PAST FORTNIGHT) BY A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL RELIEF OPERATION. WE WILL CONCERT WITH OTHERS CONCERNED TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE. A PREREQUISITE OF ANY WORTHWHILE

/OPERATION

CONFIDENTIAL

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 2171 TO WASHINGTON

- 3 -

OPERATION IS THE RESTORATION OF PEACE TO JORDAN. WE SHALL THEREFORE NEED YOUR OWN CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF WHEN ALL CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE HELP FROM ANY QUARTER. I HAVE PARTICULARLY IN MIND THE ICRC'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE FEDAYEEN ARE NOT AT PRESENT WILLING TO RECEIVE MUCH NEEDED MEDICAL HELP IF IT COMES FROM BRITAIN OR AMERICA. I HOPE THIS CALLOUS ATTITUDE TO THE WOUNDED THOUSANDS LYING IN THE STREETS OF AND RUBBLE OF AMMAN WILL QUICKLY GIVE WAY TO A MORE HUMANE CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE. IN THIS CONNEXION YOU WILL BE RECEIVING A TEL THIS EVENING SETTING OUT WHAT WE CAN OFFER BY WAY OF MEDICAL HELP EVEN BEFORE ALL JORDANIANS ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE OUR RELIEF TEAMS WHO HAVE BEEN STANDING BY IN CYPRUS FOR MORE THAN 48 HOURS. IN ADDITION TO CIVIL CHARTER MOD HAVE PROPOSED SETTING UP AT DEKHELIA IN CYPRUS A 450 BED FIELD HOSPITAL FULLY STAFFED WITH BRITISH MILITARY DOCTORS AND NURSES ETC TO WHICH JORDANIAN CASUALTIES - CIVILIAN, MILITARY AND FEDAYEEN - COULD BE EVACUATED IN CASEVAC AIRCRAFT. THIS SEEMS A REASONABLE IDEA BUT I CAN SEE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF SUSPICION BY CASUALTIES (AND THEIR RELATIVES) THAT THEY ARE BEING REMOVED FROM JORDAN (TO PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS). THE ACTUAL EMPLANING OF CASUALTIES MIGHT THEREFORE BE ATTENDED BY DREADFUL SCENES OF RELATIVES WHO DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS BEING DONE HOWEVER, WHEN YOU GET THE TEL THIS EVENING WE WOULD WISH YOU URGENTLY TO CONSULT WITH COL FERRIE AND THE KING.....

AMMAN

I THINK THE IDEA OF THE FIELD BASED HOSPITAL DEKHELIA IS AN EXCELLENT ONE. I DO NOT THINK THE DIFFICULTIES YOU FORESEE ARE REAL ONES. WHAT IS HAPPENING AT THE MOMENT IS THAT CASUALTIES GET PICKED UP BY AMBULANCES AND BROUGHT STRAIGHT TO THE AIRFIELD AND UP TO THE AIRCRAFTS STEPS. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF HOARDS OF WAILING RELATIVES. JUST BADLY WOUNDED CIVILIANS FEDAYEEN OR SOLDIERS PICKED UP AND CARRIED AWAY.

/LONDON

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- 4 -

LONDON

THIS IS VERY REASSURING. WHEN YOU GET THE TEL WITH THE DETAILS WOULD YOU THEREFORE PLEASE PUT IT URGENTLY TO COL FERRIE AND THE KING AND LET US HAVE CONSIDERED COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. DO YOU SEE ANY OVERRIDING OBJECTION TO THE USE OF NORMAL RAF CASEVAC AIRCRAFT WITH LARGE RED CROSSES IN ADDITION TO SMALL ROUNDELS?

AMMAN

I WILL CERTAINLY ACT AS YOU SAY BUT IT CANNOT BE BEFORE TOMORROW I SEE NO OVERRIDING OBJECTION TO YOUR SECOND SUGGESTION CERTAINLY THE JORDANIANS WOULD AGREE AND IT IS I SUPPOSE A QUESTION OF GETTING OVERFLYING RIGHTS FROM THE SYRIANS AND POSSIBLY OTHERS.

LONDON

BY OTHERS YOU PRESUMABLY MEAN ISRAEL DO YOU SEE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS??

AMMAN

I FEAR THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD OBJECT (I THINK THEY WOULD FEEL BOUND TO) AND I REALLY WAS THINKING MORE OF THE U.A.R./SAUDI ARABIA ROUTE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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JORDAN CRISIS
DRAFT GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

The British Government warmly welcome the rescue this morning in Amman of a number of hostages including the 8 British nationals. They are grateful to the Jordan Government for securing the release of these persons. H.M. Ambassador at Amman is making urgent arrangements for the return of the 8 released British hostages to this country as early as possible.

The British Government will continue to work together with the other countries concerned to secure the release of the remaining hostages. It remains the British Government's position that they are prepared to return Miss Leila Khaled to an Arab country as part of a satisfactory settlement which secures the release of all the detained hostages.

Meanwhile the Home Office is prepared to grant an application for access to Miss Khaled which has been received ^{from} ~~for~~ a Lebanese lawyer who has been instructed by her parents.

September 25, 1970

file HAN

September 25, 1970

Princess Dina of Jordan telephoned me this morning about the Jordan situation. The message she wished conveyed to the Prime Minister was that she had been much impressed both by what the Prime Minister had said on television about the situation and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's statement to the General Assembly.

She went on to say that she had a Committee which was co-ordinating assistance for Jordan with the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. If she could be of any help at all she would be very glad.

I thanked Princess Dina for her message which I said would be passed to the Prime Minister. With regard to her offer of assistance, I told her that I would ask those in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who were dealing with questions of relief to get in touch with her as soon as possible. She gave me her address as 18 Upper Montagu Street, W.1., telephone number 723-4774.

I have already mentioned this to Peter Tripp who said he would follow it up, but I am sending you this letter for the record.

PJM

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 hours on 25 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

I : The Military Situation

Amman

Amman was fairly quiet throughout 24 September. Army units using tanks continued to flush out snipers, who are still active in several areas including the Embassy quarter. Aircraft were able to fly in and out.

2. The ICRC have called for a 24-hour cease fire in order to evacuate the wounded. There has so far been no response.

North Jordan

3. Israeli sources (FOH 241245Z) reported that Irbid had been retaken by the Jordanian army which was mopping up in the town. The Syrian army was said to have taken up position behind its own frontier.

II : Diplomatic Activity

New York

4. The Secretary of State and Mr. Rogers discussed the question of a Four-Power Declaration calling upon all states to refrain from intervention in Jordan (UKMis telnos. 2037-2039). Mr. Rogers commented that any statement acceptable to the Soviet Union would have to be "pretty mealy mouthed". In the light of reports of the withdrawal of Syrian forces, the Secretary of State and Mr. Rogers agreed to drop the idea of a declaration unless the situation changed.

/The Secretary

5. The Secretary of State addressed the UN General Assembly (text awaited).

Meeting of Arab Leaders

6. Cairo telno. 1059 reports the return of President Numeiri and his delegation after their peace mission to Jordan. The Delegation is alleged to have recommended an immediate cease fire, talks with PLO leaders, a change of government in Jordan and the withdrawal of armed forces from Amman.

7. According to Reuter, a second peace mission led by the Sudanese Prime Minister flew into Amman in the hope of beginning talks with Arafat. STOP PRESS. Arafat will meet mission (BBC 0800).

8. A committee has been formed under King Faisal to co-ordinate Arab relief operations in Jordan.

9. Brigadier Dawood, the Jordanian Prime Minister, who has been attending the Cairo talks, is said to have disappeared from his room having left a note tendering his resignation, which (according to radio reports) King Hussein has accepted.

Jordan

10. King Hussein sent personal messages of gratitude to the Prime Minister (telex conference 1830Z) and to President Nixon (Amman telno. 645).

NATO

11. A report is awaited on yesterday's Council meeting which discussed the crisis in Jordan.

Iran

12. H.M. Ambassador in Tehran was informed (telno. 632) that, on instructions from the Shah proposals had been put to the

/"neighbouring

"neighbouring Moslem countries" of the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Turkey to seek to arrange for a cease fire in Jordan. There had so far been no response to this initiative.

III : Reactions outside Jordan

Tunisia

13. There have been local press reports that Moscow and Belgrade have congratulated Tunisia for her initiative in proposing Arab summit meetings in Cairo to stop the fighting in Jordan (telno. 284).

IV : H.M. Embassy Amman

14. Supplies are adequate for the moment. Mr. Phillips is considering whether his staff can be further reduced.

V : Evacuation

General

15. Two further evacuation flights from Amman to Nicosia arranged by H.M.G. were successfully carried out on 24 September. An MEA Caravelle brought out 77 people (48 British, 20 UN, 6 German, 2 Belgian and 1 Spanish) and an ADCO DC3 brought out a further 20 (16 UN and 4 British).

16. The first batch of evacuees to arrive in the UK (totalling 54, of whom 47 were British) landed at Gatwick at 2300 hours in an RAF Britannia. They were met by Mr. Royle and an FCO contingent. Hotel accommodation in London and transport facilities had been arranged for those who required it.

17. H.M. Ambassador in Amman classified those British subjects still in Jordan as:-

(a) 24 Embassy staff including dependents;

(b) 21 who have refused evacuation;

/(c)

(c) 26 who are outside Amman and cannot be reached.

(d) 11 who cannot be reached within Amman.

18. Embassy staff will try today to get in touch with the latter, who include the two journalists believed to be in the Philadelphia Hotel. (1830Z telex).

19. 24 journalists attempted to board the MEA Caravelle when it left Beirut, but were prevented from doing so (Beirut telno. 500).

20. The ICRC refused an offer of cargo space on this flight but their acceptance of space on the previous day's TMA DC6 indicates that the refusal was made on practical grounds rather than on principle (Beirut telno. 505).

Aqaba Route

21. The possibility was explored of chartering a Saudi Arabian Airlines DC3 to pick up evacuees from Aqaba. The Saudi authorities ruled however that the situation was still too dangerous for them to allow one of their aircraft to fly into Jordan. (Jedda tels. 562, 566 and 569).

ICRC

22. The ICRC now seem prepared to carry out some evacuation. The Consulate General in Geneva telephoned at 1950 with a message that any remaining British subjects who wished to be evacuated on ICRC aircraft should contact the ICRC delegation at the Muhacher Hospital in Amman. The ICRC are also expecting a request for evacuation from the Greek community in Amman (Athens telnos. 2 and 3 to Amman).

US Plans

23. The US government are planning a further evacuation operation today by civilian chartered aircraft. According to

/the text

the text of the message which the US Embassy in London asked the BBC Overseas Service to transmit during the course of the night 24/25 September, the aircraft would be at the disposal also of nationals of China, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy.

VI : Relief

The Situation in Amman

24. Colonel Ferrie, the RAMC Liaison Officer in Amman, reports that there seems to be still no central medical control in Amman and it is impossible to estimate casualties accurately.

Collection of casualties is impeded by the fighting. Once a cease fire is announced the task of collecting casualties will be enormous. Medical supplies are badly needed (241240Z).

25. King Hussein has issued an urgent appeal for food supplies, tents and blankets to the British, French and US governments. (teleprinter conference 1830Z).

ICRC

26. The ICRC advised the MOD medical aid mission to Geneva on 23 September that British and US personnel would not be acceptable under the ICRC umbrella. The ICRC issued on 24 September an urgent appeal to national Red Cross societies for medical assistance in the form of cash or medical supplies, and asked specifically that medical personnel should not yet be sent to Jordan until coordination arrangements are complete (^{Geneva} ~~Amman~~ telno. 58). Medical teams from Kuwait and Switzerland are, however, already in Jordan or on the way, and teams are ready in Tunisia and Egypt.

UK Aid

27. In view of the ICRC's attitude it has been decided to

/concentrate

concentrate on the provision of foodstuff and medical supplies which will be offered direct to the Jordanian Red Crescent.

The supplies, if acceptable to the Red Crescent, will be flown out in civilian aircraft (FCO telno. 389 to Amman).

28. The idea is also under consideration to set up the field based hospital at Dekalia in Cyprus instead of transporting it to Jordan. Casualties would then be flown out from Jordan for treatment in Cyprus. H.M. Ambassador Amman will put this suggestion urgently to King Hussein and Colonel Ferrie (teleprinter conference 1830Z).

Abu Dhabi

29. An aircraft carrying a surgical team and medical supplies supplied for Jordan by the Ruler was to have left Abu Dhabi on 24 September but has been delayed a further 24 hours. (Kuwait telno. 22 to Abu Dhabi).

French Aid

30. The French government is prepared to offer both supplies and surgical personnel, the latter under the auspices of the French Ministry of Defence (Paris telno. 884).

UN

31. U Thant has issued an appeal to all nations to contribute to the relief effort for Jordan.

VII : Hostages

32. There is still no hard news about their whereabouts.

Secretary of State's talk with Mr. Rogers (UKMis telno. 2040)

33. The Secretary of State said that public opinion in Britain would fail to understand why there had been no settlement of the

/PFLP

PFLP latest terms according to which all but three of the hostages - the dual nationals - would be released. If, however, it was a question of 19 American citizens remaining as hostages, the position was different. Mr. Rogers replied that even the present offer, not confirmed, was discriminatory. American public opinion recognised the dangers of giving in to blackmail. He did, however, think that the Israelis might be prevailed upon to release some guerillas in exchange for the dual nationals. In conversation with the Secretary of State Mr. Eban subsequently confirmed that his government would probably be prepared to release the two Algerians and the 10 Lebanese (UKMis New York telno. 2048).

Berne Group

34. Ministers decided that the draft letter to M. Boissier (Berne telno. 313) and the confidential guidance which had been agreed ad referendum on 23 September were not acceptable. FCO telno. 190 instructed Mr. Midgley to urge that the reply to PFLP:

- (i) should require that the hostages be brought to a safe place and access granted;
- (ii) should ask for the names and nationalities of the hostages;
- (iii) should confirm that the assurances given by the Arab governments about the release of the Fedayeen still stood.

35. However, if the Americans (recognising that not 2 or 3 but up to 37 American hostages might be retained), could accept the proposed terms of exchanges, H.M. Ambassador could also give his assent.

36. Berne telnos. 320-322 report the outcome of the Group's meeting last night at which representatives of the four governments /reached

reached agreement on the text of a letter to be sent to M. Boissier. This incorporated points (i) and (iii) above but not (ii) which should, however, be satisfied if full access were granted and on which M. Boissier is given advice. In the confidential guidance to M. Boissier it is stated that "a global solution" remains the fundamental objective. Thus the common front remains in being.

38. M. Boissier has informed the Group (Berne telno. 323) that his usual PFLP contact has advised him that the hostages were in good physical condition and were able to listen to BBC broadcasts.

VIII: Leila Khaled

39. The ICRC were told in reply to an urgent request for one of their staff to visit Miss Khaled that this could be granted only on a reciprocal basis. According to the ICRC the ^{Swiss} ~~French~~ and German governments had unconditionally agreed that the ICRC could have access to Fedayeen detainees (telno. 58).

TO BE READ WITH PAGE 1 OF TELECONF AT 0630Z

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION PUT TO AMMAN AT 1700Z on 24/IX

London

IT SEEMS TO US THAT HOWEVER SUCCESSFULLY THE KING MAY DESTROY THE MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE FEDAYEEN, HE WILL STILL ONLY HAVE AGGRAVATED THE PROBLEM OF LIVING WITH THE PALESTINIANS. IN THE FUTURE, THE FOCUS OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN SYRIA, IRAQ, LEBANON, SUPPORT FROM THE UAR AND THE PERIPHERALS (ALGERIA, KUWAIT ETC) AND THE EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN MAJORITY IN JORDAN WILL ALL HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE CIVIL WAR GOES ON, ALBEIT SPASMODICALLY. IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE KING, CUT OFF, PRESUMABLY, FROM HIS SUBSIDIES OR PART OF OF THEM, POLITICALLY DISCREDITED IN THE ARAB WORLD AND MORE THAN EVER THE TARGET OF A SNIPERS BULLET CAN LONG SURVIVE. THEN, PRESUMABLY WE MUST LOOK FORWARD TO AN EVENTUAL PALESTINIAN REGIME, PROBABLY UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY A SHORT PHASE UNDER KERENSKY/HADITHA OR ONE OF HIS ILK.

INCIDENTLY WE DONT BELIEVE THE SYRIAN REGIME WILL FALL

AMMAN

THINK THE FIRST PART OF YOUR ASSESSMENT IS VERY GOOD (HOPE THIS DOESN'T SOUND PATRONISING) BUT I SUSPECT THAT YOU MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE ~~TRANSJORDANIAN~~ EXTRAORDINARY TOUGHNESS AND RESILIENCE OF THE TRANSJORDANIANS IN GENERAL AND THE KING IN PARTICULAR. IF THE POSITIONS WERE REVERSED WITH THE PALESTINIANS IN CHARGE THE TRANSJORDANIAN ~~MAJORITY~~

MINORITY WOULD BE MOST INDEGESTIBLE AND COULD CONTINUE TO MAKE LIFE JUST AS DIFFICULT FOR THE PALESTINIANS AS THE LATTER NO DOUBT WILL DURING THE NEXT PERIOD FOR THE TRANSJORDANIANS. THIS OFF THE CUFF I SHOULD LIKE TO CONSULT MY STAFF AND PERHAPS LET YOU HAVE A MORE CONSIDERED ANSWER TOMORROW.

Private Secretary

Jordan Internal

--- On page 1 of the Teleprinter Conference with Amman at 0630 hours on 25 September, H.M. Ambassador referred to our assessment of King Hussein's future. This reference was to a question which was put to the Ambassador on the evening of 24 September with a request for his views. I attach a copy of the question as it was put and of his off-the-cuff answer, which should be read as supplemented by comment in the Teleprinter Conference this morning.

C. J. Makins

(C. J. Makins)
25 September, 1970

Copy to:

Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Royle
Mr. Battiscombe
Mr. Tesh
Mr. Bottomley
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
Private Secretary, No. 10
Emergency Unit

covering SECRET

SECRET

TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH ATMAN 0630 Z. 25 SEPTEMBER

SITREP 0600Z. 25 SEPT

A. A FAIRLY QUIET NIGHT AND EARLY MORNING IS BEING FOLLOWED BY THE USUAL NOISY PROCESS OF ELIMINATING SNIPERS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD AND POCKETS OF RESISTANCE FURTHER AFIELD.

REGARDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S FUTURE THIS LOOKS PRETTY SOUND TO ME IN THE COLD LIGHT OF MORNING. IT ^{IS} ~~IS~~ THE TIME SCALE WHICH I FIND SO HARD TO ESTIMATE. HAVING JUST BROKEN THE FEDAYEEN MILITARY ORGANISATION, PUSHED BACK THE SYRIANS OVER THEIR OWN BORDER AND AS THEY BELIEVE SCARED OFF THE IRAQIS THE HASHEMITES ARE RIDING HIGH AND WILL BE IN NO HURRY TO RELAX THE GRIP OF THE BRIGADIERS GOVT. GIVEN ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE AND THE CONTINUANCE OF SOME OF THE SUBSIDIES THEY ARE RECEIVING (E.G. FROM THE SAUDIS) THEY MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO KEEP GOING FOR A YEAR OR SO. THE ISRAELIS WOULD I SUPPOSE WHETHER ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY MAKE WHAT CONTRIBUTION THEY CAN TO SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS BUT INEVITABLY THE STRESSES AND STRAINS OF A SYSTEM IN WHICH A TIGHT MILITARY MINORITY TRIES TO HOLD DOWN A MAJORITY WHO HAVE THE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT OF MOST ARABS AS WELL AS OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS MUST LEAD TO ITS BREAKING DOWN. WE SHOULD THEN I THINK HAVE YOUR KERENSKY/HADITHA PHASE WITH THE KING EITHER OUT OR STILL PRECARIOUSLY HOLDING ON AS HEAD OF STATE. THE TRANSITION FROM THIS TO SOMETHING MORE RADICAL WILL DEPEND ON SO MANY OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS NOT LEAST THE ISRAELIS THAT I SHOULD HESITATE TO STICK MY NECK OUT ANY FURTHER. I HAVE DONE SO ALREADY IN GIVING THE KING UP TO ANOTHER YEAR (PROVIDED HE AVOIDS A SNIPERS BULLET)

THE ABOVE HAS BEEN DICTATED WITH OUT BENEFIT OF CONSULTATION WITH MY STAFF AND I MAY WISH TO MODIFY IT LATER IN THE LIGHT OF COMMENTS FROM THEM.

SECRET

2.

(Amman cont.)

IF THE SITUATION PERMITS I AM PROPOSING AFTER A WEEK OF SLEEPING IN THE OFFICE TO STAND DOWN FOR ABOUT 24 HOURS AS FROM NOON TODAY AND RETURN TO MY HOUSE. I CAN BE BROUGHT BACK IN A MATTER OF MINUTES MEANWHILE DENNIQEACHIAN BACKED BY CHRISTOPHER LUSH AND LATER PETER CARTER WILL BE HOLDING THE FRONT LINE ON THE DIPLOMATIC SIDE.

AGAIN IF THE SITUATION PERMITS OUR TENTATIVE PRIORITIES FOR TODAY WILL BE

- A.. CONTINUING THE ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT AND IF POSSIBLE ARRANGE THE EVACUATION OF MORE BRITISH SUBJECTS SUCH AS THOSE STILL CUT OFF IN AMMAN AND AQABA.
- B.. COORDINATING BRITISH MEDICAL RELIEF BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES AND HQBFNE AND
- C.. SORTING OUT OUR OWN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING MESSING ARRANGEMENTS ESTIMATING OUR OWN FOOD AND WATER POSITION ARRANGING RECEIPT OF PERSONEL AND BAGS AND GENERALLY TRYING TO CLEAR UP SOME OF THE MESS INTO WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS INEVITABLY GOT DURING 8 DAYS OF VIRTUAL SIEGE CONDITIONS.

SECRET

LONDON

3.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR SITREP AND ASSESSMENT HAV A FEW MESSAGES FOR U

V.

BRITANIA WITH 54 PEOPLE ON BOARD ARRIVED SAFELY AT 2200Z YESTERDAY. ALL WELL

1 ICRA ~~EEEE~~ ICRC GENEVA HAVE ASKED US TO TELL YOU THAT ANY REMAINING BRITISH CITIZENS WHO WISH TO BE EVACUATED ON ICRC AIRCRAFT SHOULD CONTACT THE ICRC DELEGATION AT THE MUHACHER HOSPITAL. WOULD YOU PLEASE ALSO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO THE ICRC DELEGATION

2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY NEWS FEE NEWS OF A DOCTOR RUTH TELL BELIEVED TO BE IN JORDAN. NO OTHER DETAILS.

Amman
Subj

MANY THANKS FOR MESSAGE RE BRITANIA WE HAVE NOTED THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE ICRC REGARDING DR RUTH TEL SHE IS THE WIFE OF THE HEAD OF PROTOCOL HERE AT THE PALACE AND I AM SURE THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO WORRY ABOUT HER. HER HUSBAND IS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH US AND WOULD LET US KNOW AT ONCE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING AMISS.

LONDON

MANY THANKS WILL ASSURE THOSE CONCERNED

~~CARRIAGE RETURN PSE~~

Amman

HAVE A MORE DETAILED SITREP (FROM MY DA) IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE IT.

LONDON

YES

SECRET

G AMMAN

4.

SITREP AS AT 250600 Z

AMMAN HAS HAD A QUIETER NIGHT FIRING IS STILL SPORADIC
IN MANY AREAS AS INDIVIDUAL SNIPERS OK U ARE BLASTED OUT OF THEIR
HIDEOUTS BY SALADDINS AND SARACENS FIRING AT POINT BLANK
RANGE. TANKS WITH HARDLY ANY INFANTRY SUPPLORT ARE
CLEARING JEBEL AKHDAR JUST OVER A MILE SOUTH OF THIS BUILDING
FOR THE THIRD TIME. A VERY LARGE EXPLOSION PRESUMABLY AN
AMMUNITION DUMP HAS JUST OCCURRD THERE. THE ASHRAFIYA STROKE
WAHDAT IS BEING SHELLLED YET AGAIN WITH WHAT LOOKS LIKE
USPERRDH

US SMOKE SHELLS . . DA AND COLONEL FERRIE
ARE TRYING TO CONTACT THE QIADA FOR RUTHER INFORMATION ABOUT
CASUALTIES.

LONDON

HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE

Amman
SUGGEST CONFERENCE FOR 0900Z OK ????

LONDON

OK

~~XXXXXXXX~~

SECRET

MMAN I HAVE MANAGED TO GET MY SENIOR STAFF IN AND HAVE JUST HAD AN 4 HOURS MEETING WITH THEM DISCUSSING AND ALLOCATING JOBS AND PRIORITYS AS I MENTIONED I AM PROPOSING TO STAND DOWN FOR 24 HOURS BUT CAN BE REACHED QUICKLY IF REQUIRED.

WJW WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON OUR ASSESSMENT
ABOUT WITHERED JORDAN . [SIC: WHTHER JORDAN].
I DOUBT WHETHER ANY OF US WANT ONE ASE

v

WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE THE LATEST STATE OF PLAY ON THE
COMMUNITY . BUT COULD WE ~~MAKE~~ MAKE ONE OR TWO POINTS
FIRST. NOW THAT THE DC3 OPERATION FROM AQABA TO JEDDA
HAS FALLEN THROUGH , WE ARE THINKING OF CHARTERING AN MEA
DC3 IN BEIRUT WHICH COULD DO A ROUND TRIP BEIRUT AQABA BEIRUT

DO YOU THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE WORTH DOING AND I SO AND IF SO
HAVE YOU ANY IDEAS AS TO WHEN WE MIGHT TRY TO LAY IT ON.
SECONDLY MISS VERITY'S BROTHER HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US HE ASKED
US TO PASS ON TO HIS ~~WIFE~~ HIS SISTER A MESSAGE TO SAY
THAT HE TRIED TO GET TO AMMAN IN ORDER TO HELP HER OUT , BUT GOT
NO FURTHER THAN BEIRUT . ~~WIFE~~ HE IS SORRY SHE DID NOT
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE EVACUATED
THIRDLY MEDICAL SUPPLIES WE WOULD LIKE TO FLY IN FROM UK
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE A PLANE LOAD OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AS A
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO JORDAN RED CRESCENT . THIS WOULD CONSIST
OF WHAT EVER IS READILY AVAILABLE FROM LIST IN ICRC APPEAL.
CAN JORDAN RED CRESCENT ACCEPT AND ARRANGE ~~WIFE~~ ARRANGE
FAIR DISTRIBUTION.

AMMAN

MANY THANKS FOR THE SUGGESTION ABOUT ~~PAND~~ CHARTERING AN MEA

DC3 TO DO A ROUND TRIP BEIRUT AQABA BEIRUT I THINK THIS AN EXCELLENT IDEA BUT WE SHALL NEED A LITTLE TIME TO SET IT UP GIVEN THE STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION THINK WE SHOULD AIM FOR TOMORROW 26TH MORNING.

THE AIRCRAFT WILL NEED TO LAND AT AMMAN PICK UP MY AIR ATTACHE ~~WHO IS FAMILIAR~~ WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH THE AQABA STRIP AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO GUIDE THE ~~BO~~ PILOT IN.

MESSAGE RE MISS VERITY IS NOTED....

REGARDING MEDICAL SUPPLIES

COL FERRIE HAS YET NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE JORDANIAN RED CRESCENT SO THAT WE CANNOT YET GIVE AN OPINION BUT WILL DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CHRISTOPHER LUSH WILL NOW GIVE YOU A SITREP ON COMMUNITIY (BRITISH)

BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLS:-

- 1.. EMBASSY 25 INCLUDING 4 WIVES AND 1 CHILD ALL IN AMMAN.
- 2.. CONTACTED AND HAVE DECLINED EVACUATION 21 ALL IN AMMAN.
- 3.. INACCESSIBLE SO FAR LIKELY TO WANT TO BE EVACUATED 9
6 IN AMMAN AND 3 IN IRBID.
- 4.. NOT CONTACTED BUT UNLIKELY TO WISH TO BE EVACUATED 13
6 IN AMMAN 3 IN AGLUN 2 IN HAFRAQ AND 1 EACH IN MAAN
AND ZERQA
- 5.. AT AQABA TO BE EVACUATED BY AIR SHORTLY 15

THIS BRINGS OUR TOTAL TO 82 EXCLUDING JOURNALISTS WHO NOW APPEAR TO BE DOWN TO LESS THAN A DOZEN.

ANY QUESTIONS??

LONDON

I KNOW YOU WERE THINKING OF FURTHER REDUCING THE MINIMUM EMBASSY STAFF . ANYTHING FURTHER ON THIS ??

SECONDLY , IS IT RIGHT TO ASSUME THAT , LEAVING ~~THE AQABA AREA~~ ~~REMOVING~~ THE AQABA OPERATION ASIDE FURTHER EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS SO FAR AS THEY CAN BE FORESEEN CAN BE MET BY TAKING ~~THE~~ PLACES ON RED CROSS AIRPLANES

THIRDLY I TAKE IT THAT YOU HAVE NO MORE NEWS ABOUT THE PHILADELPHIA.

FOURTHLY FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ABU DHABI TELN TELNO 155 TO FCO , REPEATED TO BAHRAIN RESY BUT NOT TO YOU

RULER HAS REQUESTED URGENT EVACUATION FROM JORDAN AND RETURN TO ABU DHABI OF THE 17 DEFENCE FORCE STUDENTS WORKING THERE UNDER GHQ JORDAN ARMY AUSPICES ON VARIOUS COURSES. ADDF AIRCRAFT CARRING MEDICAL SUPPLIES (MY TELNO. 112) COULD PERHAPS BE USED IF IT REACHES AMMAN.

2. WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW, GRATEFUL IF HM EMBASSY COULD BE ASKED TO ARRANGE.

GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD REPLY IN DUE COURSE .

I DONT THINK THAT I HAVE ANY MORE FROM HERE AT THE MOMENT. I DOUBT WHETHER FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WE NEED ANOTHER CONF BEFORE 1600Z TODAY , ALTHOUGH WE WILL BE WAITING EAGERLY FOR ANY NEWS ABOUT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE .

WE WILL NOW AIM TO SET UP THE AQABA OPERATION FOR TOMORROW AND WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED
FINALLY I HOPE YOU HAVE A VERY RESTFUL 24 HOURS
YOU CERTAINLY DESERVE IT. KKKK

Amman I THINK WE MAY BE ABLE TO REDUCE OUR EMBASSY STAFF BY ABOUT 4 BUT NOT BEFORE THE PRESENT SITUATION COOLS A BIT. E WE SHALL THEN TAKE ANOTHER LOOK IN THE LIGHT OF ~~OWN~~ WHAT WE ASSESS OUR JOB TO BE DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

THE REDUCTION WILL INCLUDE SOME SENIOR STAFF WHO ARE OVERDUE FOR LEAVE YOUR SECOND ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT.

3RD WE TRIED JORDAN ARMY HQ LAST NIGHT ABOUT ACCESS BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL WE ARE HAVE HAVING ANOTHER GO THIS MORNING BUT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE TO LEAVE THIS TO THE MILITARY JUDGEMENT OF THE ARMY. I DO NOT WANT ANY OF MY STAFF KILLED.

IN TRYING TO CONTACT TWO MEN WHO SO FAR AS WE KNOW SHOULD BE SAFE ENOUGH IN THE CELLARS..

MESSAGE RE ABU DHABI IS NOTED...

WE WILL INFORM JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES BUT WILL NATURALLY GIVE PRIORITY TO OUR OWN PEOPLE.

I AGREE ABOUT THERE BEING NO NEED FOR ANOTHER CONF. BEFORE 1600Z TODAY UNLESS SOMETHING UNFORESEEN HAPPENS. WE CAN REPLY BY TELEGRAM ABOUT MEDICAL SUPPLIES SON SOONER.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR FINAL SENTENCE I ONLY WISH I COULD LET MY CBO'S TAKE A BIT OF TIME OFF BUT THEY, SIMPLY HAVE TO KEEP GOING. I CANNOT EXPRESS HOW MUCH WE HAVE OWED TO THEM NOT ONLY DURING THE EIGHT DAYS OF BATTLE BUT FOR SOME TWO WEEKS BEFORE WHEN THEY WERE WORKING IN CRISIS CONDITIONS.

London

THANKS YOU VERY MUCH . YOU WILL NO DOUBT LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY SUPPLIES FOR ~~OURSELF~~ FOR YOU AND YOUR STAFF WHICH WE COULD ASK THE EMBASSY AT BEIRUT TO PUT ON TO THE AQABA DC3 FOR OFFLOADING AT AMMAN .

London OTHERWISE I NOTE ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ YOUR POINTS. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~UNDERSTANDING THE~~

~~EVEREVEREVER~~

WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE PHILADELPHIA
. BUT THIS IS THE SORT OF THING ON WHICH IT IS HELPFUL FOR US
TO HAVE A PERIODIC ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ RETURN.

EVERYONE HERE FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST SHARES
YOUR ADMIRATION FOR WHAT YOUR CBO'S HAVE DONE . YOU MAY LIKE
TO KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER DURING AN INTERVIEW ON ITN
QUOTE THIS WEEK UNQUOTE LAST NIGHT PAID A WARM TRIBUTE
TO THE WORK OF YOUR EMBASSY DURING THE CRISIS . WE WILL BE LETTING
YOU HAVE THE TEXT OF WHAT HE SAID WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.
THAT IS ALL FOR NOW.

AMMAN

~~XXXX~~ THANK YOU FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT THE AQABA PLANE FROM
BEIRUT COULD BRING SUPPLIES FOR US.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE IT CARRY 1.. KING (GRADE 10)

2.. ANY BAGS FOR US 3.. WHAT EVER CAN BE ARRANGED IN THE
TIME AS EMERGENCY TINNED FOOD ~~XXXX~~ SUPPLIES FOR THE 25 EMBASSY
STAFF AND DEPENDANTS THE IDEAL ~~XXXXXX~~ FOR THIS WOULD BE
10 DAYS COMPO RATIONS PLUS ~~XXXX~~ VITAMIN PILLS DETASTING TABLETS
AND WATER PURIFYING ~~XXXXXX~~ POWDER AND ALSO SOME DRIED YEAST.

WE WILL HAVE A FURTHER ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ SHIPPING LIST.

London

BEER??

~~XXX~~

AMMAN

WE CAN ALL ALWAYS DO WITH THIS WE RECKON WE HAVE 24 HRS SUPPLY

file on

September 26, 1970

This letter is to confirm my telephone talk with Christopher Makins on the Jordan situation. The Prime Minister wished steps to be taken to ensure that full publicity continued to be given to the 2½ tons of medical supplies that we have already got into Amman and any further supplies which we may send (If the ICRC are still causing difficulty this should be brought out).

With regard to King Hussein's request for food relief, the Prime Minister wished to know urgently what was being done about this. What steps were being taken to organise an international effort and in the meantime could we not do something on our own, e.g. send food on the same basis as we had sent medical supplies. I should be grateful for advice in the course of this afternoon on what reply I can give to the Prime Minister on this.

The Prime Minister also wished to send a very early message to King Hussein thanking him for what he had done to help with the release of the British hostages. I discussed with Christopher Makins a text and subject to final clearance by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and by the Prime Minister we agree that the right course was probably to deliver the message to King Hussein this afternoon and publish it this evening around the time of the arrival of the hostages.

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- 2 -

I am sending a copy of this letter direct to Christopher Makins in the Emergency Unit.

(SGD.) P.J.S. MOON

Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sent to

705

(1) Emergency Staff

Sir P. Adams

Hd. N. East D.

Hd. N. Q. D.

Hd. A. T. D.

R C

No 10 D. S.

DWF E 07/2/26

LWY 313/26

FLASH FCO

GRS 200

CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1073 26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

261310Z

ADDSO TO FLASH FCO TELNO. 1073 DATED 26/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (FLASH) TO WASHINGTON, BONN, BERNE, TEL AVIV
AMMAN, AND UKHIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1216 TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND NY TELNO. 1055
SEMI COLON

PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRES. NASSER ON HOSTAGES.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. HAIKAL SPEAKING
ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT NASSER THAT THE LATTER THOUGHT HE COULD
SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING HOSTAGES PROVIDED THAT THE
THREE COUNTRIES HOLDING FEDAYIN IN CUSTODY (BRITAIN, FEDERAL
GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND) WOULD GIVE PRESIDENT NASSER AN
UNDERTAKING TO RELEASE THOSE FEDAYIN. I TOLD MR. HAIKAL THAT
I BELIEVED THAT THE UNDERTAKING CONTAINED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE STILL STOOD BUT HE ASKED ME TO CONFIRM WITHIN AN HOUR.
I SAID THAT THIS MIGHT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE BUT I WOULD DO SO
WITHIN THREE HOURS.

2. AFTER CONSULTING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED ON THIS SUBJECT

2. AFTER CONSULTING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED ON THIS SUBJECT I RETELEPHONED MR. HAIKAL TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS OFFER WAS NOT CONDITIONAL ON ACTION BY ISRAEL AND HE REPLIED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH SOME THIRD PARTY THAT IT MEANT "ALL FEDAYIN HELD BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS FOR ALL HOSTAGES" IN ACCORDANCE WITH PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO. 1216 TO UKMIS N.Y.)

3. HE SAID THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS BEING SENT ONLY TO H.M. GOVERNMENT WHO SHOULD GIVE THE UNDERTAKING ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER TWO GOVERNMENTS IN ORDER THAT NASSER COULD GIVE A SIMILAR UNDERTAKING ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO THOSE HOLDING THE HOSTAGES.

4. GRATEFUL FOR A VERY URGENT REPLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS (FLASH) TO WASHINGTON, BONN, BERNE AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

DEAUMONT +

NNNN

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

SERIAL No

7964/30

TELEGRAM NUMBER 404

26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 261255Z

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 404 OF 26/9 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO BERNE, WASHINGTON, BONN.

HOSTAGES

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KING
HUSSEIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS. I KNOW THE DEEP PERSONAL CONCERN WHICH YOU HAVE FELT
THROUGHOUT FOR THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES. I WAS PARTICULARLY
GRATEFUL FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST WHEN THE TRAGIC
FIGHTING BEGAN IN JORDAN THAT YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THOSE
IN WHOSE HANDS THE HOSTAGES WERE, THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE BY YOU FOR ANY HARM WHICH CAME TO THEM. NOW THAT THE
EIGHT BRITISH HOSTAGES, WITH THE GERMANS AND SWISS HAVE BEEN RELEASED
UNHARMED I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR ALL THAT YOU HAVE DONE TO BRING
THIS ABOUT. THEIR SAFE RETURN WILL BE GREETED WITH PROFOUND RELIEF
BY THEIR FAMILIES AND BY THE WHOLE BRITISH PEOPLE. IT IS THE HOPE
OF ALL OF US THAT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES WILL ALSO SOON BE SET
FREE.

THANK YOU ALSO FOR THE MESSAGE YOU SENT ME ON 24 SEPTEMBER. AS
YOU KNOW, WE SHALL DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP IN THE MASSIVE TASK OF
RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE TO ALL WHO HAVE SUFFERED. ENDS.

2. WE INTEND TO MAKE TEXT PUBLIC AT 1800Z TODAY AND HOPE THAT YOU
CAN ARRANGE FOR IT TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PALACE BEFORE THEN.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET].

FILES:
EMERGENCY STAFF
H.E.D.
MR. ARTHUR

COPIES TO:
SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE.

10/26/70

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Mr. Moon

Emergency Relief for Jordan

You asked for a note on action now being taken by the F.C.O. and other interested Whitehall departments in response to King Hussein's urgent appeals (a) for medical supplies and personnel, and (b) for foodstuffs. The position is as follows :

(A) Medical Supplies

We have already flown in, and publicised the fact, 2½ tons of assorted drugs, field dressings, plasma, etc. A civilian freighter on charter to the F.C.O. is likely to leave Manston Airport some time tomorrow (Sunday) with 16 tons of further medical supplies paid for from official funds.

It seems likely that a further 6 tons of medical supplies will be carried on the aircraft chartered for the evacuation of wounded (see below) so that the total cargo leaving tomorrow will be 22 tons. News Department are briefing fully on all this for the Sunday press.

2. The consignee of this load or loads will be the Co-ordinating Committee of the I.C.R.C. under Dr. Marti, which according to Amman Tel. No. 662 has agreed that all offers of medical assistance are welcome, and seems to be getting administrative grip of the situation on the ground at last.

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(B) Equipment and Personnel Volunteered by the
Ministry of Defence

A Light Section of a field hospital (66 staff, 50 beds), a Field Surgical team, a Field Ambulance Unit, and a R.A.F. Air Evacuation Unit have been flown with supporting staff in 9 Hercules aircraft to Cyprus. Lord Carrington has now agreed that the offer of a full Casevac scheme-"Operation Shoveller" - involving civil air shuttle of casualties from Amman to a field hospital of 275 beds at Dhekelia be put to the Jordanian Government. Colonel Ferrie, the R.A.M.C. Advance Liaison Officer in Amman, is working out details of how the scheme would in practice work with the Jordanians and the I.C.R.C. co-ordinators. It seems likely that the Casevac civil aircraft we have chartered (but handed over to M.O.D. to administer) will arrive at Nicosia some time on Sunday with six tons of.overspill medical supplies on board. M.O.D. had hoped to get the aircraft into Amman by Monday if Colonel Ferrie could tie up arrangements with the Jordanians as soon as then. This would have been a bilateral operation, i.e. without I.C.R.C. auspices, given the sticky attitude towards M.O.D.'s offers of help encountered by the M.O.D. Delegation who saw

the I.C.R.C. in Geneva on Wednesday; and there would have been minimal commitment of services medical personnel in Jordan itself.

2. However, Amman tel. No. 662 shows that the I.C.R.C. co-ordination there have put the "Casevac Unit on call" as fourth priority after a Field Ambulance section, Field Hospital and extra ambulances. Colonel Ferrie will now have to sort out with them how soon we can hope to get the M.O.D. scheme into operation. This is rather a disappointment to M.O.D. The F.C.O. position is that while we agree that they should preposition the Casevac aircraft at Nicosia, we have at the same time stressed that Col. Ferrie needs to go back to the I.C.R.C. and the Jordanians on the precise arrangements governing all aspects of casualty evacuation in Amman. We have added that the worst position would be to get the Casevac Charter aircraft into Amman on the pretext of ferrying in medical supplies, and then find that the I.C.R.C. and/or the Jordanians made major difficulties about, e.g., selection of the casualties with whom it would fly out.

3. Press line on M.O.D. offers of assistance. This is being worked out, again in time for the Sunday press, between the M.O.D., F.C.O. and No. 10 Duty Press Officers.

(C) Longer-Term Aid (mainly foodstuffs)


I attach copies of our tels. Nos. 2170 and 2171 to Washington recording discussions with the U.S. Embassy on this subject and setting in hand consultations with the Americans and French on how food relief to Jordan could best be co-ordinated. The Americans say they are considering a crash programme to bring in essential foodstuffs by charter aircraft. The F.C.O. view, which was discussed with Mr. Rippon briefly on 25 September, is that we can best contribute, within the limits of our resources, by flying in various categories of medical aids without delay, while leaving the medium-term problem of foodstuff aid, probably by sea to Aqaba, possibly using UNRWA transport facilities, to a three-power or wider international operation,

2. Press line. As the consultations are not yet en train and our ideas embryonic, there is not much to be said yet on this beyond the fact that we have received and are studying the King's appeal with the other two countries approached; and that an international operation may have to be mounted. News Department duty officer has been given this.

3. The King has also asked us and the Americans for a lot of ammunition and other military equipment to replenish his depleted stocks! This is not for

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the press, though they will probably guess
we have been asked.


c (S. L. Egerton)
26 September 1970

c.c. Private Secretary
Mr. Tickell
Mr. Daunt
Miss Deas
Sir Philip Adams
Mr. Haydon
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Wade-Gery
Mr. Hughes (Finance Officer)
Emergency Unit (3 copies)

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SECRET

M. V. W. 10

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

SITREP at 0700 hours on 26 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

I: The Military Situation

Amman

Although the city has been quiet by night, Army tanks have by day continued their efforts to eliminate snipers and pockets of resistance.

General Situation

2. A broadcast on behalf of the King and Arafat calling for a cease-fire was made around mid-day, but the order is not being strictly observed by either side. Apart from the Irbid area, the country is under the control of the army (I.D.F. report and Amman tel. no. 651).

North Jordan

3. I.D.F. Tel Aviv (FOH 251115Z) says that despite reports to the contrary, Irbid has not yet been secured by the Jordanian Army. Thursday's attack on the town was halted, it is believed, by a "political brake" exercised by King Hussein in response to a cease-fire appeal from Cairo. Israeli sources expected that the town, which was surrounded by the army, would have been taken yesterday, but there has been no hard news of recent developments.

Israel

4. Israeli forces still seem to be in their concentration areas (tel no. 906) and there is^{as} yet no sign of a move back or of the demobilisation of reservists.

Libya

5. Various unconfirmed reports have been received of a
battalion/

battalion of Libyan troops having been flown to Syria during the last few days (Tripoli tel no. 1363).

Iraq

6. Bagdad tel FOH summarises probable Iraqi troop movements during the past week.

II: Diplomatic Activity

7. The delegation of Arab leaders led by President Numeiri had talks with Arafat and King Hussein culminating in a broadcast appeal at mid-day Friday for a cease-fire. Upon his return to Cairo, accompanied by Arafat, Numeiri is alleged to have accused Hussein of ignoring the truce.

8. A second delegation consisting of three leading Palestinians was despatched to Damascus. Meanwhile talks continued in Cairo among the remaining Heads of State (tel no. 1061).

Libya

9. Libya is reported to have broken off all relations with Jordan (BBC 0500 hours) and to have given asylum to Brigadier Daoud, the former Jordanian Prime Minister.

III: Reactions outside Jordan

U.A.R.

10. IDF Tel Aviv (FOH 251112) note the changing tone of Egyptian propoganda. They say that Hussein is being blamed for the carnage but that the extremists of the PFLP must also share the blame for their irresponsible acts. The fear of foreign intervention particularly by the U.S. and/or Israel is repeatedly mentioned by Cairo.

Soviet Union

11. Pravda stresses the "profound interest" of the Soviet Union

in the/

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in the speedy termination of the "fratricidal war" in Jordan and calls on all states to demonstrate circumspection in their actions.

IV: H.M. Embassy Amman

12. Essential supplies are being flown in by planes taking out evacuees. The Ambassador thinks he may be able to reduce his staff by four when the situation improves.

V: Evacuation

British Subjects

13. The number of British subjects remaining in Jordan (excluding journalists) was estimated by H.M. Embassy in the telex conference at 0900 Z to be 82, falling into the following categories:-

- (a) 24 British Embassy;
- (b) 21 in Amman who have been contacted and refuse to leave;
- (c) 9 inaccessible who would probably wish to be evacuated;
- (d) 13 not contacted who are unlikely to wish to be evacuated;
- (e) 15 in Aqaba.

H.M. Embassy Beirut subsequently reported (Beirut tel no.517) that six British subjects, including three journalists, arrived in Beirut from Amman on 25 September by MEA chartered flight.

14. It is hoped to evacuate the British subjects in Aqaba today by means of a DC3 flight Beirut/Amman/Aqaba/Beirut. The Embassy Air Attaché is expected to join the flight at Amman (FCO tel. no. 399 to Amman). The BBC have broadcast messages to British subjects in Aqaba asking them to prepare for evacuation, (FCO tel no. 395 to Amman).

15. H.M. Ambassador/

SECRET

15. H.M. Ambassador thinks that the few remaining evacuees will be able to leave by Red Cross aircraft and that there is no need for further flights to be chartered by H.M.G. (telex conference at 1600Z).

VI: Relief

ICRC

16. Geneva tel. no 60 reports that offers of medical aid are flooding in from all directions in response to the ICRC appeal. More ICRC representatives have arrived in Amman where they are discussing with the Jordanian authorities the acceptability of U.S. and U.K. offers of medical assistance. The ICRC are sensible of the hostility of the more extreme guerrillas towards such assistance, but Colonel Ferrie, the RAMC Liaison Officer in Amman, believes that the ICRC men on the spot would personally welcome the arrival of the British field hospital (Amman tel. no 251500Z to HQBFNE).

17. The ICRC representatives in Amman have already arranged authority for three French aircraft to fly to Amman on 26 September with about 50 medical military personnel and some Light vehicles (Geneva tel. no 60). A civilian surgical team is also believed to be standing by in Beirut (Geneva tel. no 61).

U.K. Aid

18. As the Jordanian Red Crescent is virtually non-existent, the only organisations capable of receiving medical supplies offered by H.M.G. would be the Jordanian army or the ICRC (telex conference 1600Z). It has been decided to send the supplies by charter aircraft on Sunday 27 September to arrive the following day for

delivery/

SECRET

for delivery to the ICRC (FCO tel. no 398 to Amman).

19. Colonel Ferrie reports from Amman that the Jordanian Minister of Health welcomes the MOD casualty evacuation plan and would also like to receive the 50-bed field hospital as soon as possible. The Minister is taking the matter up with the ICRC representatives.

(Amman tel. no 25100Z)

20. Meanwhile the MOD are going ahead with the plans to charter a civil aircraft which will stand by in Cyprus until Colonel Ferrie reports that satisfactory arrangements can be made in Amman for assembling the wounded. A MOD team would accompany each flight and there would be no detachment based in Amman.

VII: Hostages

21. All 8 of the British hostages, together with 5 Germans and 2 Swiss, were found unharmed by the Jordanian army at 0930 on 25 September in a hut in Jebel Hussein. H.M. Consul was able to visit the freed hostages for an hour later in the day. They were in good health and said that they had been well treated by the PFLP (telex conference 1600Z). The Jordanian army subsequently claimed to have discovered a third Swiss hostage (BBC 0500). The remaining ~~34~~ 38 hostages have still not been traced.

22. Arrangements are in hand to fly the 16 freed hostages during the course of 26 September to Cyprus by MEA Comet and thence to Heathrow by RAF Britannia. The MEA Comet will carry Embassy stores and a Grade 10 Officer from Beirut to Amman. If, as seems possible, some of the U.S. hostages have been located and freed by the time

the Comet/

SECRET

the Comet arrives they too will be flown in it to Cyprus (FCO tel. no 399 to Amman). Because of the risk of further hijacking or reprisal, details of the operation are not being released.

Berne Group

23. The Group meets again at 1000 hours today. Meanwhile the ICRC in Beirut have been instructed to avoid any commitments with the PFLP.

VIII: Leila Khaled

24. Ministers agreed that H.M.G. were prepared to release Miss Khaled to an Arab country as part of a satisfactory settlement which secured the release of all the detained hostages.

25. H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv (tel. no 909) commented that news of Miss Khaled being simply handed back to the PFLP would cause indignation in Israel.

IX: Hijacking

26. A message has been sent by the Prime Minister to pilots of all British aircraft warning them to take the strictest precautions against the danger of hijacking in the light of the rescue of the 8 British hostages in Amman and the continued detention of Miss Khaled.



Prime Minister,

This paper deals with
action by us on medical
supplies and food.

With regard to
the marked passage
on page 4, I have
asked the FCO to
discuss this further
with Mr Ripper.

M.

26/9

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East at 7.45 pm September 28

I have checked again the Middle East position.
It is as follows:-

Bonn. All is clear providing the Swiss agree.

Berne. The Cantonal authorities have still to give their formal authority but the federal authorities seem to be working on the assumption that this authority will be given. They have now asked that the aeroplanes should not go to Zurich civil airport but to a military airport nearby. (The Emergency Unit spoke to Berne around 7.30 pm to confirm that there still had not been formal agreement from the federal authorities).

Flag A Amman. Their latest telegram on the hostages (No 704) timed 1645Z is attached. This does not add a great deal to what we had been told

Flag B earlier this afternoon. *(see also final para of telex conf. attached)*
Cairo. There has been no news since the message which you saw in which Haikal said he thought the hostages had already been sent to Beirut.

I am also attaching an interesting Cairo telegram

Flag C (No 1081) dealing with the Arab summit meeting.

Am.

September 28, 1970

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER FROM PETER MOON

12

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

MAIN EXTRACTS FROM SITREP AT 0700 ON 27 SEPTEMBER, 1970

(ALL TIMES REFERRED TO ARE BST UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED)

THE MILITARY SITUATION

AMMAN

H.M. AMBASSADOR REPORTS THAT THE CEASE-FIRE SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY EFFECTIVE, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL BURSTS OF GUNFIRE ARE HEARD. AMMAN CANNOT BE SAID TO BE UNDER FULL ARMY CONTROL WITH THE CITY CENTRE AND JEBEL AMMAN EAST OF THE FIRST CIRCLE STILL OCCUPIED BY THE FEDAYEEN.

GENERAL SITUATION

~~GENERAL SITUATION~~

THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF SERIOUS FIGHTING ELSEWHERE IN JORDAN. IT IS STILL NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE FEDAYEEN ARE CONTINUING TO HOLD IRBID AND OTHER NORTHERN TOWNS.

POLITICAL SITUATION AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

CAIRO

IN A STRONGLY WORDED MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN PUBLISHED IN AHAM, PRESIDENT NASSER EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AS REPORTED BY PRESIDENT NUMEIRI, LEADER OF THE PEACE MISSION. NASSER ALLEGED THAT THE JORDANIAN FORCES WERE STILL SHOOTING, ALL PROMISES HAD BEEN BROKEN, THERE WAS A PLAN TO LIQUIDATE THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION AND THE "TERRIFYING SLAUGHTER WAS CONTRARY TO ALL ARAB AND HUMANITARIAN VALUES".

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN CAIRO PRESIDENT NUMEIRI SUBSEQUENTLY ACCUSED KING HUSSEIN OF CARRYING OUT A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO LIQUIDATE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES. KING HUSSEIN, ISSUING A DENIAL ON AMMAN RADIO, SAID THAT THE CHARGES HARMED THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE AND THE ARMY AND WOULD AGGRAVATE THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN JORDAN.

H.M. AMBASSADOR, CAIRO HAS COMMENTED THAT THE ARAB LEADERS MAY HOLD HUSSEIN PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARNAGE AND IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR HIS RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARABS TO RETURN TO THEIR PREVIOUS STATE OF A FEW WEEKS AGO.

ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE, KING HUSSEIN WILL ARRIVE IN CAIRO TODAY FOR TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS.

EVACUATION

THERE ARE ONLY THREE BRITISH SUBJECTS IN AMMAN WHOM THE EMBASSY HAVE STILL BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT.

NINETEEN EVACUEES, OF WHOM 17 ARE BRITISH, WERE FLOWN FROM AQABA AND AMMAN BY D.C.3 TO BEIRUT ON 26 SEPTEMBER.

THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW INTO AMMAN WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND PERSONNEL ON 26 SEPTEMBER WERE ALSO MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS. THE BBC BROADCAST A MESSAGE TO THIS EFFECT.

RELIEF
I.C.R.C.

THE I.C.R.C. TEAM IN AMMAN ARE IMPROVING CO-ORDINATION BUT THEY ARE STILL SHORT OF STAFF. THE I.C.R.C. HAVE AGREED THAT MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IS WELCOME FROM ALL SOURCES, INCLUDING THE UK AND THE USA.

UK AID

TWO AND A HALF TONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN FLOWN INTO AMMAN. ~~THE~~ CIVILIAN FREIGHTER ON CHARTER TO THE FCO IS SCHEDULED TO FLY TO AMMAN TODAY WITH A FURTHER 16 TONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND IT IS HOPED THAT ANOTHER 6 TONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL BE CARRIED ON THE AIRCRAFT CHARTERED FOR THE EVACUATION OF WOUNDED. THE SUPPLIES WILL BE CONSIGNED TO THE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE OF THE I.C.R.C. IN AMMAN (AMMAN TELS. NOS. 662 AND 664).

THE CIVIL AIRCRAFT CHARTERED BY MOD TO CARRY OUT CASUALTY EVACUATION IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN NICOSIA THIS MORNING WITH 6 TONS OF SUPPLIES. THE I.C.R.C. HAVE ASKED THAT IT REMAIN THERE ON STAND-BY UNTIL THE CASUALTY NUMBERS IN JORDAN HAVE BEEN PROPERLY ASSESSED. AN I.C.R.C. REQUEST VIA COLONEL FERRIE FOR A FIELD AMBULANCE SECTION AND THREE AMBULANCES IS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE MOD. COLONEL FERRIE HAS BEEN ASKED TO ADVISE THE I.C.R.C. IN AMMAN AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT THAT A FIELD HOSPITAL, IF SUPPLIED, WOULD HAVE TO BE FLOWN IN BY RAF AIRCRAFT (AMMAN TEL. NO. 662 AND MODUK/AMMAN 261515Z). GENEVA REPORTS THAT THE I.C.R.C. HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED THAT THE UK SUPPLY EIGHT AMBULANCES (WITHOUT DRIVERS) TO THE I.C.R.C. IN BEIRUT (GENEVA TEL NO 64).

OTHER RELIEF OPERATIONS

IN RESPONSE TO KING HUSSEIN'S APPEAL, THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS INSTRUCTED THE US EMBASSIES IN ANKARA AND BEIRUT TO RELEASE EMERGENCY FOOD RATIONS. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS ALLOCATED 5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR AN EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAMME AND A SPECIAL CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE HAS BEEN SET UP IN WASHINGTON. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE I.C.R.C. OVER THE SUPPLY OF MEDICAL RELIEF AND ARE PROCEEDING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE I.C.R.C. WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.

TURKISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT DELIVERED MEDICAL AND FOOD SUPPLIES TO AMMAN ON 25 SEPTEMBER.

HOSTAGES

~~ZW~~VEILA KHALED

IN CONVERSATION WITH HM AMBASSADOR, BERNE, M. NAVILLE, PRESIDENT OF THE I.C.R.C., AGAIN PRESSED FOR HMG TO RECONSIDER THEIR DECISION NOT TO PERMIT AN I.C.R.C. REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT MISS KHALED (BERNE TEL NO 335). THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT, HEP EXPLAINED, WOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN M. BOISSIER'S POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE P.F.L.P.

HM AMBASSADORS IN AMMAN AND BEIRUT PREDICT A SHARP REACTION AND PERHAPS REPRISALS FROM THE P.F.L.P. IF MISS KHALED IS NOT RELEASED - PARTICULARLY IF ALL THE HOSTAGES HELD BY THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN RETURNED - OR IF MISS KHALED IS HANDED OVER TO THE ISRAELIS.

MESSAGE ENDS

PRIME MINISTER FROM PETER MOON

✓ P.A. PH Seen
Om 27/9
27/9

We have learned from Washington (and this has been confirmed by the U.S. Embassy here) that the last six hostages are now at the U.A.R. Embassy in Amman and are expected shortly to be taken to Amman airport under Red Cross auspices together with a U.S. Embassy official for departure.

September 27, 1970

PRIME MINISTER

PA.
m
27/9

A²⁷ly

The position at 8.00 a.m. this morning was as follows.

The news is still putting out that 32 out of the 38 remaining hostages have been handed over to the Jordanian forces. Our Embassy in Amman were however, when spoken to this morning, still unable to confirm this.

There has been no reply so far from Cairo, Washington, Berne and Bonn to the message sent to them at 1.30 a.m. this morning. Berne and Bonn did however warn us that it would not be possible for them to act until this morning.

September 27, 1970

PRIME MINISTER FROM PETER MOON

P.A.
on 27/9
A 27/9

Our Embassy in Amman have now reported that the Jordanian Army H.Q. confirm that 32 hostages, including 4 women, have been released via the U.A.R. Embassy to the Jordanian Government and are now on their way to the airport for evacuation. Their destination is not known. The Ambassador is still trying to get information about the remaining 6.

The F.C.O. have checked this with a member of the U.S. Embassy here. He has told them that their information is that the 32 flew out of Amman at 08.45 our time this morning.

P.s. The U.S. Embassy here have now added that their Embassy in Amman has reported that the remaining 6 are in Jordanian Army hands.

Sir Burke Trend and Sir Denis Greenhill are both on their way to the office.

September 27, 1970

CYPHER CAT A & BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1304

TO UKMIS NEW YORK
23 SEPTEMBER 1970 (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL 281655Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1304 OF 28/9 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
CAIRO, TEL AVIV.
SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, JERUSALEM.

FOUR POWER TALKS

COUNSELLOR AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CALLED ON ADAMS ON 27 SEPTEMBER
TO GIVE ADVANCE WARNING OF AN APPROACH WHICH THE U.S. MISSION AT
THE UNITED NATIONS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE TO OUR MISSION
AND TO THE FRENCH. THIS WAS TO URGE THAT FOUR POWER MEETINGS AT
THE DEPUTIES LEVEL SHOULD BE DROPPED FOR THE TIME BEING, STARTING
WITH A MEETING PLANNED FOR TUESDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. GALLOWAY EXPLAINED THAT THE OBJECT OF THIS EXERCISE WAS TO AVOID
ANY DISCUSSION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A SETTLEMENT, WHICH SEEMED
UNREALISTIC AT THIS TIME. THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR
TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO MOVE UNTIL
SOME RECTIFICATION OF THE STAND-STILL INFRINGEMENTS HAD BEEN
MADE BY THE U.A.R. AND THE AMERICANS FELT BOUND TO ACCEPT THIS.
GALLOWAY ADDED THAT IT WAS THE APPRECIATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT INSIST ON THE REMOVAL OF ALL NEWLY
PLACED MISSILES AND NEWLY CONSTRUCTED MISSILE SITES: BUT SOME
GESTURE OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE INDISPENSABLE IF WE WERE TO GET
THE ISRAELIS TAKING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT.

3. GALLOWAY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT OPPOSING THE REGULAR
MEETINGS OF THE PRINCIPALS, SO THAT THE FOUR POWER EXERCISE COULD
BE SEEN TO BE CONTINUING. THEIR TACTIC WAS DESIGNED TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT, IN THE AMERICAN VIEW, THE RIGHT THING WAS TO CONCENTRATE
PRESSURE ON THE U.A.R. TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE MISSILE SITES

/AS A

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-2-

AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE RESUMPTION OF TALKS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT.
4. WHEN THE AMERICANS MAKE THIS PROPOSAL IN THE FOUR POWER
TALKS, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT H.M.G. BELIEVE THAT THE DEPUTIES MEETINGS
SHOULD CONTINUE, AND LEAST UNTIL THE DEPUTIES HAVE COMPLETED THEIR
WORK UNDER THEIR PRESENT MANDATE. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE DO NOT
AGREE THAT THE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL
AGREEMENT JUSTIFY THE ABANDONMENT OF THE DEPUTIES' TASK. ON THE
CONTRARY, THE FACT THAT JARRING HAS RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN HIS
MEETINGS WITH THE PARTIES SEEMS TO US TO MAKE IT MORE THAN EVER
IMPORTANT THAT THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THEIR TASK
OF PREPARING TO SUPPORT JARRING'S EFFORTS AT THE APPROPRIATE
MOMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHT FIRST STEP, AS THE AMERICANS
THEMSELVES ORIGINALLY PROPOSED, IS FOR THE DEPUTIES TO DEFINE
IN A REPORT TO THEIR PRINCIPALS THE AREA OF AGREEMENT SO FAR
REACHED BETWEEN THE FOUR.

DOUGLAS-HOLE.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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AMERICAN D.	(AMERICAN)
E.E.S.D.	W.E.)

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, NASSER IS SAID TO BE PLEASED WITH THE DEGREE TO WHICH EVENTS OF THE PAST TEN DAYS HAVE ISOLATED THE SYRIANS, IRAQUIS AND ALGERIANS FROM THE PALESTINIANS. HIS OWN RELATIONS WITH ARAFAT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, THE DECISION TO ALLOW FATAH TO BROADCAST AGAIN FROM CAIRO, TAKEN ABOUT FIVE DAYS AGO, SHOWS THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN MAINTAIN REASONABLE CONTROL OVER THE CONTENT OF ITS PROGRAMMES.

8. KING HUSSEIN WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING WAS, DESPITE HIS ORDEALS BOTH IN JORDAN AND HERE, SURPRISINGLY FRESH AND IN GOOD FORM. HE REMARKED SOMEWHAT SADLY THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, BUT THAT HE WOULD WORK AS BEST HE COULD FOR RECONCILLATION. HIS EQUANIMITY MAY HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR - POSSIBLY AND THIS IS ONLY A GUESS BASED ON HINTS FROM OUTSIDE INFORMANTS - BY (A) THE FACT THAT ARAFAT HAS PROBABLY BEEN TOLD BY THE ASSEMBLED HEADS OF STATE THAT HE HAS GOT TO DEAL FIRMLY WITH THE SPLINTER GROUPS - THE HI-JACKING OF AIRCRAFT IN PARTICULAR IS CLEARLY MOST UNPOPULAR, AND (B) HIS POSSIBLE SUCCESS IN GETTING THE KUWAITIS (BUT ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT THE LIBYANS) TO RESTORE THEIR SUBSIDY. I KNOW HE WAS WITH THE AMIR OF KUWAIT LAST NIGHT WHEN I TRIED TO REACH HIM.

9. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT, MORE PARTICULARLY SINCE NEITHER OF THE PRINCIPALS (HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT) IS CLEARLY ENTIRELY MASTER IN HIS OWN HOUSE. THEN AGAIN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE ELASTIC ENOUGH TO ALLOW OF A PLETHORA OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS, GENUINE OR DELIBERATE, AND THE SO CALLED FOLLOW - UP AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES, ESPECIALLY THE LATTER, WILL NOT, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAVE THE PHYSICAL MEANS TO STOP FIGHTING IF IT WERE TO BREAK OUT AGAIN.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK (PRIORITY) TO PARIS, KHARTOUM, TUNIS AND ALGIERS.

BEAUMONT +

Discussed by Minister

Prime Minister

Agree & ?

On 29/9

PL 28/9

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE 01-930 7022

CONFIDENTIAL

MO 11/10/4

R/ 28th September 1970

Dear Peter,

Following the Ministerial discussions of the appeals from Geneva and Amman for aid to Jordan, the Defence Secretary now intends (subject to the question of timing mentioned below) to send in to Amman by air a Field Ambulance Section plus three extra ambulances, a Field Surgical Team and the Light Section of a Field Hospital. These units are already deployed forward to Cyprus and they could begin to move in at any time from tomorrow.

Service personnel for these units will be volunteers as they will be required to serve unarmed and in civilian clothes. However, once they have volunteered they will be subject to normal Service orders and discipline and will retain full service rights. They are also being invited to enrol in the British Red Cross as under certain circumstances this would give them additional recognition and protection.

In the first instance civil charter aircraft will be used. However, we would prefer to use Service aircraft with Red Cross markings and we are trying to get clearance for this through diplomatic channels.

X. | This revised concept for Operation SHOVELLER which involves flying unarmed Service personnel into Jordan has been prepared on the understanding that, as HM Ambassador has made a request for British medical units, he considers that it is now reasonably safe for unarmed British Service personnel to operate in Jordan on the basis described above. However, the Defence Secretary considers that it would be placing them unduly at risk to send them into Jordan for so long as Miss Khalid remains in our custody; and he therefore intends, subject to the Prime Minister's views on this point, to defer the execution order to go ahead with the operation until her release has been publicly announced.

Since we are anxious to lose no more time than we need on this account, I am asking Ian McCluney (by copy of this letter) if he will kindly arrange for us to be informed as soon as such an announcement has been authorised - the message going to our Resident Clerk if it becomes available during the night.

/Finally

P.J.S Moon, Esq.,
PS/Prime Minister

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Finally, you may like to know that, at the request of the FCO, CBFNE has already been authorised to fly in one aircraft load of food a day (initially civil charter) between now and Thursday 1st October 1970, a total of about 80 tons.

I am also sending copies of this letter to Graham Angel and Richard Lloyd Jones.

Yours sincerely,
Tony Stephens

(A.W. STEPHENS)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13 B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

TELEX CONF. WITH AMMAN 1430Z 28/9/70

LONDON

1) HAVE YOU ANY COMMENTS ON THE TEXT OF THE PRESS STATEMENT ON
LEILA IN OUR TELNO 144 415

AMMAN

WE HAVE NO COMMENTS. STATEMENT SEEMS FINE.

OK LONDON

NEXT POINT:

CARGOES OF FOODSTUFF AID KINDLY COLLECTED BY M O D
IN CYPRUS WILL BE COMING IN ONCE A DAY UNTIL AN INCLUDING
THURSDAY

WE SHOULD LIKE YOU TO REVIEW NEED FOR FUTHER CONSIGNMENTS
AFTER THURSDAY IN THE LIGHT OF ANY RE-OPENING OF LOCAL FOOD
SUPPLY ROUTES

AMMAN

THIS IS GOOD NEWS WE WILL CERTAINLY REVIEW THE NEED FOR
FURTHER CONSIGNMENTS LATER. WE HAVE SEEN IRAQI FOOD LORRIES
PASSING THROUGH BUT HAVE NO IDEA HOW MANY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

KKKKKK

SECRET.

LONDON

232

GOOD I NOW HAND OVER TO MOD REPS WHO HAVE A LIST OF QUESTIONS TO PUT.

AS 1

PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS INDIV IF YOU CAN. OTHERWISE WE CAN COME BACK TO ANY POINT AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION.

1. SUBJECT TO FINAL CLEARANCE BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WE INTEND TO REQUEST CBFNE TO FLY THE SECTION FIELD AMBULANCE PLUS THREE ADDITIONAL AMBULANCE LAND ROVERS IN THE CL 44 TOMORROW TUESDAY. TOGETHER WITH ANY OTHER PERSONNEL OR STORES THAT CBFNE DECIDES TO SEND. THIS FLY IN WOULD BE PRIOR TO THE FLY IN ON WEDNESDAY 30 OF THE FIELD SURGICAL TEAM AND THE SECTION OF THE FIELD HOSPITAL PREFERABLY IN SERVICE AIRCRAFT WITH RED X MARKINGS IF THE NECESSARY OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE OVER THE UAR AND SAUDI ARABIA CAN BE OBTAINED. OTHERWISE TWO CL44'S WILL HAVE TO BE USED FOR THE FLY IN AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPORT UNTIL CLEARANCE FOR SERVICE AIRCRAFT CAN BE OBTAINED.

CAN YOU CONFIRM AMBASSADOR'S AGREEMENT THAT ALL SERVICE PERSONNEL, AS A TOTAL OF SOME 120, WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE DEFENCE ADVISER'S STAFF? PERSONNEL WILL BE IN CIVILIAN DRESS WITH RED CROSS ARMBANDS.

BRITISH RED CROSS WILL ENROL AND DOCUMENT ALL PERSONNEL IN CYPRUS.

2

AMMAN

REGARDING YOUR LAST QUESTION THE THOUGHT FILLS ME WITH SOME ALARM BUT I THINK I HAVE LITTLE CHOICES

YOUR OTHER SUGGESTIONS ARE WELCOME AND GOOD NEWS.

2. LONDON

HAVE YOU ACCEPTED THE SITE OF THE PARTIALLY ~~H/L~~ BUILT HOSPITAL FOR JOINT OCCUPATION WITH U S IF NOT PLEASE DO SO.

KKKKKK

AS

AMMAN

YES ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT RECCED THE SITE IN DETAIL.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT US HOSPITAL MAY NOT NOW FIVE AMERICAN PLANES HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED,

~~33~~ LONDON

33

HAVE YOU ANY GENERAL ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES IN AMMAN AND
DO YOU THINK THE NUMBERS WITH THE PROMISES OF OUTSIDE AID SHOULD
MAKE US SERIOUSLY CONSIDER SENDING FORWARD THE HEAVY SECTION TO
MAKE THE ~~WILL~~ LIGHT SECTION UP TO 200 BEDS. THE HEAVY SECTION IS AT
PRESENT AT 72 HOURS NOTICE BUT COULD BE BROUGHT TO 24 HOURS BY
WEDNESDAY 1700Z AND ~~WOULD~~ WOULD ONLY BE JUSTIFIED IF IT IS
URGENTLY NEEDED IN AMMAN.

AMMAN

3

ANY ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN
BUT ON CURRENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND KNOWING US AND
FRENCH CONTRIBUTIONS CONSIDER THAT IT IS MOST UNLIKELY

THAT THE HEAVY SECTION WILL BE REQUIRED. IT WILL BE AS WELL
TO KEEP IT AT 72 HOURS NOTICE FOR A BIT LONGER UNTIL THE
CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN LOCATED.

LONDON

THANK YOU WE WILL CERTAINLY KEEP THE HEAVY SECTION AT 72 HOURS
NOTICE UNTIL WE ARE ADVISED BY YOU THAT IT IS NOT REQUIRED.
WOULD YOU LIKE THE D A D A H AND THE HYGENE SECTION WHICH IS
ALSO AT 72 HOURS NOTICE

AMMAN
~~AMMAN~~

SUGGEST THIS GROUP BE PUT TO 48 HOURS NOTICE. WE WILL
INVESTIGATE IF REQUIREMENT SOONEST.

LONDON

SECTION WILL BE AT 24 ~~HOURS~~ HOURS NOTICE TO MOVE FROM U K
FROM WEDNESDAY. IF THE GENERAL FLY IN IS BY SERVICE
AIRCRAFT THEY WILL BRING 4 TON LORRIES TO MOVE STORES ETC
TO THE HOSPITAL SITE.

IF THE FLY IN HAS TO BE BY CL44 CAN YOU ARRANGE
TRANSPORT TO THE SITE. ?

AMMAN

GOOD NEWS ABOUT ARRIVAL FOUR TON LORRIES BUT WE ARE ASKING
JORDANIAN ARMY TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FROM AIRFIELD TO SITE
... ANY CASE.

XXXXX

44

LONDON

GOOD WE WILL ASK CBFNE PROBABLY TO SEND IN THE 4 TONNERS IF
FLY IN IS BY SERVICE AIRCRAFT OTHERWISE FLY IN WILL BE BY
2 CL44'S AND WE WILL EXPECT JORDAN ARMY TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT.

3. AS THE HOSPITAL IS GOING INTO A PARTIALLY BUILT BUILDING
DO YOU NEED ALL THE TENTAGE AND IF NOT WILL YOU ADVISE CBFNE
ACCORDINGLY?

AMMAN

WE REALISE THE BULK THAT TENTS TAKE UP IN AIRCRAFT BUT
AS PLANS CAN BE CHANGED HERE WITHOUT NOTICE AND AS TENTS
ARE SO USEFUL IN JORDAN REQUEST THAT ALL THE TENTAGE IS
BROUGHT.
.....

LONDON

THE TENTAGE WILL BE SENT IN. ARE YOU HAPPY ABOUT
ACCOMMODATION FOR UP TO 125 OF ~~WHOM ARE 5~~ WHOM 5 ARE
JERUSALEM OFFICERS (FEMALE)
.....

AMMAN

WE ARE INFORMED BY DMS JORDANIAN ARMY THAT HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION
IS CUSTOM BUILT THOUGH NOT YET FURNISHED AND WE DO NOT
ANTICIPATE MUCH DIFFICULTY.
.....

WASHINGTON

GOOD BUT WE MUST HAVE SOONEST THE EXACT LOCATION OF THIS
HOSPITAL AND RECOMMEND THAT YOU STAKE YOUR CLAIM TO LIVING
~~ACCOMMODATION AND SUPPORT BEFORE THE U S MOVE IN IN A BIG WAY~~
~~DO YOU ANY FURTHER COME~~
ACCOMMODATION AND SUPPORT BEFORE THE U S MOVE IN IN A BIG WAY.
DO YOU ANY FURTHER COMMENTS ON THIS POINT? KKKKKKK

DO WE HOPE TO HAVE REPS AT THE HOSPITAL SITE BEFORE DARK
TONIGHT. NO OTHER COMMENTS.
.....

LOCATION OF HOSPITAL ON 1/250,000 MAP IS GRID REFERENCE
TA 0743.
.....

LONDON

PLEASE OBTAIN THE VIEWS OF H E THE AMBASSADOR ON WHAT
ADDITIONAL VISIT ~~W~~ RISKS EXIST FOR BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL
IN JORDAN ARISING FROM THE FACT THAT WE STILL HOLD LEILA.

XXX AND ADVISE US ON 1ST TELCONFERENCE TOMORROW .

AMMAN

THIS IS THE AMBASSADOR .

I HAVE BEEN IN THE BOOTH DEALING WITH OTHER QUESTIONS AND
LEAVING BE-N AND DA TO HOLD THE VARIOUS BABIES THAT YOU
HAVE BEEN DUMPING ON US. I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY ADDITIONAL
RISK TO BRITISH SERVICE PERSONNEL ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT
WE STILL HOLD ~~YOU~~ LEILA BUT IF WE CONTINUE TO HOLD HER AFTER
THE SECURE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING SIX HOSTAGES WE MIGHT
BE IN FOR TROUBLE.

LONDON

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ADVICE I HAVE ONLY ONE FURTHER POINT
THE DEFENCE COMMUNICATIONS ADVISE ME THAT THEY ARE SIGNALLING
THE JOINT SIGNAL BOARD ON THE FOLLOWING TERMS
WE HAVE ADVISED DA AMMAN THAT ~~YOU~~ YOU WILL NOTIFY JORDANIAN
AUTHORITIES THROUGH EMBASSY AMMAN DETAILS OF REAR LINK D13
A13 AND AIR MANAGEMENT CIRCUIT FREQUENCIES TO BE USED.

AMMAN

FINE . WE ONLY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO OBJECTION TO
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REAR LINK COMMUNICATIONS BY THE
JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY THE FRENCH THAT
THE SITE OF THEIR AERIALS WAS NOT POPULAR BUT WAS ACCEPTED.
FOR SITE OF THEIR PLEASE READ SIGHT

LONDON

NOTED BUT WE INTEND THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS
WILL BE IN CLEAR

000000

AS REGARDS A FIRST TELECONF TOMORROW I SUGGEST 0700Z
IF WE GET ANY NEWS ABOUT HOSTAGES WE CAN SEND A FLASH TEL
WHILE PLEASE WAIT 1 (AS1) I HAVE A SHOCK FOR YOUR
THE FORM OF A SHOPPING LIST FROM THE ARMY. YOU WILL SEE
THAT I AM ADVISING YOU TO PLAY THIS COOL SO THAT I HAVE A
CHANCE TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES

LIST AND COMMENT FOLLOW

THE FOLLOWING LIST OF AMMUNITION REQUIRED BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY
HAS JUST BEEN HANDED TO ME (AMBASSADOR SPEAKING) BY MIREIWID TEL
I NOW SEE IT INCLUDES VEHICLES. I AM PASSING IT AS RECEIVED
BUT HAVE THE FOLLOWING OFF THE CUFF COMMENTS.

MIREIWID IN HANDING IT OVER ASSURED ME THAT THE AMERICANS HAD
GUARANTEED PAYMENT FOR THE SHOPPING LIST. MY HEAD OF CHANCERY IS
TRYING TO CONFIRM THIS NOW WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY BY AN UNRELIABLE
TELEPHONE SYSTEM. IN ANY CASE THE SUPPLY OF E.G. 76 CENTURION TANKS
THE 105 MM CUN IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME AND THERE WILL BE MORE
TIME FOR US TO DISCUSS THE LIST LOCALLY.

MIREIWID HAS PROMISED ME THAT HE WILL TRY TO FIX AN INTERVIEW WITH
THE KING TOMORROW AND I SHALL TAKE THIS OPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS LIST
WELL AS DEBRIEFING HIM ABOUT HIS VISIT TO CAIRO AND ASKING HIM
ABOUT HIS FUTURE INTENTIONS.

LIST FOLLOWS:-

SERIAL NO.

TYPE OF AMMUNITION

QTY REQD.

1	SHELL QF 25 PR HE L6 SL MK 1 FUZED 117 MK 17/6	21014
2	SHELL QF 25 PR HE TNT L6 PLUGGED	1460
3	SHELL QF 25 PR SMOKE BE SCREENING PLUGGED	1157
4	SHELL QF 25 PR HESH L3A9 FUZED L19A3	1472
5	SHELL 25 PR FLARE BLUE PLUGGED	52
6	SHELL 25 PR FLARE RED PLUGGED	53
7	FUZE NO 213 MK 5	4887
8	FUZE NO 221B MK 7	1270
9	CARTRIDGE 5 NORMAL MK 1/2 TYPE 22	10000
10	CARTRIDGE 25 PR SUPER - CHARGE	243
11	ROUNDS 76MM ARM'D CAR HEIT	5004
12	ROUNDS 76MM ARM'D CAR HESH	6013
13	ROUNDS 76MM ARM'D CAR SMOKE	2476
14	GRENADE SMOKE WP NO 56	2400
15	FUZE ELECTRIC F 103 MK 4	2400
16	105 MM TK HESH (L35A3) ROUNDS FUZED L56	22371
17	105 MM TK APDS (L26) ROUNDS	14051
18	105 MM TK SMOKE (L39A2) ROUNDS	4497
19	GRENADE HAND NO 83 SMOKE RED	330
20	GRENADE HAND NO 83 SMOKE YELLOW	330
21	GRENADE HAND NO 83 SMOKE GREEN	330

A. GENERAL PURPOSE VEHICLES

1.	MOTOR CYCLE	85
2.	L/ROVER 4X4, 88'' W.B. CARGO	108
3.	L/ROVER 4X4, 88'' W.B. WELDING	23
4.	L/ROVER 4X4 109'' W.B. CARGO	156
5.	TRUCK 1 TON W/BODY CARGO	67
6.	TRUCK 1 TON AMBULANCE	18
7.	TRUCK 3 TON 4X4, WATER TANK 1000 L.G.	32
8.	TRUCK 3 TON, W/BODY CARGO	208
9.	TRUCK 3 TON AMBULANCE	29
10.	TRUCK 3 TON 4X4 WRECKER	6
11.	TRUCK 10 TON RECOVERY	8

B. FIGHTING VEHICLES.

1.	FERRET SCOUT CAR COMPLETE	27
2.	A.P.C. 6X6 SARACEN COMPLETE	42
3.	ARMoured CAR 6X6 SALADIN	19
4.	CENTURION TANK W/105 MM GUN MK'S 9 OR 10	76

9

THE ABOVE LIST WILL NO DOUBT TAKE YOUR BREATH AWAY MUCH AS IT
AND I NEED HARDLY STRESS THAT ANY PUBLICITY AT THIS STAGE
THE FACT THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY HAS ASKED FOR LET ALONE
WE ARE CONSIDERING SUCH A LIST COULD HAVE MOST UNFORTUNATE
IMPLICATIONS. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT IT REPRESENTS WHAT THE
JORDAN ARMY HAS LOST IN THE RECENT FIGHTING WHETHER AGAINST
THE SYRIANS OR THE SYRIANS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE HASHEMITES
ARE JUMPING IN ON THE CHANCE OF STRENGTHENING THEIR ARMED FORCES.
I HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED I SHOULD LIKE IN SPITE OF THE APPARENT
MANNER WITH WHICH THIS MESSAGE WAS CONVEYED TO ME BY MR TEL
DISCUSS IT FURTHER WITH THE KING TOMORROW BEFORE WE TAKE ANY
ACTION ON IT.

AS I HAVE NOW LEARN BEEN PROMISED OR THREATENED WITH A LIST
OF AIRCRAFT SPARES TOMORROW.

AMMAN

THANKS FOR THIS ASTONISHING LIST . I GATHER FROM
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE THAT THEY TOO HAVE HAD A LONG AND DETAILED
LIST, A LOT OF IT SEEMED TO BE FOR TOPPING UP PURPOSES.
THEY ARE STUDYING THE LIST BUT ARE NOT INCLINED TO
ACT SPEEDILY. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR REPORT OF WHAT THE KING
SAY IN EXPLAINING THE WIDE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT ASKED FOR
I WOULD THINK WE WOULD CERTAINLY WISH TO PLAY THIS LONG AND COOL,
WAS YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

AMMAN

OF C HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
WILL TRY TO DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. TO HIGHTEN THE DRAMA
I WOULD ADD THAT MR TEL SAID ORALLY THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WILL
BE ABLE TO AIRLIFT THE ORDER. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE
SHOULD PLAY THIS VERY COOL WITH NO PUBLICITY AND MY STAFF AND I
WILL MAKE FURTHER ENQUIRIES AS SOON AS WE CAN. BOTH OF THE JORDANIANS
AND THE AMERICANS.

201001
TOMORROWS TELECONF , WE AGREE THIS SHOULD BE AT 0700Z

10

BUT I FEAR WE MAY NOT (NOT) BE ABLE TO AUTHORISE YOU TO SWITCH
OFF YOUR GENERATOR AT THE USUAL TIME TONITE, IF IT CAN BE KEPT
GOING WITHOUT UNDUE HARDSHIP ON YOUR STAFF. THE REASON IS THAT
WE MUST BE ABLE TO RAISE YOU AT NEED TO CHECK ON THE WILD RUMOURS
ABOUT THE SIX HOSTAGES WHICH ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO GO ROUND.
WE REALISE YOU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THEM ONE WAY OR THE OTHER
WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ?

THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO AFTER DARK. THERE THEREFORE SEEMS NO
POINT IN KEEPING STAFF UP AND GENV WORKING IN THE

IF FROM THIS END WE HAVE ANYTHING TO SEND YOU WE CAN
REACTIVATE OUR SYSTEM. OTHERWISE WE SHALL JUST BE HANGING
AROUND OUT OF TOUCH WITH ANYONE BUT YOU AND UNABLE TO REACH
OUR HOUSES (APART FROM THOSE WHO WILL BE STAYING HERE ANYWAY)
DO YOU REALLY WANT US TO KEEP OPEN ON THESE TERMS AND IF SO
UNTIL WHEN???? IT WILL BE DARK IN 40 MINS

201001
PLEASE CLOSE DOWN AT THE NORMAL TIME . BUT PLEASE ALSO DO NOT
FAIL TO SEND US FLASH ANYTHING RELEVANT TO THE RELEASE OR FATE
OF THE HOSTAGES. I CANNOT OVER EMPHASISE OUR QUOTES NEED TO KNOW
CLOSURE

IMMAN

NY H.C. HAS JUST REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:-

THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL NEGOTIATING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE
REMAINING 6 HOSTAGES (SAID USSEF, PROBABLY EIS) ASKED THE REDCROSS
TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FOR HIM TO GO OUT TO WHERE THEY WERE HELD AT
1000 LOCAL TIME THIS AFTERNOON. WE ARRANGED FOR HORNIDLOW, A BRITISH
DOCTOR FROM ABU DHABI WHO HELPED USSEF TO FETCH THE OTHER 32, TO
OFFER HIS SERVICES AND HE DULY TURNED UP AT THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY AT
0900. HE WAS TOLD THAT USSEF HAD BEEN OUT FOR 2 HOURS BUT WOULD BE
BACK SHORTLY. HE WAS STILL WAITING WHEN I LEFT HIM AT 3.50 AND
PROPOSES TO STAY THERE UNTIL HE HAS SOME DEFINITE NEWS
HE HAS PROMISED TO PASS ON TO US ANYTHING HE HEARS.

IT IS THAT USSEF IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE BELP
THAT IF HE IS SUCCESSFUL HE WILL BRING THE HOSTAGES OUT THIS
MORNING. IT CERTAINLY LOOKS AS IF THIS IS THEIR BEST CHANCE OF
GETTING OUT.

ADVANCE COPIES

Cairo 1081
JORDAN CRISIS

FCO/wh

P.S.

P.S. to C.D.L.

~~P.S. to MR. GODDER~~

P.S. to LORD LOTHIAN

P.S. to MR. ROYLE

P.U.S.

SIR P. ADAMS

MR. GALLAGHER

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (7)

HD. A. & T. D.

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

~~PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.~~

~~PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)~~

~~SECURITY DEPT.~~

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMNS. DEPT.

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET

~~P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY~~

P.S. TO SEC. OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

CABINET OFFICE: SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

(29)

CYPRUS CAT/A

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1081

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
28 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

861330Z

ADDED TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1081 DATED 28/9/70 REPEATED
FOR INFO (IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, UKMS NEW YORK,
TEL AVIV AND AMMAN (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW,
BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, ALGIERS.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1072 :

ARAB SUMMIT.

KING HUSSEIN ARRIVED IN CAIRO YESTERDAY MORNING AND WAS MET
BY PRESIDENT NASSER. AFTER SLIGHT HESITATION, KING HUSSEIN
TOOK A STEP FORWARD AND THE TWO LEADERS EMBRACED. THE PRESS
WERE KEPT WELL BACK AND NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF THIS APPEAR
IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS.

2. AFTER A DAY OF MEETINGS, THE ARAB SUMMIT ENDED LAST NIGHT WITH AN AGREEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS IN M.I.P.T. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMED THIS TO ME WHEN I SAW HIM THIS MORNING.

3. AS YOU WILL SEE, IT IS, IN FACT, AN AGREEMENT TO RETURN TO THE (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINE) STATUS QUO ANTE, INCLUDING THE DEMILITARISATION OF AMMAN. THE 14TH POINT CALLING FOR COMPLETE LIBERATION AND THE ROUTING OF THE "USURPING ISRAELI ENEMY" WILL NO DOUBT BE READ BY SOME OF THE SIGNATORIES AS A CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL, BUT HAS I SUSPECT BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN A CALL FOR TOTAL ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL AND A CALL FOR THE RETURN OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. THERE IS, I THINK, NO DOUBT THAT KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO JOIN THE SUMMIT WAS BOTH BRAVE AND SKILFUL AND HAS DONE SOMETHING TO TURN BACK THE RAPID DRIFT OF SYMPATHY AWAY FROM HIM. HE HAS AT LEAST SHOWN CONSIDERABLE COURAGE IN FACING HIS ACCUSERS DIRECT.

5. QADDAFI RETURNED TO LIBYA LAST NIGHT BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS DEPARTURE ARE NOT YET CLEAR. HE IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SEEN OFF AT CAIRO AIRPORT BY BRIGADIER DAUD WHO IS STILL IN CAIRO.

6. THE FACT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT ALL IS SOMETHING OF A TRIUMPH FOR THE EGYPTIANS WHO MAY WELL HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSUADING HUSSEIN TO COME TO CAIRO. PHOTOGRAPHS IN TODAY'S PRESS SHOW NASSER SITTING BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT (WHO, ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT STARTED THE MEETINGS WITH REVOLVERS DRAWN UNTIL PERSUADED TO REMOVE THEM BY KING FAISAL). APART FROM THE HUMANITARIAN WISH TO AVOID CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN AND THE NEED TO ASSERT HIS POSITION AS CHIEF CONCILIATOR FOR THE ARABS, NASSER MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN CONCERNED TO PRESERVE HUSSEIN AS AN EFFECTIVE PARTNER IN THE JARRING TALKS AND ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE EGYPTIANS ARE STILL KEEN TO SEE THESE CONTINUE. IT IS I THINK SIGNIFICANT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD HAVE SPENT MUCH OF THE TIME DURING THE RECENT CRISIS TALKING TO THE SPANIARDS AND ITALIANS IN ANTICIPATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISITS.

SECRET

Mr Noon 14

Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 28 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

Amman

Although the cease-fire has been observed generally and the city is fairly quiet, there have been sporadic outbursts of firing as Army tanks and armoured vehicles continue their search for snipers. The city centre and other areas are still held by the Fedayeen. In the Defence Attache's opinion (telno 681) it would take a major operation by many more troops, particularly infantry, than are available to clear Amman.

North Jordan

2. Irbid and the northern towns are still in Fedayeen hands with the Army waiting outside (Tel Aviv FOH 271000Z). There have been isolated incidents and sniping in the area. The south of Jordan is said to be under the control of the Army which is rounding up the Fedayeen.

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

Cairo

3. Following a day of consultation among the Arab Heads of State including King Hussein, and Arafat, an agreement was signed by all parties to end the fighting in Jordan. According to agency reports the agreement provides for:

- a) an immediate ceasefire;
- b) the creation of a "Higher Committee" under the chairmanship of the Tunisian Prime Minister to "supervise its implementation";
- c) the Jordanian Army and the guerillas to withdraw from

SECRET

/Amman

SECRET

Amman and return to previously held positions;

- d) a return to civil rule in Irbid and other northern towns;
- e) the release of detainees on both sides.

If the agreement is violated, all Arab states are committed to take collective action to preserve the peace.

4. The Arab leaders have now dispersed.

III. Reactions outside Jordan

5. HII Ambassador was summoned to receive a note (Khartoum telsno. 546-7) warning that any outside intervention in Jordan would have very serious consequences.

IV. HII Embassy, Amman

6. Members of the staff are safe and well, although in some danger when venturing on the streets, particularly after dark. A stray bullet passed through the Registry window yesterday afternoon.

V. Evacuation

7. Twenty British nationals evacuated from Jordan will arrive in London from Beirut today. Three British subjects reported missing in Amman have not yet been found.

VI. Relief: ICRC plans

8. The ICRC have told our Consul-General (Geneva) that they accept our request that they should "act as a co-ordinator" of medical units (Geneva telno 65). They have asked us to fly in "medical units regardless of risks involved". They propose the following schedule for UK and US medical aid.

Tuesday, 29 September. Arrival in Amman of American medical unit or transportable hospital.

Wednesday, 30 September. Arrival of UK surgical team and one field hospital.

SECRET

Thursday, 1 October. Arrival of US surgical hospital.

9. They have asked us to confirm acceptance of this schedule. The ICRC while agreeing to co-ordinate medical aid have so far refused to accept that this should be "strictly" under their auspices. They will not arrange flight clearance with the Palestinians or Jordanian authorities, and have not agreed our flights with them, as they did in the case of the French. HM Consul-General expressed concern to the President of the ICRC about the organisation of British aid under ICRC aegis. The ICRC President, who was unable to clarify the situation, hoped to be able to spell out the conditions more exactly. We shall resolve this very soon.

Cargo-Lux aeroplane

10. This aeroplane is due to have left Manston aerodrome about 22.30 last night with 22 tons of material for relief in Jordan. It is expected that this will fly straight to Amman.

UK medical aid

11. The ICRC have informed us that it will not be necessary to evacuate casualties from Jordan to bases in Cyprus (Operation "Shoveller"). The casualties will be flown somewhere nearer, Syria or the Lebanon. Our aircraft assigned for CASEVAC will be used to ferry food supplies^{if}, as seems probable, it is not required for evacuating the wounded.

UK food aid

12. HM Ambassador Amman estimates a "starvation gap" of one week before local food supply routes will re-open.

13. We have arranged a shuttle service of supplies from Cyprus-Amman. Foodstuffs (flour, rice, beans etc) will be purchased locally or supplied from HQ, BFME (Cyprus). The flights will start today, if arrangements can be completed via CASEVAC aircraft.

SECRET

US medical aid

14. The Americans plan to set up a large field hospital in Amman with supporting services. All personnel will be civilian. The first stage will be the arrival in Amman (scheduled for dawn today) of five Hercules aircraft from bases in the UK. A further 25 aircraft will leave Germany this evening to reach Amman at dawn tomorrow.

UN food aid

15. HM Embassy in Rome have suggested to the Director of the UN's World Food Programme (FAO) that nearby stocks at sea should be diverted to Jordan. The Director promised to reply to this suggestion early this morning.

VII. Hostages and Leila Khaled

16. Thirty-two out of the 38 American hostages were released in Amman early on the morning of 27 September and flown to Nicosia by a Swiss cargo plane. The UAR Embassy appear to have acted as intermediary in their release. Although confirmation is still awaited from HM Embassy, Amman, the remaining six hostages are believed to have been freed, but pending evacuation this morning/^{their}precise whereabouts are unknown. It is thought they are being held by the Jordanian Army.

17. UK Ministers decided that they were willing to release Leila Khaled after the remaining six hostages had arrived safely outside Jordan; and that with the agreement of the UAR (since given) Miss Khaled would then be taken by RAF plane to Cairo. The German and Swiss Governments were informed that the aircraft could collect their detainees on the way, if they so wished (FCO telno 644 to Bonn).

18. Having first accepted this plan (Bonn telno 1134), the German Government later stated that they would participate only if the Americans were agreeable. After consultation with HM Embassy, Washington, the Germans were told that the Americans had made no criticism of our plan and that if the Federal Government wanted more

4
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/positive

SECRET

positive assurances, they should pursue the matter in Washington. HMG intended to proceed with or without German participating, although we obviously hoped they will join us. An answer is expected from Bonn following a Cabinet meeting at 0800 hours today.

19. According to HM Embassy, Berne, the Swiss Government were in principle ready to cooperate in the return of their prisoners but feared that the handing over of the detainees to the UAR might provoke a hostile reaction from the PFLP. The Swiss were informed that the Egyptians had acted as negotiators for the release of the first 32 hostages and we did not anticipate any trouble from the PFLP.

20. Berne later reported by telephone that while the Swiss Cabinet favoured the deal, the Cantonal Government of Zurich opposed the release of the detainees. We expect to hear by mid-morning whether this conflict has been resolved.

21. In order that Miss Khaled can be despatched at the earliest opportunity and to reduce the risk of the Israelis submitting a request for her extradition before her departure (Tel Aviv telno 913), the RAF Comet will be placed on 3 hours standby wef 0700 hours at which time we may have news from Amman of the departure and destination of hostages.

ADVANCE COPIES

JORDAN CRISIS

A. I. ... 120
(39)

P.S.

P.S. to C.D.L.

P.S. to MR. GODBER

P.S. to LORD LOTHIAN

P.S. to MR. ROYLE

P.U.S.

SIR P. ADAMS

MR. GALLAGHER

.....

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (7)

HD. A. & T. D.

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

~~PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.~~

~~PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)~~

~~SECURITY DEPT.~~

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMS. DEPT.

.....

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET—

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

P.S. TO SEC. OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

CABINET OFFICE: SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

RESIDENT CLERK

CYPHER CAT/A

FLASH AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 704

TO F.C.O. LONDON

28 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 281645Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 704 DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT AND BERNE AND
IMMEDIATE TO CG GENEVA PARIS MOSCOW BONN WASHINGTON ALGIERS

REMAINING SIX HOSTAGES.

THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT THE SIX REMAINING HOSTAGES
ARE BEING HELD SOME DISTANCE FROM AMMAN AND IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE
TO MOVE THEM TONIGHT, THEY HOPE TO BRING THEM TO AMMAN EARLY TOM-
ORROW.

2.. WHILE THE EGYPTIANS EMPHASISED THAT THE SIX WERE BEING RELEASED UNCONDITIONALLY, THEY SAID THAT THE PFLP EXPECTED HMG TO EXERT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR THE RELEASE OF THE TWO ALGERIANS BEING HELD IN ISRAEL, AS THEY HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF A BRITISH AIRCRAFT. THE PFLP ALSO EXPECTED ISRAEL TO RELEASE 12 FEDAYEEN BEING HELD IN ISRAEL. A LIST OF THESE WOULD BE RELEASED LATER.

3.. WE WILL REPORT AS SOON AS WE HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER, BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE BEFORE TOMORROW MORNING.

FCO PASS FLASH TO BERNE AND IMMEDIATE TO CG GENEVA BONN PARIS WASHINGTON AND ALGIERS.

MR PHILLIPS

NNNN

Dr Roan
15

SECRET

SECRET

Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 29 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

Amman

Jordanian Army officers were reported as considering that the Army had not won decisively enough.

2. Civilians, particularly women and children, appeared on the streets in the Amman suburbs clustering around water and food distribution vehicles. The Army made a concentrated effort to remove disabled and burnt-out vehicles. The airport and the northern road to it were open and British relief supplies arrived and were handed over to the Red Cross. No Fedayeen were seen.

General

3. There are indications that Army units are beginning to return to their peacetime locations. There were steady movements of tanks and other military vehicles southwards.

4. An Army spokesman said unattributably that the terrorists might establish themselves in Northern Jordan and that "such a situation could have special significance for Israel".

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

5. King Hussein returned to Amman from the Arab summit in Cairo early on Monday, 28 September. His courage in having faced his accusers in Cairo is reported by HM Ambassador there to have done something to improve his standing.

6. Vice President Anwar Sadat announced on Cairo Radio at approximately 9 pm on 28 September that President Nasser had died

/some

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some five hours previously. (Agency reports subsequently stated that President Nixon had suspended exercises by the US Sixth Fleet as a mark of respect; and that Prime Minister Kosygin would represent the Soviet Union at the funeral on Thursday, 1 October.)

7. The death of President Nasser did not in the view of HM Ambassador in Cairo affect the plan to deliver Leila Khaled and the six other prisoners there.

III. Reactions outside Jordan

8. The Israeli Ambassador sent a message to the FCO (from Blackpool) expressing concern at reports about the possible imminent release of Leila Khaled saying that the Israeli Government viewed her disposal in the terms of the Extradition Treaty between Israel and the UK. Arrangements have been made for the Ambassador to call on the Permanent Under Secretary at 9.15 am today.
9. The Swiss Government issued a communiqué anticipating a happy outcome of the hostages crisis.

IV. HM Embassy, Amman

10. Members of the staff are safe.

V. Evacuation

11. Nothing to report.

VI. Relief

12. HM Ambassador in Amman reports relief requirements will be for food and general nursing rather than surgery.

UK food aid

13. Some 38 tons of British supplies from Cyprus and the UK arrived in Jordan yesterday and were handed to the Red Cross. Further supplies, amounting in total to about 80 tons, will arrive from HQ BFNE once a day until and including Thursday, 1 October.

/We

SECRET

We shall review the need for further consignments after 1 October in the light of the supply route situation.

UK medical aid

14. As there are no longer plans to evacuate casualties from Jordan to Cyprus, operation SHOVELLER has been revised and become a plan to ferry medical aid from Cyprus to Jordan. If there are facilities for unloading vehicles in Amman from civil freight aircraft (although this is reported unlikely) it is hoped to fly in a field ambulance and three ambulance land Rovers today.

15. RAF aircraft would bring in a field surgical team and part of a field hospital tomorrow, 30 September. Clearance for these RAF flights has been requested. All personnel involved will be in civilian dress and attached to DA's staff. They will be enrolled in the British Red Cross in Cyprus so as to give them additional recognition and protection once in Jordan. We shall share a partially built Jordanian military hospital 7 miles west of Amman with the Americans. A 50-bed French field hospital has been established in Amman.

US medical aid

16. The US Government have decided to take up the ICRC's offer to act as co-ordinator for their medical teams. One field hospital has arrived in Amman and another is due there today.

UN food aid

17. The World Food Programme officials in Rome have plans to take supplies to Jordan from stocks in the UAR, Lebanon and Turkey. There are no nearby cargoes at sea.

Israeli food aid

18. It has been reported that 145 tons of food provided by the
/Israel

SECRET

Israel Government entered Jordan on 27 September.

Arab Relief Committee

19. This has been set up under the chairmanship of King Faisal. We have offered to inform him of our plans to help Jordan both unilaterally and as part of any international effort and have asked to be kept informed of progress by his Committee.

Arms replacement

20. HM Ambassador, Amman received a very substantial 'shopping list' for arms and military vehicles on which he is seeking clarification from King Hussein.

VII. Hostages/prisoners and Leila Khaled

21. A UAR Embassy official in Amman told HM Embassy that the six hostages were safe and well in a house outside Amman but he subsequently admitted that he had lost contact with the captors.

22. HM Ambassador in Cairo was told by the UAR authorities that they thought that the six had left Amman. HM Embassy in Amman on rechecking with the Egyptian Embassy there found that the Red Cross had been asked to provide transport to where the hostages were believed to be held outside Amman at 3.30 pm local time on 28 September. The Egyptian Embassy subsequently told the British Embassy that the six remaining hostages were being held at some distance from Amman and that it would not after all be possible to move them on 28 September. They hoped to bring them to Amman early on 29 September.

23. While the Egyptians emphasised that the six were being released unconditionally, they said that the PFLP expected HMG to exert pressure on Israel for the release of the two Algerians being held there, since they had been taken off a British aircraft. The

/PFLP

SECRET

PFLP also expected Israel to release 12 Fedayeen being held in Israel.

24. The text of a press announcement to be issued by the British Government at the time of the release of Leila Khaled was cleared with HM Ambassadors concerned.

25. The Governments of the Federal German Republic and Switzerland agreed that the three Fedayeen prisoners held by each of them should be put aboard the RAF Comet carrying Leila Khaled (at Munich and Zurich) en route to Cairo. The Germans sent their three prisoners to Munich.

26. The Swiss Government asked that the RAF Comet should stage at Dübendorf military airport (near Zurich) rather than at the civil airport. Ministry of Defence are in touch with the Air Attaché in HM Embassy, Berne about landing conditions at that airport (Berne telno 349 of 28 September to FCO repeated to MOD).

27. The Swiss Government suggested that, once the present crisis is finally resolved, the Berne Group should consider what action might be taken with Arab Governments to deter further hijacking by terrorists.

28. Members of the Arguello family told HM Consul-General Geneva that they wished eventually to repatriate to Managua the body of their deceased hijacker relative.

SECRET

Message from U.S. Embassy

At noon a member of
the US Embassy went to
the Miyashiro Hospital.
Found there ^{the U.A.R.} a member of
Military Attaché negotiating
with members of ICRC.
He did not see the hostages.

U.S. Official left having
made arrangements with
ICRC to get information
from them as quickly as
possible.

American draw conclusion
that the hostages are still
in VARR Embassy.

CONFIDENTIAL

PHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2123

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
29 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 291710Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 2123 OF 29 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AND SAVING TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

YOUR TELNO 13/4: MIDDLE EAST: FOUR POWER TALKS.

FURTHER MEETING OF DEPUTIES WAS HELD UNDER OUR CHAIRMANSHIP THIS MORNING. AMERICANS ATTENDED RELUCTANTLY AND AT LOW LEVEL AND WITHOUT PAPERS. THEY STARTED BY EXPRESSING SOME DOUBT WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT FOR DEPUTIES TO CONTINUE BUSINESS AS USUAL PRETENDING THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED IN THE REAL WORLD. ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS POINTED OUT THAT THE DEPUTIES' BASIC TASK OF ESTABLISHING THE AREA OF AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED. AMERICANS THEN CHANGED THEIR GROUND, SAYING THAT THEY KNEW THAT THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE TOMORROW ABOUT FUTURE OF FOUR-POWER TALKS INCLUDING (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) ON THE TASK OF THE DEPUTIES. THEY WERE NOT UNWILLING TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION BUT DOUBTED ITS USEFULNESS IN THE LIGHT OF LACK OF AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ISSUES OF SECURE AND RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES AND THE COMMITMENT TO PEACE, ON WHICH USSR COMMENTED THAT THEY WERE STILL WAITING U S REPLY TO THEIR PROPOSALS ON PEACE. THE AMERICANS REFUSED EVEN TO AGREE TENTATIVELY ON DATE FOR NEXT MEETING. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION SUMMED UP POSITION AS BEING THAT IN SPITE OF THE HAZARDE THE POSITION OF ONE DELEGATION HAD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROCEED. THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE LINE THEY WILL TAKE WITH THE PRESS. WARNER POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS AN UNFAIR SUTTING UP, BUT THAT HE AS CHAIRMAN FELT IT DIFFICULT TO CONDUCT A USEFUL DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS THAT HAD EMERGED.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE PARIS AND MOSCOW ROUTINE CAIRO AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO BEIRUT, AMMAN, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM

SIR C. CROWE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PPPP



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 7022

MO 11/10/4
CONFIDENTIAL

29th September, 1970

Dear Peter,

In my letter of 28th September I described the preparations which we had made for sending medical units into Jordan, but explained that the Defence Secretary was reluctant to give the go-ahead for them to be flown into Amman so long as Miss Khalid remained in this country. As you will know, this problem of timing was raised in Cabinet this morning and, in view of the views which had been expressed by the Embassy in Amman in the meantime about the low degree of risk to the units, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary to consider further whether their arrival in Amman need be held up until Miss Khalid's release. The conclusion reached by Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Lord Carrington was that it would be right to follow the Embassy's advice and to go ahead with sending the units in.

Since then, the question of which route should be used to fly the units to Amman has been settled to the extent that the Lebanon-Syria route will be available for as far ahead as can be foreseen (though it has not so far been possible to obtain clearance for an alternative route as well, as we would have wished in order to minimise the chances of the operation being halted). Executive orders have therefore been given for the units listed in my previous letter to be flown to Amman tomorrow, commencing at 3 a.m.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ian McCluney, Graham Angel and Richard Lloyd Jones.

Yours sincerely,

Tony Stephens

(A.W. STEPHENS)

P.J.S. Moon, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
TELEGRAM NO 927
RESTRICTED 290747Z

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
29 SEPTEMBER 1970

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 927
OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

PRESIDENT NASSER.

IMMEDIATE ISRAELI REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NASSER'S
DEATH SHOWED MIXED FEELINGS.

2. THE ONLY OFFICIAL REACTION SO FAR, APART FROM MR EKAN'S
REMARKS IN NEW YORK, HAS BEEN A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE
PRIME MINISTER TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL REMAINS READY TO MAKE
PEACE WITH ANY SUCCESSOR.

3. THERE WAS SOME EXCITEMENT APPARENT WHEN THE NEWS WAS
FIRST HEARD, AND PRESIDENT NASSER WAS CERTAINLY REGARDED AS
NO FRIEND OF ISRAEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PREVAILING MOOD
OF THOSE TO WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN REFLECTS A SOBER RECOGNITION
THAT IN RECENT MONTHS HE HAD SHOWN SIGNS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE
APPROACH. MOREOVER HE WAS PROBABLY THE ONLY MAN WITH THE
PRESTIGE TO STAND UP IN SOME DEGREE TO THE RUSSIANS AND
TO LEAD THE ARAB WORLD TOWARDS FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THIS MORNING'S PRESS, IN HASTILY-WRITTEN EDITORIALS,
EMPHASISES PRESIDENT NASSER'S POSITION AS THE STRONG MAN OF
EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD AND EXPECTS A PERIOD OF CONFUSION
TO FOLLOW. BUT THERE IS ALSO RECOGNITION THAT HIS DEATH IS
UNLIKELY TO BE AN UNMIXED BLESSING FOR ISRAEL. AS THE JERUSALEM
POST PUTS IT 'ISRAEL'S HOPE FOR REAL PEACE REMAINS IN A STABLE
MIDDLE EAST. THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT NASSER WILL NOT UNHAPPILY
BRING THAT GOAL CLOSER TO ATTAINMENT'.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYBER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TELEGRAM NO 708

SECRET

19
TO F.C.O.
29 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET. 290810Z

YOUR TEL 412 OF 27 SEPT.

(F.C.S.)

FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU FROM KING HUSSEIN WAS DELIVERED
TO THE EMBASSY LAST NIGHT.

BEGINS...

MAY I EXTEND MY MOST SINCERE GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION
TO YOU SIR FOR YOUR KIND PERSONAL MESSAGE. AT A MOST CRITICAL
AND DISTRESSING PERIOD OF OUR LIVES IT HAS INDEED GIVEN ME
STRENGTH TO FEEL THAT WE HAD OUR FRIENDS' SUPPORT, THOUGHTS AND
FEELINGS WITH US. THAT WE WERE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS THE
RELEASE OF ALL THOSE INNOCENT PEOPLE AND THEIR SAFE RETURN TO
THEIR FAMILIES AND HOMES, IN SOME LITTLE WAY CONSOLED ME IN THE
FACE OF THE FEELINGS OF DEEP SHAME, ANGER AND SORROW AT THEIR
PREDICAMENT AND SUFFERING: FEELINGS SHARED WITH ME BY MANY
IN JORDAN, THE ARAB WORLD AND THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. KINDLY CONVEY
MY REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBERS OF
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT AS WE BEGIN TO
REBUILD OUR COUNTRY AND NATION, AND DRESS OUR WOUNDS, WE WILL
RECEIVE ALL YOUR HELP AND SUPPORT. WE HOPE THAT WE WILL ALWAYS
LIVE UP, WITH GOD'S WILL, TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR STAUNCH
FRIENDS AND WELL WISHERS.

ENDS....

MR. PHILLIPS

FILES

EMERGENCY STAFF


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PRIVATE SECRETARY

SIR P. ADAMS

MR. ARTHUR

SECRET



PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East A2

Sir Philip Adams

Situation in Jordan

I understand that Mr. Michael Adams has seen Mr. Maitland and the Prime Minister and has said that the threat to the Embassy on the night of 12 September which triggered off the announcement about the release of Miss Khaled was not apparent to him. You will recall that the Embassy reported that it had received a telephonic threat and then that the armed Fedayeen were assembling outside. This led to a request from the Ambassador for the announcement about the girl's release, which Ministers agreed upon at short notice.

2. On the following day, the newspapers poured a good deal of scorn on the alleged threat to the Embassy and certain Ministers suggested that the Ambassador had panicked.

3. I think we really must get a full account from Mr. Phillips of what happened. I suggest that Mr. Maitland makes a full record of his conversation with Mr. Adams and that we then send it to John Phillips for his comments. Unless this is cleared up, it will always rankle with Ministers.

Copies to: Private Secretary
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Moon, No. 10
Mr. Maitland, No. 10

(Denis Greenhill)
30 September, 1970

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

P.M. has seen.

Mr. 30/9/70



With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

*Prime Minister;
Mr.*

30/9

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

S.W.1

20277 Dean

SECRET

Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 30 September 1970

(all times referred to are BST unless
otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

Amman

Civilians were moving freely on foot yesterday but there were no civilian cars in the streets. Shooting had stopped. The Army were distributing food and civil defence vehicles were issuing water.

2. Jordan Army sources admitted that Army intelligence had grossly underestimated the strength, determination and defences of the Fedayeen but that the Army could now deal with them if the ceasefire were broken.

North Jordan

3. Irbid was still controlled by Fedayeen, King Hussein having given orders that the Army should not perpetrate there the destruction which it had done in Amman. Elsewhere in the north, the Army were in control.

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

King Hussein

4. HM Ambassador, Amman saw King Hussein for some 40 minutes (see telex conference 1640Z 29 September). The King stressed the need for Britain and the US to meet his military requirements as urgently as possible, particularly the supply of ammunition.

5. On the Cairo Summit, the King said that he had not really been reconciled with Arafat whom he regarded as "a criminal". But fortunately there were other Palestinian leaders with whom the King

/felt

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

felt he could work. He said that he was prepared to accord a separate political status to the Palestinians even before a settlement with Israel.

6. The King said that he proposed to cooperate fully with the conciliation committee which was working under the Tunisian Prime Minister.

7. King Hussein sent a personal message of gratitude to the Secretary of State (Amman telno 708).

The Israeli Ambassador

8. The Ambassador yesterday called at his own request on the Permanent Under Secretary who told him that if the six remaining hostages in Jordan reached safety, the Israelis could assume from what had been said publicly that it was likely that the seven Fedayeen prisoners in Europe would be freed (FCO telno 442 to Tel Aviv). Speaking without instructions, the Ambassador rehearsed what he was confident was his Government's position on the Anglo-Israeli Extradition Treaty, particularly that under Article 10 of the Treaty their request for the provisional arrest of Miss Khaled was maintained. Her release could not be reconciled with the operation of the Treaty.

III. UK relief to Jordan

9. The airlift of food and medical supplies by ILMG in eight Argosy and two Hercules aircraft of the RAF, as well as two civilian CL 44 aircraft on charter, from Akrotiri to Amman began in the early hours of 30 September. Clearances were obtained for the aircraft to overfly the Lebanon and Syria using ICRC call signs and markings. The airlift initially is carrying 120 British service personnel who will render medical and signals assistance. They will be unarmed, dressed in civilian clothes and enrolled with the ICRC. Thirty-six tons of foodstuffs were flown into Amman yesterday from

/Cyprus

SECRET

SECRET

Cyprus.

IV. Hostages/Prisoners (including Leila Khaled)

10. In a telex conference with the FCO at 5.40 pm on 29 September, HM Ambassador reported that the six remaining hostages had just been brought under Egyptian Embassy/ICRC auspices from Irbid to the Muashir hospital (ICRC headquarters) in Amman. He reported subsequently (Amman telno 716) that the Americans planned to fly the six from Amman to Athens by charter "Caravelle" early this morning, 30 September, arriving in Athens at 9.30 am.
11. Miss Khaled's journey to Cairo by RAF "Comet" will, it is estimated, take about nine and a half hours including the scheduled stops at Munich and Zurich where the German and Swiss Governments have six Fedayeen prisoners ready to go aboard the RAF 'plane.
12. The Defence Attaché in HM Embassy, Amman saw the six hostages boarding an MEA aircraft at 6.40 am this morning 30 September as planned with destination Athens. Short of some technical hitch the aircraft should arrive in Athens at 9.30 am.

SECRET

P. J. S. Moon Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

P.A.

Am

279



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

With the compliments of

SIR DENIS GREENHILL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
S.W.1.

30 September, 1970

...
^{armour}
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

3. Speeches of the Iraqi forces in Jordan, the King said, they had a problem. The King said ^{direct} that they had a suspicion that some of them had ^{put on} Fedayeen uniform. His troops were not ^{containing} them and he ordered to get the situation under control.

4. The next task, King Hussein said, was reconstruction. Sir Alec Douglas-Home commented that a British Military Hospital was now operating in Jordan and he assumed that the Jordanians had almost more hospitals than they needed.

5. Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked about the prospects for a settlement, which he thought was urgently needed by Jordan. King Hussein agreed and ^{added} that

President Nasser's death would complicate the search for a settlement enormously.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked whether there was any possibility of working out a settlement on the West Bank. King Hussein said

that he was going to give this serious thought. He thought it would be necessary

to provide for the extremists whom the Palestinians sought a territory much ^{/larger}

CONFIDENTIAL

larger than the ~~at~~ West Bank.

6. Sir Alec Douglas-Home mentioned King Hussein's request for ammunition and arms. He said that we were looking at these urgently and would do what we could, but the heavier items would of course take a long time. King Hussein said that the ammunition was an urgent need, particularly the 105 mm. They had eaten into their war reserves and he needed to replace them.

7. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would keep in touch with King Hussein through the Ambassador in Amman. He was ~~most~~ grateful for the King's help throughout the time that our hostages had been ~~in~~ Fedayeen hands. King Hussein said that he was glad they were safe, ~~and~~ In turn he thanked Sir Alec for his message.

W
10.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PS/ No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF THE U.A.R. IN CAIRO AT 8.00 A.M.
ON THURSDAY, 1 OCTOBER, 1970

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Sir
Alec Douglas-Home, M.P.

Mr. Mahmoud Ried

His Excellency Sir Richard
Beaumont

(Private Secretary)
? Dr. Ghaleb

Mr. J.A.N. Graham

ADVANCE COPY

Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that it was
a sad occasion that brought him to Cairo.
President Nasser's death would be a grave
loss to the U.A.R. and the Arab world.

Mr. Ried said that the President had
killed himself by work. During the last
ten days of his life he had barely slept.
He had made himself ^{available to listen} ~~listen~~ to the quarrels
and complaints of all the Arab leaders and
it was by his ~~his~~ persuasiveness and
^{personality alone} ~~personality~~ ^{been brought} ~~that they had managed to bring~~
~~them together~~ to sign the accord. The
effort had killed him.

2. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the
British Government were also grateful
to the late President and to the U.A.R.
Government for their part in the release
of the hostages detained by the Palestinian
Fedayeen. Mr. Ried said that he was glad
they were safe. He (had spoken to) The
President ^{him} ~~about~~ this only the night before
he died.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3. Turning to the Arab/Israel dispute Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked if there was anything that Britain could do to re-establish the necessary degree of confidence. Mr. Riad said that it was a mistake to talk about establishing confidence. There was a complete absence of confidence between the two parties and there was no possibility of establishing it. If you waited for confidence to grow you would wait for ever. The important thing was to take realistic steps towards a settlement and such a settlement could only be on the basis of withdrawal by Israel from "all the Arab territories", coupled with the establishment of peace. The fact was that the U.A.R. had accepted the resolution at the time it was passed while Israel had not. The new element in the so-called Rogers⁴ initiative was not the cease-fire or the stand-still agreement or any particular proposals for a settlement, but the implied undertaking by the United States to use their influence with Israel to make the latter implement the 1967 resolution.

4. Speaking of the cease-fire/stand-still agreement, Mr. Riad said that it was at an end: although the U.A.R. would not immediately break the cease-fire when it /expired

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

He had a long
list of
Israeli breaches
of the standstill
but in fact it
was pointless
to argue about
it.

expired at the beginning of November they could not expect an indefinite cease-fire. The stand-still, as far as they were concerned, was completely finished. It was the Americans who had ~~signed~~ ^{volunteered} the undertaking that they would not supply Israel with more than 50 Phantoms; it was the Americans who had broken that undertaking. The stand-still agreement had been presented in a form that suggested that while the Americans would be entitled to supply Israel with ^{offensive} aircraft to be stationed outside the stand-still zone, the U.A.R. were to be bound not to re-inforce their missile defences in the stand-still zone; there was no reciprocity in this. The U.A.R. had calculated from the start that the Americans would in fact supply the Israelis with more aircraft, despite their undertaking, and ~~unfortunately~~ they had had no scruples in improving their missile defences ^{— "we are not fools"}. They had stepped up the number of missiles in the zone immediately before 8 August and thereafter the construction of new sites was passed off as ~~x~~ "maintenance" — just as the Israelis passed off the construction of the Bar Gev line as "maintenance".

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

5. Asked by Sir Alec Douglas-Home whether there might not be advantage in a general limitation on the supply of arms to the area, Mr. Riad said this was quite unacceptable while Israel was receiving sophisticated equipment from the United States. On the contrary in his view the factor that had ^{to} been ~~constantly~~ borne in mind was the ^{equation: aggression viz.} "Israeli aggression" ^{plus} Israel's expansionist policy ~~coupled with her~~ ^{inferiority} ~~military superiority~~ ^{equaled} aggression. They were only two answers to this, either a settlement on the basis of the 1967 resolution or the expansion of Arab arms so as to tip the balance against Israel. Since the Israelis appeared to reject the former the Arabs had no alternative but to adopt the latter. They would match American supplies to Israel ^{sought to} with ~~the~~ ^{sought to} requests to the Russians for ~~more~~ ^{equally} sophisticated ~~arms~~ ^{weapons}. While Israel obtained her arms from the United States ^{on credit} the U.A.R. would obtain her arms supplies on credit ^{also}. The U.A.R. had 600,000 men under arms this year and next year the figure would be 700,000: soon it would be 1,000,000.

It was no longer an Arab-Israeli conflict: it was a confrontation, albeit indirect, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

6. In conclusion Mr. Riad said that he believed that there was still a role for the four powers to work out guide lines

NOTHING TO BE REPORTED IN THIS MATTER

lines for Dr. Jarring, but if they were to succeed Britain must use her influence more actively. It seemed to him that since the adoption of the 1967 resolution Britain had reverted to a more *passive policy*. Recent events had shown that she had influence with Israel and he thought she should use it. Moreover the ~~U.S. Administration~~ ^{U.S. Administration} with their domestic problems, ~~in the United States~~ ^{Administration} would welcome ~~the~~ ^{an} application of British pressure which they could cite to Jewish opinion in the States as an alibi.

7. On other bilateral questions Sir Alec Douglas-Home said he recognized that our two countries had had their differences in the past but there seemed no reason why we should not have closer and warmer relations in the future, which was certainly the desire of the British Government. Mr. Riad said that provided the British Government stuck to their plan to withdraw from the Gulf there should be no difficulty. Mr. Riad said that he would be going to New York on about 16 October to deliver his speech: he hoped that there would be an opportunity for a longer talk with Sir Alec Douglas-Home at that time.

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MR P. *[signature]*
[signature]
2/10

Middle East crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 1 October 1970

(all times referred to are BST
unless otherwise stated)

I. The military situation

All quiet, Army generally in control. Two squadrons of Centurion tanks and some armoured cars have established themselves near the British and US military field hospitals. British service personnel are safe and well protected (see para. 7 below).

2. Life in Amman is slowly improving although food distribution appears to be uneven. Some local staff of HM Embassy reported for duty yesterday.

II. Political situation and diplomatic activity

3. Foreign representatives and large numbers of Egyptians have been collecting in Cairo for the funeral of President Nasser today. The Egyptian authorities initially asked that the RAF Comet returning the seven Fedayeen detainees (including Leila Khaled) should not arrive in Cairo until after President Nasser's funeral (Cairo telno 1105 to FCO). Following representations by HM Ambassador, the Egyptian authorities subsequently agreed that the Comet should after all land in Cairo and discharge the seven Fedayeen this morning (1 October).

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, accompanied by Mr. George Brown, arrived in Cairo at approximately 8 pm BST yesterday evening to attend the funeral of President Nasser. While in Cairo he plans to talk to King Hussein (FCO telno 997 to Cairo).

/Amman

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Amman

5. The official of the UAR Embassy who conducted the last six American hostages from Irbid into ICRC hands on 29 September called yesterday on the Counsellor of HM Embassy and presented him with a list of 56 Arab nationals whose release the PFLP expected in return for the 56 hostages recently released from the hijacked airliners (the PFLP list included the 7 Fedayeen now returned to Cairo by RAF Comet). The Egyptian official alleged that if these 56 people were released, the PFLP would not perpetrate any further hijackings (Amman telno 723 to FCO). He made a similar approach to the United States Embassy in Amman (Washington telno 2900 to FCO).

Tel Aviv

6. HM Ambassador reports that King Hussein is thought in Israel partly to have restored his political position. The Israelis have also drawn the moral that the King has demonstrated his ability to use his Army against the Fedayeen and that he could not expect Israel in future to accept his professed military impotence as an excuse to tolerate Fedayeen attacks on Israel. Nor has the King's suggestion that the Fedayeen should now concentrate on their proper role of fighting Israel escaped attention. (Tel Aviv telno 935 to FCO).

III. Aid to Jordan by HMG

7. Operation SHOVELLER began in the early hours of 30 September with an airlift of medical and food supplies together with 128 medical and signals personnel from service units in Cyprus. The initial lift included 9 vehicles to operate a field hospital and field ambulance section. We plan that they should remain in Amman for about three weeks. A further five aircraft flights are projected for today and three tomorrow; and the airlift will

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continue as required.

IV. Hostages/Prisoners (including Leila Khaled)

8. The last six hostages arrived by civil charter aircraft in Nicosia at about 9 am BST on 30 September on their way to Athens and New York.

9. Arrangements were put in hand for the transfer of Leila Khaled from Ealing police station to RAF Lyneham. Her transfer was delayed pending confirmation by the Egyptian authorities that they would receive her together with the six Fedayeen detainees from West Germany and Switzerland on the night of 30 September/1 October. They had indicated to HM Ambassador early yesterday that they wished to defer the return of the detainees until after President Nasser's funeral and were prepared publicly to explain their administrative reasons for any such delay. In the event, however, following strong representations by HM Ambassador, the Egyptians agreed to take delivery of the released detainees from aboard the RAF Comet which landed in Cairo at approximately 7 am, having taken off from Munich at 11.50 pm and ^{from} Zurich 2.07 am (at precisely the times notified to the Federal German and Swiss authorities) taking aboard the other six Fedayeen.

10. Details of the release of Leila Khaled and her delivery to Cairo with the six other Fedayeen were released to the press from No. 10. The statement referred to the participation by the UAR Government in the negotiations for the release by the PFLP of their hostages. The exchanges between HMG and the UAR Government have been highlighted by commentators in London and Cairo.

11. Arrangements are in hand for the delivery of the body of
/the dead

the dead American hijacker, Arguello, to his family.

Footnote

The Jordan Emergency Unit will close at 9 am BST on 1 October having noted the latest appreciation of authoritative military sources in Amman:

"It seems pretty clear that the recent fighting has changed the overall picture remarkably little, except, of course, that both sides must obviously have much less ammunition than when they started."

Jordan Emergency Unit

Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

1 October 1970

EXTRACT FROM AJCS'S MESSAGE TO PJSM DATED 9. OCTOBER 1970.
NOTE: COPY FROM ALAN ST. JOHN (ORIGINAL ON SOUTH EAST ASIA JULY 1970.)

PLEASE COULD YOU PASS THE FOLLOWING TO MR GRAHAM, POC.
FROM: J. J. McDONNELL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARY AND MR WILLIAM GALLOWAY OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY,
LONDON, ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9 1970, AT THE IMPERIAL HOTEL
BLACKPOOL

PRESENT

THE RT HON SIR ALEC DOUGLAS HOME, MP
MR WILLIAM GALLOWAY
R JOHN McDONNELL

1. L. EAST

5. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT ARGUED THAT THEIR INTERRUPTION OF THE FOUR-POWER
TALKS WOULD CREATE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON EGYPT. BUT
MR PIAD HAD BEEN ADAMANT WHEN HE SAW HIM ON OCTOBER 1 IN CAIRO:
HE HAD SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EGYPT AND
ISRAEL. THE EGYPTIANS WERE DETERMINED TO KEEP THE MISSILES IN
THEIR NEW POSITIONS, AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FIND A NEW POINT
OF BALANCE BETWEEN THE IMPROVED EGYPTIAN DEFENCES ON THE ONE
HAND, AND WHATEVER FURTHER HELP THE AMERICANS MIGHT GIVE TO
ISRAEL ON THE OTHER. MR GALLOWAY AGREED THAT THE BALANCE
OF STRENGTH WOULD HAVE TO FIND A NEW LEVEL. THERE HAD BEEN
TWO REASONS FOR THE AMERICAN DECISION TO INTERRUPT THE WORK OF
THE FOUR: THE STRAIN ON ISRAELI COOPERATION THAT HAD BUILT UP
DURING THE PROGRESSIVE REVELATION ~~(REVELATION OF REVELATION?)~~
OF BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE HAD REACHED ITS
LIMIT: AND THE ISOLATION OF THE AMERICANS IN THE MEETING
OF DEPUTIES TEN DAYS AGO HAD MADE THEM FEEL THAT THEY HAD
CARRIED ISRAEL AS FAR AS THEY COULD FOR THE MOMENT. THE
INTERUPTION WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE FINAL., BUT THEY HAD TO BUY
SOME TIME. BEFORE THE FOUR COULD GO ON WITH THEIR WORK,
ISRAEL MUST BE LED BACK TO AN ACCEPTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS
THROUGH DR JAFFINS. COULD WE TRY TO GET THE FRENCH
TO SEE THIS?

6. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME SAID THAT HE DID NOT MIND IF THE MEETINGS
OF DEPUTIES HAD TO BE INTERRUPTED, BUT THE WORK OF THE FOUR SHOULD
GO ON AT THE LEVEL OF PEACE REPRESENTATIVES. BUT HE
AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF ANY FURTHER AGREEMENT ON THE
CONTENTS OF DR JAFFINS'S PIECE OF PAPER UNTIL A NEW
MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM WAS FOUND: THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT
AS LONG AS ARMS WERE STILL POURING INTO BOTH SIDES. IT WAS
SOMETHING TO BE THANKFUL FOR THAT THERE WAS NO SHOOTING
AT THE MOMENT: IT WAS A PITY THAT OUR AMBITIONS HAD SHRUNK
TO SUCH A DEGREE.

ENDS

END OF MESSAGE
OCTOBER 9 1970

cc Johnny Graham

SECRET

23a



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

10 October, 1970.

Dear Peter,

A.A.

Mr. 10/11

...

I enclose a copy of a record of conversation between Mr. Godber and Mr. Allon in Jerusalem on 3 November which the Prime Minister may find of interest.

Yours ever
J. Moon

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

SECRET

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OF ISRAEL, IN JERUSALEM, ON TUESDAY, 3 NOVEMBER, 1970

Present:

The Rt. Hon. Joseph Godber M.P. Mr. Y. Allon

H.E. Mr. E.J.W. Barnes Mr. A. Lourie

Mr. P.M. Foster

Mr. R.W. Renwick

Welcoming Mr. Godber Mr. Allon referred to the reactions in Israel to Sir Alec Douglas-Home's speech at Harrogate. Mr. Godber replied that we had been surprised at the strength of these reactions. We had naturally been obliged to state our position during the United Nations debate.

2. Mr. Allon said that if this was the British position, Israel and Britain would have to agree to differ on this matter. In the view of his Government, the less the Powers talked at this stage about specific boundaries, and the more they concentrated on the general terms of Resolution 242, the better. The moment maps were drawn all sorts of problems were created, as had been the case with the earlier Rogers plan. As a result Arab countries who might possibly have accepted less, would now want more. The timing had been very unfortunate. The speech would not help the Jarring mission. Too heavy a price seemed to have been paid in an attempt to please the Arabs.

3. Mr. Godber said that he did not accept any part of this analysis. The Foreign Secretary's speech had, in our view, been a balanced presentation. It did not represent a change in our position. Mr. Michael Stewart had himself said that there was nothing new in Sir Alec's statement.

4. Mr. Lourie said that our position had not been expressed publicly before: this was an important difference.

5. Mr. Godber pointed out that we had to speak in the course of the United Nations debate. The French representative at the United Nations had given his own interpretation of our position. We could not allow our

/position

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position to be interpreted by the French. We had to express it ourselves. We also had to consider political opinion in Britain. Mrs. Meir's visit would offer an opportunity to discuss this with her, and to clear up any misunderstandings.

6. Mr. Allon agreed. He was glad that Mr. Godber had heard from General Yariv the Israeli assessment of the military situation. Mr. Godber said that he had been grateful for this, and for the assistance which General Yariv's organisation had given us during the crisis in Jordan.

7. Mr. Allon said that the Jordan crisis should have demonstrated that Israel's presence could at times have a stabilising rather than a disruptive effect in the Middle East. Mr. Godber agreed that Israel's attitude during that crisis had in certain respects contributed to stabilise the situation.

8. Mr. Allon said that if the United States, Britain and Israel were able to combine their efforts, he honestly believed that they could prepare the way for the removal of the Russians from Egypt. There were indications of growing resentment in Egypt about the Soviet presence there. The economic situation was also difficult, as Haikal's recent interview with Fawzi in Al Ahram had shown. While being careful not to appear anti-Russian, Fawzi had made some telling points about what was wrong in Egypt. Economic progress would be vital to the survival of the successor régime.

9. Mr. Godber asked Mr. Allon for his assessment of Russian intentions. Mr. Allon said that the Russians did not want war, but did not want peace either. Britain could help to make life more difficult for the Russians in Egypt by indicating our willingness to help the Egyptians if they would get rid of the Russians. We might also be able to influence Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and possibly even the Libyans to withhold their subsidies unless Russian influence was removed. The Russian presence was the principal obstacle to the renewal of the Jarring mission and to peace.

10. Mr. Godber said that it would be very difficult to get Saudi Arabia to act in this way, and in the case of Libya it would surely be impossible. Mr. Allon said that the Libyans were not communists. Mr. Godber agreed but said that their reactions were nonetheless wild and unpredictable.

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11. Mr. Allon considered Nasser's death to be a most important development. There could be no Nasserism without Nasser. There was now no single centre of influence in the Arab world. Each Arab country would have to look after itself. This represented a return to a more normal situation.

12. Mr. Godber agreed that there had been some quite encouraging developments. King Hussein's position had been strengthened for some time. There were also signs of some disillusionment with the Russians in Syria and Iraq. Much would now depend on the way in which the situation evolved in Egypt.

13. Mr. Allon agreed about Syria and Iraq. The only country in the area in which the Russians had really struck roots was in Egypt. There was no need to be pessimistic about the long-term prospects for Russian influence.

14. Mr. Godber doubted whether it was realistic to hope that the new régime in Egypt would have the resolution to try to get rid of the Russians so long as they continued to fear Israeli attack. They could hardly be expected to relinquish the only protection they had, even if they did not like the Russian presence. What was the Israeli attitude towards the renewal of Dr. Jarring's mission?

15. Mr. Allon said that the Israeli Government had accepted this in August, despite much domestic opposition, both inside the Cabinet and outside it. This had been a big political risk to take. Mr. Godber said that we well understood this. It would, however, be tragic if, the risk having been taken, the mission never got off the ground.

16. Mr. Allon said that this had been due to Egyptian action over the missiles. Mr. Godber said that there had also been reinforcement of Israeli positions. Mr. Allon said that they had reinforced existing positions but had taken care not to violate any clause of the cease-fire agreement.

17. Mr. Godber asked whether the Israelis really now felt themselves to be at a disadvantage. Mr. Allon said that they could undoubtedly hold their own. But the Egyptians might now be encouraged to try a war of attrition. The Israeli artillery was not effective enough on its own to defend their positions on the Suez Canal. To support their front line they would have to use the Air Force.

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/He

He agreed, however, that it was very doubtful if the Egyptians could cross the Canal. Mr. Godber doubted whether the new régime in Egypt would try to do so.

18. Mr. Allon added that so long as the cease-fire lasted these problems did not arise. The Israelis would continue the cease-fire if the Arabs continued to observe it. No formal renewal was required, since a cease-fire had been prescribed by the Security Council immediately after the six days war. The question of the cease-fire was not affected by the missiles. But the Jarring mission was affected by Egyptian violations of that agreement. How could the Israelis now be expected to trust an Egyptian signature?

19. Mr. Godber doubted if the Israelis could ever accept an Egyptian signature on its own. There would have to be wider guarantees. What form would these have to take to give Israel a feeling of security?

20. Mr. Allon said that United Nations guarantees had proved worthless, as had the undertakings of the maritime nations to ensure freedom of navigation in the Aqaba Gulf. Any third party guarantees would have to be in addition to secure borders. His Government could not base the defence of Israel on guarantees alone. There was an obvious danger of differences of appreciation of the strategic situation. Israel could defend itself if it had secure boundaries. The Powers should concern themselves with the Russian threat, and leave Israel to deal with the Arabs. Negotiations should be entered into without pre-conditions. It was no use trying to draw maps in advance. The boundaries could only be determined when the parties were sitting together. But the majority of members of the Israel Government would say that if they had to choose between holding the existing cease-fire lines without peace, and other secure boundaries with a peace settlement, they would choose the latter course.

21. Mr. Godber asked whether the Israelis would be prepared to consider a fresh United Nations presence on their borders. Mr. Allon referred to the experiences of 1967. Mr. Godber asked whether the Israelis would feel differently if it were stipulated that such forces could only be removed by a decision of the Security Council.

/Mr. Allon

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Mr. Allon said that this would be an improvement. He did not exclude the possibility of the supervision of future de-militarised zones by international observers. But at this stage this was a secondary problem.

22. Mr. Godber asked how then we should now proceed. Dr. Jarring seemed to us to be the only possibility. Israel had complained with some justice about cease-fire violations. But the new régime in Egypt was scarcely in a position to say that it would remove the missiles in order to talk with the Israelis.

23. Mr. Allon asked why we seemed to take the Russian presence so lightly. Mr. Godber said that we did not take it lightly. Mr. Allon said that the Russians had been encouraged by the apparent weakness of the West, though since the Jordan crisis the situation had changed. What did we think of the possibilities now of a negotiation with Jordan first?

24. Mr. Godber said that King Hussein would surely feel that to enter into negotiations on his own would put him in a very vulnerable position. He could hardly be expected to do this. Mr. Allon said that in that case Israel would have to be patient.

25. Mr. Godber said that it was true that there was now no outstanding Arab leader. Developments in Egypt and Jordan over the last 3 months might have solved some of Israel's problems temporarily, but not permanently. Mr. Allon said that the Arabs felt that twice before they had suffered a military defeat, but had subsequently been able to win a political victory. The Arabs now wanted to repeat this, and were encouraged in their hopes by certain aspects of British and American policy. Mr. Godber agreed that our mutual interest was in a Russian withdrawal. But he could not see that any Egyptian leader would be strong enough to effect this now.

26. Mr. Allon said that the Israelis understood that King Feisal was very ill. Mr. Godber said that he still seemed to be in effective control of affairs. Mr. Allon said that the Israelis were concerned about the future in Saudi Arabia. Was King Feisal preparing his succession adequately?

27. Mr. Godber said that this was doubtful. But we had no indication at present that the King was relinquishing his hold. There was now a better situation in Muscat and Oman. So far as the Persian Gulf was concerned, we were unlikely to maintain our forces there at their present level after the end of 1971. But we did hope to find a way to continue to exert a stabilising influence.

28. Mr. Allon asked if we had any indication of Russian penetration of the Gulf. Mr. Godber said that there was no real evidence, though the Russians would no doubt try through Iraq. The Iraqis, however, were not at present very happy with the Russians. We hoped that we could come to a reasonable arrangement with the Gulf States.

29. Mr. Allon asked whether there was any prospect of Chieftains appearing in Jordan. Mr. Godber said that this was very unlikely. The Centurions had acquitted themselves well enough against the Syrians. Mr. Allon said that the Chieftain was a first-class weapon. He hoped that we would not consider selling it to any Arab country, including Libya. Mr. Godber said that there was no present likelihood of any such sale.

DISTRIBUTION:

Private Secretary
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Evans
Mr. Hope-Jones
Mr. Lambert
Mr. Tesh

MOD (14)

H.M. Ambassador, Tel Aviv
Chancery: Amman
Cairo
Baghdad
Beirut
Jedda
Moscow
Washington
Paris
UKMIS, New York

EN CLAIR

ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO. 2087.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

25 SEPTEMBER, 1970.

UNCLASSIFIED 252305Z

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 2087 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO,
TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2074: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS RELEVANT EXTRACT FROM EL-ZAYYAT'S TELEVISION
INTERVIEW ON 20 SEPTEMBER TO WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
REFERRED AT TODAY'S PRESS CONFERENCE:-

BEGINS:

QUESTION: MR. AMBASSADOR, LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION. YOUR FOREIGN
MINISTER HAS SAID THAT THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE MISSILE POSITIONS
IN THE ZONES. NOW CAN YOU SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF A ROLLBACK OF
THOSE MISSILES TO THE PRIOR AUGUST 7 SITUATION?

AMBASSADOR EL-ZAYYAT: YES, ON TWO COUNTS, ON BOTH COUNTS. FIRST,
LET ME TELL YOU WHAT HE HAS SAID, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN WRITTEN
AND NOT SAID -- I HAVE A COPY OF IT. HE SAID THAT WE HAVE NOT
MADE ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WE HAVE ACCUSED THE ISRAELIS
OF VIOLATIONS, AND INDEED THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCEDED THAT
THE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE VIOLATIONS, AND SAID THAT WE HAVE DONE SO.
THE QUESTION WAS AN INTERPRETATION QUESTION. WE WERE ASKED NOT TO
INCREASE OUR POWER IN THE AREA. WHAT WE HAVE DONE, AND ADMITTED
WE HAVE DONE WAS THAT WE HAVE MOVED MISSILES WHICH WERE ALREADY IN
THE AREA ON AUGUST 7 FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER. NOW THIS WE
THOUGHT, AND WE THINK WE MUST DO, AND THE REASON IS VERY SIMPLE.
NOW THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE
CROSSED OUR SKIES, HAVE PICTURES OF ALL OUR MISSILES, THEY KNOW

/WHERE

WHERE THEY ARE EXACTLY. NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO RECTIFY THAT. IF WE RECTIFY IT ON OUR SIDE BY MOVING BACK THE MISSILES WHERE THEY WERE IN THE SAME AREA, HOW ARE WE GOING TO RECTIFY ON THE OTHER SIDE THE KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE TAKEN OF THE PLACES WHERE THEY ARE IN? THEN WE ASKED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SAY IF WE ROLLED BACK -- NOT ROLL BACK -- BUT IF WE BRING BACK AND THEN WE KNOW THAT THEY HAVE ALL OUR PLACES, WOULD THEY GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SURPRISE ATTACK. IF THEY DON'T GUARANTEE THAT, WOULD THEY TELL US WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO DO IF ISRAEL DOES REPEAT ITS 6TH OF JUNE SURPRISE ATTACK AND KILL ALL OUR MEN AND FINISH OUR DEFENSES? WE DID NOT GET A REPLY UNTIL NOW.

QUESTION: IS THAT THE ONE CONDITION THAT YOU NEED TO START A ROLL BACK?

AMBASSADOR EL-ZAYYAT: EITHER THIS OR SOME INTELLIGENT WAY OF TELLING US WHAT TO DO TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT A DE-MILITARIZATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CANAL?

AMBASSADOR EL-ZAYYAT: THIS HAS BEEN NOT PROPOSED.

ENDS.

F.C.O. PASS PARIS, MOSCOW, CAIRO, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, UKDEL NATO AND JERUSALEM.

SIR C. CROWE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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N.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East P. 2



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

13 October, 1970

P.A.

M.

13/10

Dear Peter,

Thank you for your letter of 24 September about a report from Madrid about the U.A.R. attitude towards the standstill arrangements on the Suez Canal.

... H.M. Embassy at Cairo have commented that at the time of the statement by the U.A.R. Permanent Representative in New York on 25 September (see UKMIS New York telegram No. 2087, copy attached) it certainly seemed that, although the Egyptians would no doubt treat the question discreetly (Zayyat's statement received no publicity in the Cairo press), they might be prepared to make some steps which could qualify as "rectification".

Yet when the U.A.R. Foreign Minister saw the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Cairo on 1 October, Riad said with some emphasis, and with apparent sincerity, that there was no question of the Egyptians withdrawing their missiles from the Canal and that the removal of a single missile would cause the Egyptian Army to revolt. Whether one takes this at its face value or not - and, in the Embassy's view, on balance one probably should - the Embassy's impression is that the Egyptians will find it exceedingly difficult in the tricky period following the President's death and pending the establishment of a confident successor regime to take any action at all which could be regarded by the Army as a softening of their position.

Moreover, Elliot Richardson, the American representative at Nasser's funeral, was told by Anwar Sadat that "rectification" of the situation brought about by the placing of missiles in the standstill zone was out of the question, though he admitted that it constituted "a problem".

/We agree

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

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We agree with these comments by the Embassy. It is difficult to form a clear impression of what the Egyptians might be prepared to do. Much will no doubt depend on the evolution of American and Israeli attitudes in any further discussions that there may be between the three Governments on this subject. The State Department's present view is that both the insistence of the Israelis on the restoration of the status quo ante 7 August and the refusal of the Egyptians to move a single missile are maximum bargaining positions. But it remains to be seen whether the Americans will find a formula which will enable a new bargain to be struck on a compromise position.

Tas ever,
W. McNamara.

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cc. Tickell
259.
41

September 27, 1970

The Prime Minister has seen the note of September :
by Stephen Egerton about emergency relief for Jordan.
He has commented on this:-

"Good. Well done. But if it takes too
long to stir the others into action over
food and tents we must quickly go it alone.
EH"

You will wish to ensure that the Prime Minister's
comments are brought to the attention of those concerned
I have drawn the Prime Minister's attention to the
action which has already been taken on flying in
emergency food supplies.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tickell
in the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office.

Sgd. P.J.S. MOON

I. McCluney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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